

S. HRG. 108-43

# THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

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HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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FEBRUARY 11, 2003

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## **THE FUTURE OF IRAQ**

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**TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2003**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback, Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

Last Thursday this committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, who joined us just one day after he presented powerful evidence of Iraq's noncompliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. He detailed in his statement before the United Nations Security Council a compelling document, which was a great service to our Nation and to the world community.

Today, for the third time this year, the Foreign Relations Committee turns its attention again to Iraq. We pose the question: What must we do to help ensure that Iraq becomes a secure and responsible member of the world community following any potential military action? When asking this question, we must avoid any tendency to view military operations in Iraq as separate from reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, our ability to secure allies for any necessary military action will be greatly enhanced if we have laid out a clear vision of how the United States will work with the international community to feed and to shelter Iraq's people, to help establish responsible governance, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

We must not assume that our commitment of armed forces will end if and when Saddam Hussein is dislodged from power. Even under the best post-Saddam scenarios, Iraq will remain an enormous security challenge that is likely to require substantial American and allied troops.

Since Secretary Powell's appearance last week, the debate over Iraq has taken additional twists and turns. This past weekend Germany, Russia, and France proposed doubling or perhaps tripling international inspectors in Iraq with the support of peacekeepers to enforce what some have termed coercive inspections. Unfortunately, this proposal, as its predecessors, will fail in the absence of Iraqi compliance and cooperation.

Hans Blix put it best when he said, and I quote: "The principal problem is not the number of inspectors, but rather the active co-operation of the Iraqi side." Absent Iraqi cooperation, it is unclear what impact, if any, U-2 overflights and a law against weapons of mass destruction will have with regard to compliance with U.N. Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein has not complied with past U.N. resolutions. He has not opened his weapons programs to independent auditors, the United Nations, and the IAEA. He continues his defiant rhetoric and refuses to disarm. Today, fully 12 years after Operation Desert Storm, the world continues to face threats posed by Iraq and its ruler.

We have full confidence in the United States military, which is moving into the region with its allies in a comprehensive manner. Tens of thousands of our reservists have been called up, including one from our own midst, Commander Patrick Garvey, who will leave my staff next week to join the effort.

With well over 100,000 troops already in theater and perhaps as many more on the way, our men and women in uniform and the technology and firepower they control will have every advantage. There is still hope that military action can be averted. Nevertheless, success in Iraq requires that the administration, the Congress, and the American people now think beyond current military preparations and move toward the enunciation of a clear post-conflict plan for Iraq and the region.

We must articulate a plan that commences with a sober analysis of the costs and squarely addresses how Iraq will be securely governed and precisely what commitment the United States must undertake.

Several groups of scholars and experts have produced blueprints for our post-conflict policy discussions. We will use those reports as a framework. And I thank the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the International Rescue Commission, the Brookings Institution, and others who have wrestled with these issues.

In the same vein, the Washington Post posed several questions last Sunday that have been the subject of much examination by this committee. They are: Who will rule Iraq and how? Who will provide security? How long might U.S. troops conceivably remain? Will the United Nations have a role? And who will manage Iraq's oil resources?

Unless the administration can answer these questions in detail, the anxiety of Arab and European governments, as well as that of many in the American public over our "staying power," will only grow. We want to work with the administration to formulate a clear post-conflict plan. Such a plan must be embedded in a broader vision of how political liberalization and economic development can be fostered in the aftermath of potential military conflict.

Today we will lay out the overarching problems ahead and focus on the security aspects. Forthcoming hearings will examine humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, public governance, economic development, and other critical issues. We will have before us two distinguished panels. The first panel, at the table now immediately before us, will feature Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman

and Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who will outline the administration's planning with respect to the future of Iraq.

The second panel of defense security experts will attempt to paint a picture of the security challenges the coalition will face should the current regime be displaced, by whatever means. We look forward to the insights to be provided by General Anthony Zinni, Colonel Scott Feil, and Professor Anthony Cordesman.

I look forward to consulting closely with the members of this committee and with the administration on thoughtful preparations for Iraq. Our security, our alliances, and our credibility will depend on undertaking a vigorous effort to move Iraq into the family of nations.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Last Thursday, this committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, who joined us one day after he presented powerful evidence of Iraq's non-compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. His detailed statement before the United Nations Security Council was a great service to our Nation and to the world community.

Today, for the third time this year, the Foreign Relations Committee turns its attention to Iraq. We pose the question: what must we do to help ensure that Iraq becomes a secure and responsible member of the world community following any potential military action? When asking this question, we must avoid any tendency to view military operations in Iraq as separate from reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, our ability to secure allies for any necessary military action will be greatly enhanced if we have laid out a clear vision of how the United States will work with the international community to feed and shelter Iraq's people, help establish responsible governance, and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. We must not assume that our commitment of armed forces will end if and when Saddam Hussein is dislodged from power. Even under the best post-Saddam scenarios, Iraq will remain an enormous security challenge that is likely to require substantial American and allied troops.

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We have full confidence in the United States military, which is moving into the region with its allies in a comprehensive manner. Tens of thousands of our Reserves have been called up, including one from our own midst, Commander Patrick Garvey, who will leave my staff next week to join the effort. With well over 100,000 troops already in theater and perhaps as many more on the way, our men and women in uniform and the technology and firepower they control will have every advantage. There is still hope that military action can be averted.

Nevertheless, success in Iraq requires that the administration, the Congress and the American people think beyond current military preparations and move toward the enunciation of a clear post-conflict plan for Iraq and the region. We must articulate a plan that commences with a sober analysis of the costs and squarely addresses how Iraq will be secured and governed and precisely what commitment the United States must undertake.

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I look forward to consulting closely with the members of this committee and with the administration on thoughtful preparations for a post-Saddam Iraq. Our security, our alliances, and our credibility will depend on undertaking a vigorous effort to move Iraq into the family of nations.

I welcome our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. I call now upon the distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. I think in a sense you and I have been like a broken record since last summer, attempting to focus on this subject.

All the members sitting here before you now are from a generation, the so-called Vietnam generation, we may have had different views during the conduct of that war and we may have different views as to the consequences of that war, but I suspect, without talking to any of my colleagues, we would all agree on one thing: that the one lesson universally learned from Vietnam is that a foreign policy, no matter how well or poorly articulated, cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the American people.

There is no informed consent today. The American people have no notion what we are about to undertake. They have focused on, in my experience in my State and in my region and other parts of the country, they have focused on the war in Iraq in terms of and from the perspective of the last war in Iraq. I believe—and I do not know what the polls would say, but I can tell you what my anecdotal evidence is, and I suspect my colleagues do not have very different views. I think most of our constituents think if we go to war, the war will be swift and successful, as close to bloodless as they have become accustomed to in Kosovo and in the last gulf war, and that Johnny and Jane are going to come marching home again quickly.

There has been an overwhelming reluctance on the part of the administration to speak to, even acknowledge, in the witnesses we

had in the summer, the necessity to have a significant concentration of American forces in place in Iraq for some period of time.

We are going to hear from Colonel Feil and Mr. Cordesman and General Zinni. We have heard from them in the past. I believe they were here about 5 months ago, 6 months ago, telling us: Get ready. Not do not do it, but get ready. We are about to undertake an enormous, an enormous, responsibility, not only for our own safety's sake, but for the region's.

That is not a reason not to proceed against Saddam Hussein, but it is a compelling reason to discuss in as much detail as possible what we are about to ask of the American people. I think they are fully prepared to do whatever is asked of them if it is rational. But I am very concerned—and I will say this, although I do not speak for the military. I had an opportunity to speak with a couple hundred troops assembled in the gulf not long ago, and they wanted to know whether or not, we were going to be there when it is over and the guns go silent? Where are we going to be when it came down to deciding we had to put another \$10, \$20, \$30, \$40, \$50 billion—and the estimates vary greatly and it will depend on how the fighting takes place if it occurs.

Are we going to make sure we do not do what we have done in Afghanistan? We have now safely committed the fate of Afghanistan in large part to the warlords. I am told when I speak to members of the administration things are all right in western Afghanistan, Ishmael Khan is in charge. I find that very reassuring. We now have essentially a mayor of Kabul, a guy named Karzai, and a struggle between what we have in Afghanistan and the warlords for control of Afghanistan.

As far back as last spring, speaking to the French—speaking for myself—speaking to the French Foreign Minister and Defense Ministers, the one thing that was most often raised with me was: All right, we think he should go, but when he goes, what are you going to do? Are you going to do what you are doing in Afghanistan?

We have authorized \$3.3 billion for Afghan reconstruction and security assistance over the next 4 years. But very little of this has been appropriated. We are told we do not need any more in Afghanistan.

To state the obvious, Iraq is a heck of a lot more complicated, a heck of a lot more sophisticated, and they live in a neighborhood that is very, very, very complex, and so I do not think we are talking about the day after. I do not think we are talking about post-conflict policy in terms of weeks. I think we are talking about the decade after. That is just my view. I hope I can be dissuaded that that is the extent of the commitment.

Mr. Chairman, maintaining a secure environment after a possible war with Iraq is going to be the sine qua non for any positive change we wish to bring to Iraq. I suspect we will discover the definition of security will take on a very broad dimension: patrolling cities and borders, mediating between rival groups, helping refugees return peacefully, remaking a new Iraqi army, helping those discharged find employment, and arbitrating the most mundane of local disputes.

I predict to you that Kirkuk is going to make Metrovica look like a picnic. When the Senator from Nebraska and I had our little 7,

8-hour car ride through the mountains of northern Iraq in the middle of the night to meet with the Kurds, they went way out of their way to demonstrate to us how much progress they had made, and it was obvious they had, in their semi-state of autonomy up there since the "no-fly zone" has been imposed.

We also were impressed by how much out of the way they went to tell us that the Barzani and Talibani clans were together and they were united and they were resolved. But then they would say as we were leaving: But by the way, Kirkuk. We have been ethnically expelled from Kirkuk for the past 20 years, methodically replacing Indo-European Kurd Sunni with an Arab Sunni. We are going home.

The oil is a national asset, they quickly add, but Kirkuk is ours. You are going to guarantee that for us, are you not?

So I just think, whatever we do, we have to understand we are about to make a significant commitment. And I hope we will not do the kinds of things we have done over the 30 years I have been here, and that is, decide to leave the women and men, the soldiers, after they do the fighting without a long-term commitment. We are going to give them whatever they need, even if it means reducing the tax cut, not having health care, not increasing money for education, not moving to fix our highways, not doing anything else.

That is the single solitary first fundamental commitment we make. And I quite frankly expect the President to keep the commitment he made publicly, privately to a bunch of us, and to me personally, that he will tell the American people that is the deal, that is the deal.

So I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement be placed in the record. I can think of no more important hearing than this at the moment, and I know you are going to follow through on not just a generic look at this, but we are going to go down the line to try to flesh this out. We do not expect all the answers, but we do expect an acknowledgment that this is a gigantic undertaking in what—a word that we do not like to hear—nation-building, nation-building.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing on a topic that could not be more timely. It marks a continuation of the dialogue that you and I initiated in the committee last summer to help the American people understand the enormous challenges facing us in a post-Saddam Iraq.

It is appropriate that our first hearing on the "day after"—or more accurately the "decade after"—concentrates on the critical questions of security and weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman, it is essential that no one be under the illusion that if we go to war, that the experience will be anything resembling Desert Storm. Indeed, testimonials by many of the key participants in that last conflict with Iraq make clear that the very thorny issues we will be discussing today go a long way in explaining why we stopped short of unseating Saddam Hussein. In General Schwarzkopf's words: "Had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit."

Mr. Chairman, if we want to avoid replacing a dictator with chaos . . . and precipitating the very problem that may require war—namely, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Iraq—then we have got to follow through.

I am confident that, if we act, our military will succeed swiftly and decisively. But I'm concerned that the temptation will be there to declare victory and walk away

well before we should. Unfortunately, Afghanistan's deteriorating security situation demonstrates what that kind of approach breeds.

I hope Iraq can emerge as a stable, pluralistic—even democratic society—in short order. I hope that its rival ethnic communities, and those that seek retribution can contain their anger and focus on building a new Iraq without any outside assistance. But given Iraqi history and the stakes involved for the United States, basing our plans on such a rosy outcome would be folly in my view. We can hope for the best, but we should prepare for the worst.

And those who seek to make Iraq a model for democracy in the Arab world should be the loudest voices in favor of a robust American military presence after a war . . . a major international civilian administration . . . and a massive infusion of assistance.

Mr. Chairman, maintaining a "secure environment" after a possible war will be the *sine qua non* for any positive change we wish to bring to Iraq. I suspect we will discover the definition of security will take on very broad dimensions—patrolling cities and borders, mediating between rival groups, helping refugees return peacefully, remaking a new Iraqi army, helping those discharged find employment, and arbitrating the most mundane local disputes.

And, of course, we cannot assume that a swift military victory will settle the question of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

In the post-war chaos, unless and until we get our hands on all weapons strewn around country, there is a real danger that they could be exported out of country, sold to the highest bidder, or hidden away for later access.

Secretary Powell, in his presentation last week, said that Iraq possesses two of the three key components to build a nuclear bomb—a cadre of scientists with expertise and a bomb design. How does that change appreciably in the aftermath of a war when there will be a natural relaxation of vigilance by the international community? What pressures will Iraq face to pursue weapons of mass destruction given its neighborhood which includes a next door neighbor and former foe with its own nuclear ambitions?

Disarming Iraq will require much more than a resounding military victory on the battlefield and even the destruction of those weapons that we do find.

Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the American people be informed of the enormous burden that they may soon be asked to shoulder. Colonel Scott Feil, who we will hear from later today, told this committee last summer that a post-Saddam security force would require 75,000 troops at a cost of over \$16 billion for the first year alone. Other independent studies have estimated that total security costs for the "Decade After" will be between \$75 and \$200 billion.

The American people must know that this will be a major undertaking. Because no foreign policy, no matter how brilliant, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. I believe that the American people will support a massive commitment to securing, disarming, and rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq, but only if they are informed ahead of time. Hopefully, we can begin the process of informing them today.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the distinguished ranking member and I assure him that his statement will be published in full. Furthermore, as we have indicated, this will be the first of our hearings about the future of Iraq, with the other situations that you have described certainly upfront in our attention as we proceed.

I am going to call now upon our witnesses for their statements and then we will have a round of questioning by all Senators. It is a pleasure to have both of you here, and I call first on Secretary Grossman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, members of the committee. It is an honor to be here today and I join Under Secretary Feith in thanking you for inviting us to be at this hearing, to participate in this conversation, and to make this presentation to you.

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time if I could just submit a statement for the record and perhaps summarize it if that would be acceptable to you.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full and please summarize.

Mr. GROSSMAN. May I also first of all say that it is my first opportunity to testify before this committee in the 108th Congress and I thank you for that opportunity. Senator Lugar, we congratulate you on your chairmanship, and Senator Biden, we wanted to thank you very much for your leadership of this committee over the past several years.

I also want to endorse, to second, to come behind, what Secretary Powell said here on Thursday, and thank you for your strong support of the men and women at the State Department. We appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member have talked about what this hearing is about today. Doug and I were talking before and, in fact, although it is all set up as testimony, in a way, what we are doing here is a consultation, because many of the policies that Under Secretary Feith and I will describe to you, as you and the ranking member have said, are not finished yet. They are not decided yet, and so, in a sense this is a very important hearing because we look forward to the chance to work with you and to hear your views and, as Senator Biden said, to help with the informed consent of the people of the United States.

President Bush, as you know, has not made final decisions about if and when to use military force to disarm Iraq and, very importantly for us today, he has also not made final decisions about how exactly the United States will proceed with respect to Iraq after a conflict if one is required.

But I want to tell you that we are not without guidance in this regard even if the President has not yet made final decisions, and that is because on the 20th of January President Bush directed all relevant agencies of the U.S. Government to focus their attention on post-war planning. Under Secretary Feith in his statement will describe to you the office that has been set up for this planning at the Pentagon.

But let me tell you that the President's direction to us is clear. If it becomes necessary for the United States to lead a military coalition to liberate Iraq, the United States will want to be in a position to help meet the humanitarian, reconstruction, and administrative challenges facing the country in the aftermath of combat operations. And I think, Senator Lugar, that that tracks exactly with the kinds of concerns that you had in your opening statement.

Before I offer some thoughts on our plan and where we stand, I'd like to offer this base since I think it is an important part of the debate today. If we have to act and that is what the President directs be done, I want to assure you that we have been working hard to make sure that we are going to have allies in this regard.

As Deputy Secretary Armitage reported to you last week, 26 countries are providing us with access, basing or overflight rights or some combination of those three. Another 18 countries have granted us access, basing or overflight rights or have come forward voluntarily to offer them if we need them. And 19 countries are in-

volved now in direct military planning for military assets. So if this has to be done, I think it is important for you and for people to recognize that there will be people with us.

Mr. Chairman, just to go down the issues that you listed, let me highlight five subjects, all of them that you and the ranking member talked about: First, I think it is important that we quickly go through the guiding principles that we are working on as we move forward in thinking about the future of Iraq; second, to stress, as you did, the importance of ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction; third, I want to report to you on where we stand in planning on the humanitarian issues; fourth, some words on planning on reconstruction; and then fifth, as you said, to talk a little bit about where we think politically we are headed in the future of Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, if it is necessary for the United States to take military action here are the principles that will guide our thinking. First, we will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and to the world that the United States wants to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq or control Iraqis or their economic resources.

Second, we must—must—eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear program, its related delivery systems, get at, as you said, weapons of mass destruction.

Third, we must also eliminate Iraq's terrorist infrastructure and its ties to terrorism.

Fourth, key to support and safeguard the territorial integrity of Iraq, which goes to the point that Senator Biden was making, the United States does not support Iraq's disintegration.

Fifth, to begin the process of economic and political reconstruction, working to put Iraq on the path to become prosperous and free and, as you said, Mr. Chairman, part again of the international community. To Senator Biden I say that this job will take a sustained commitment and we are committed, as the President has said, as the Secretary has said, to stay as long as is necessary in Iraq, but I should also say not one day more.

First, weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that our job one today, during conflict, and in post-conflict Iraq if there is one will be to locate, secure, and dispose of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. That will be the most urgent priority. And we will focus on weapons, delivery systems, agents, related infrastructure, dual use infrastructure, and Iraq's technical and scientific expertise. Under Secretary Feith will have a little more to say on this.

But what I want to tell you is that there is a very active inter-agency effort going on now, chaired by the National Security Council, to make sure that we are working to decrease the possibility of the Iraqi regime using WMD before or during any military action and we are in discussions with a larger number of countries to establish a program to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program after a regime change in Baghdad.

I also find it heartening that a number of countries are working with us in this area, including to help our response to the possibility that Saddam Hussein might use or provoke the use of these weapons. As I say, Under Secretary Feith will have more to say on this issue.

Next issue, meeting Iraq's humanitarian needs. You have both raised this question. What are we doing? In the event of a military conflict our immediate objective will obviously be to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians. Those who flee their homes in fear will have to be cared for. Potential supply lines for food, for water, for medicine, fuel, will also have to be restored.

Mr. Chairman, I can report to you that all of the relevant U.S. Government agencies are engaged in some very detailed planning to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs and we are emphasizing the absolutely necessary cooperation between civilian and military elements of our government. This effort is being led by the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. I can tell you that the State Department and USAID are engaged in this and are also engaged in a very large program of outreach with non-governmental organizations and international organizations who will be key partners in addressing Iraq's humanitarian needs.

We are working hard to make sure that civilian and military elements in this planning are consulting and coordinating.

President Bush has authorized \$15 million to support this planning process and an additional \$35 million has already been made available for existing accounts to make sure we can get the wherewithal prepositioned and respond to the United Nations' requests for preparedness. These areas are in food, are in shelter items, water, and a substantial amount of work has been done on meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and more will be done.

I understand that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff received a briefing at the end of last week which goes into this in some considerable detail. I'm glad to talk about those issues in Q's and A's if that is useful to you.

Let me turn now, Mr. Chairman, to what comes after humanitarian assistance, and that is reconstruction. Iraqis will face the task of reconstructing a country that has been subjected to decades of neglect and mismanagement. Here again, I can report to you that there is a very large interagency effort under way, again chaired by the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget, to think through our reconstruction needs and our reconstruction objectives.

This effort is focused on a number of priority areas: education, health, water, sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, rule of law, agriculture, communications, and economic and financial policies. I hope you will not be surprised to find that that list of priorities of course tracks with work we are doing in the program on the future of Iraq.

I hope you also will not be surprised that we are working in these areas to set for ourselves very clear benchmarks, very clear time lines, and very clear ways to see if this is necessary, if we are succeeding.

With regard to the oil sector, Under Secretary Feith will talk about this in some detail, but our guiding principle is that Iraq's oil belongs to the Iraqi people, and we are committed to ensuring that any action taken in this area is for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Should military action be required, the United States will take steps to protect and preserve Iraq's oil sector and we will support the efforts of Iraqis to restore production.

Mr. Chairman, you talked a bit and Senator Biden talked some about what kind of political future is it that we want to work with Iraqis. If we are going to rebuild this country or participate in rebuilding this country physically, it is also important that we do so politically. As you all know, last March the Bush administration announced and has stepped out on what we call a Future of Iraq Project. In consultations with Iraqis in the United States, Iraqis in Europe, Iraqis outside of Iraq, we developed 17 working groups and all 17 are listed in my statement. I will not go through them here.

But the purpose of these groups is to begin practical planning for what might happen in Iraq after regime change. As I say, these groups run everywhere from transitional justice to public outreach to defense policy to foreign policy. Each of the groups has brought together a number of Iraqi experts and those interested in these issues, not to have an academic discussion but to consider thoughts and plans for what can be done immediately.

I give you two examples. In the legal field, Iraqi lawyers and the transitional justice working group have drafted 600 pages in Arabic of proposed reforms in the criminal code, the criminal procedure code, the civil code, nationality laws, and military procedures, and more. So that there is a functioning body of law if there is regime change.

The economy and infrastructure group has focused on public finance, water, agriculture, the environment, and also how to transition from the U.N. Oil for Food Program into something run by and for Iraqis.

I want to make one other point in this area, though. I think it's important. We are meeting with these Iraqis on a regular basis, on an intensive basis. But we also make the point, and they make the point as well, that Iraqis on the outside will not control the decisions that will ultimately have to be made by all Iraqis. The people we are working with are a great, great resource, but they know and we all know that all Iraqis in the end must be able to talk freely and work together to build a free and democratic Iraq.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a short observation about how we get to this future for Iraq, again recognizing that no decisions have been made on structure or timing. I report to you that the administration at the most senior levels is still considering these issues and discussing these ideas with free Iraqis, political opposition, technocrats, people like your second panel, and others. We are consulting also with our close allies and with you.

Conceptually, getting to this future of Iraq there could be three stages: first stabilization, where an interim coalition military administration will focus on security, stability, and order, laying the groundwork for what I might call stage two, which would be transition, where authority is progressively given to Iraqi institutions as part of the development of a democratic Iraq. And finally, transformation, after Iraqis have drafted, debated, approved a new democratic constitution and held free and fair elections, which I think you would agree is the way for any future Iraqi Government to be truly legitimate.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, would you categorize or mention the three stages again?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. My words: stabilization, where an interim coalition military administration will focus on security, stability, and order, which we hope would then lay the groundwork for stage two, which might be called, if you accept my phrase here, transition, where authority is progressively given to Iraqi institutions as part of the development of a democratic Iraq; and then third, transformation, after Iraqis have defined their democracy, got a constitution, had an election, that they would regain their sovereignty and they would again become a normal country.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I know that my testimony today has only been a start in this effort to answer your questions about the future of Iraq. As Senator Biden said, there are many uncertainties here. But what I am certain about is that we seek an Iraq that is democratic, that is unified, that is multi-ethnic, which has no weapons of mass destruction, which has cut its links to terrorists, and is at peace with its neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, I commit to you that we will stay in the closest possible consultation with you in the weeks ahead as we make further decisions in this regard. I thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

Thank you for inviting us to talk about post-Saddam Iraq.

This is my first opportunity to testify before this committee in the 108th Congress. I congratulate Senator Lugar on his Chairmanship. Senator Biden, we thank you as well for your leadership in this committee last year.

I also want to second Secretary Powell's thanks to all the members of the committee for your strong support for the men and women of the State Department.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee need no introduction to the subject of Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein. As Secretary Powell told the United Nations Security Council on February 5, "Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world."

The day after his address to the UN Security Council, Secretary Powell came before this committee and said, "The President does not like war, does not want a war. But this is not a problem we can walk away from."

Mr. Chairman, our testimony today will in some ways be like a consultation. Many of the policies Under Secretary Feith and I will describe are still under discussion in the Administration. President Bush has not made final decisions about if and when to use military force to disarm Iraq, nor has he made any final decisions about exactly how the United States will proceed with respect to Iraq after a conflict, if one is required. Although we may not be able to describe final decisions, we are not without clear guidance. On January 20, President Bush directed all relevant agencies of the government to focus their attention on Iraq post-war planning. Under Secretary Feith will describe to you the planning office at the Pentagon. The President's direction is clear: If it becomes necessary for a U.S.-led military coalition to liberate Iraq, the United States will want to be in a position to help meet the humanitarian, reconstruction and administrative challenges facing the country in the immediate aftermath of combat operations.

Before I offer some views on what that future might look like, let me first lay this base. If we have to act, we will have allies.

- 26 countries are providing us with access, basing or overflight rights, or some combination of the three.
- Another 18 countries have granted us access, basing or overflight rights based on our contingency request for those rights, or have come forward voluntarily to offer such rights to us, should we wish to make use of them.

- 19 countries have offered us military assets or other resources. This number includes many countries that have granted us access, basing and overflight rights, but also a number of additional countries.

Mr. Chairman, let me now highlight five subjects.

First, I want to offer some of the principles that guide our thinking about the future of Iraq.

Second, I want to stress the importance of ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

Third, a report on what we are planning on the humanitarian front.

Fourth, some words on our planning for reconstruction.

Fifth, on the political front, I want to tell you about the work we have been doing on what post-Saddam Hussein Iraq ought to look like.

#### I. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Mr. Chairman, if it should be necessary for the United States to take military action, these principles will guide our thinking.

- First, we will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States wants to liberate, not occupy Iraq or control Iraqis or their economic resources.
- Second, we must eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear program and its related delivery systems.
- Third, we must also eliminate Iraq's terrorist infrastructure.
- Fourth, safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq. The United States does not support Iraq's disintegration.
- Fifth, begin the process of economic and political reconstruction, working to put Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country.

This job will take a sustained commitment. The United States is committed to stay as long as is necessary in Iraq, but not one day more.

#### II. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Mr. Chairman, President Bush is determined to see Iraq disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. That is job No. 1 today, during a conflict if there is one, and in the days after.

Locating, securing and disposing of Iraq's WMD capabilities will be an urgent priority. We will focus on weapons and delivery systems, bulk agents, related infrastructure, dual-use infrastructure, and Iraq's technical and scientific expertise.

Ensuring that the U.S. Government has the capacity to do all this is the work of a broad interagency task force, chaired at the NSC. We are working to decrease the possibility of the Iraqi regime using WMD before or during any military action, and we are in discussions with other countries to establish a program to eliminate the Iraqi WMD program after regime change in Baghdad. A number of our allies are cooperating with us in this area, including helping prepare for a response to incidents that Saddam Hussein might provoke.

Under Secretary Feith will have more to say on this.

#### III. MEETING IRAQ'S HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Mr. Chairman, my third point is what we are planning to do to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs.

In the event of a military conflict, our immediate objective will be to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians. Those who have fled their homes in fear will have to be cared for. Essential supply lines for food, medicine, water, and fuel will have to be restored.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. Government agencies are engaged in planning to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs with an emphasis on civilian-military coordination. This effort is led by the National Security Council and OMB. USAID and State are engaged with the non-governmental organizations and international organizations who will be important partners in addressing Iraq's humanitarian needs. Civilian and military officials regularly consult and coordinate plans.

President Bush has authorized \$15 million dollars to support this planning process and an additional \$35 million has been made available from existing accounts. Other donors are also responding to the UN's request for preparedness support. As a result, food, shelter items and water bladders are ready. A substantial amount of work has been done on meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and still more is being done by a number of agencies and organizations in Washington, New York and around the world.

#### IV. RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the fourth area: reconstruction. Iraqis will face the task of reconstructing of a country that has been subjected to decades of neglect and mismanagement. There has been a tremendous interagency effort, led by the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget, to think through reconstruction needs and objectives. The interagency effort has focused on a number of priority program areas including education, health, water and sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, rule of law, agriculture, communications and economic and financial policy. I hope you won't be surprised to learn that many of these priority program areas overlap exactly with the working groups in the Future of Iraq Project, which I will describe next.

With regard to the oil sector, our guiding principle is that Iraq's oil belongs to all of the Iraqi people. We are committed to ensuring that any action taken in this area is for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Should military action be required in Iraq, the U.S. will take steps to protect and preserve Iraq's oil sector, and we will support the efforts of Iraqis to restore production. Under Secretary Feith will have more to stay on this.

#### V. THE POLITICAL FUTURE

The United States is committed to helping Iraqis rebuild their country politically as well as physically.

Last March, the Bush Administration announced the Future of Iraq Project. In consultations with "free Iraqis," we developed 17 working groups. The purpose of these is to begin practical planning for what could be done between now and the date of a change of government in Baghdad, and in the immediate aftermath of a transition. The subjects of the working groups include:

1. Transitional Justice
2. Public Finance
3. Democratic Principles
4. Public Health and Humanitarian Issues
5. Public Outreach
6. Water, Agriculture & the Environment
7. Economy and Infrastructure
8. Local Government
9. Defense Policy
10. Oil & Energy
11. Education
12. Anti-Corruption Issues
13. Civil Society-Capacity Building
14. Building a Free Media
15. Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
16. Foreign Policy
17. Preserving Iraq's Cultural Heritage

Each of the working groups brings together about 10-20 Iraqi experts to discuss the Iraqis' thoughts and plans for what can be done now, and in the aftermath of a change of government in Baghdad, to improve the lives of the Iraqi people.

Here are some examples of the work that Iraqi experts have done:

- In the legal field, for example, the Iraqi lawyers in the Transitional Justice working group have drafted 600 pages, in Arabic, of proposed reforms of the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Code, the Nationality Law, the Military Procedure Code and more; proposals for the trial of Saddam Hussein and his top associates; proposals for national reconciliation, and the reform of the police, the courts and the prisons.
- The Economy and Infrastructure; Public Finance; and Water, Agriculture and the Environment working groups have prepared proposals for the transition of the Oil-for-Food program to better meet the basic needs of food and medicine of the Iraqi people. The Iraqis also have plans for reconstruction of four key sectors: Electricity, Communications, Water, and Agriculture.

Both we and the Iraqis we are meeting make the point that Iraqis on the outside will not control decisions that will, ultimately, have to be made by all Iraqis. The Iraqi diaspora is a great resource but not a substitute for what all Iraqis will need to do together to work towards democracy in their country. Both we and free Iraqis look forward to the day when all Iraqis are able to talk freely and work together to build a free and democratic Iraq.

And while we are listening to what the Iraqis are telling us, at the end of the day, the United States Government will make its decisions based on what is in the national interest of the United States.

#### WHAT THE TRANSITION MIGHT LOOK LIKE

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a short observation about how we get to this future for Iraq, recognizing that no decisions have been made on structure or timing. The Administration is still considering these issues, and discussing ideas with free Iraqis who are in the political opposition, technocrats, intellectuals and others. We are also consulting with our close allies and with you.

Conceptually, there are three stages:

- (1) Stabilization, where an interim coalition military administration will focus on security, stability and order; laying the groundwork for stage 2.
- (2) Transition, where authority is progressively given to Iraqi institutions as part of the development of a democratic Iraq.
- (3) Transformation, after Iraqis have drafted, debated and approved a new, democratic constitution and held free and fair elections, the only way for any future Iraqi government to be truly legitimate.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize my testimony today has been only the start of an effort to answer your questions about the future of Iraq. There are many uncertainties. What I am certain about is that we seek an Iraq that is democratic, unified, multi-ethnic, with no weapons of mass destruction, which has cut its links to all terrorists, and is at peace with its neighbors.

We expect to stay in close touch with you over the coming weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for the testimony and those important assurances to the committee.

Secretary Feith, would you give us your testimony.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. FEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to you and to the members of the committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you today about the efforts under way in the Defense Department and in the U.S. Government generally to plan for Iraq in the post-conflict period should war become necessary.

With your permission, I would like to submit my statement for the record and just provide you now with a summary of it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full and please proceed with the summary.

Mr. FEITH. Thank you.

If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq, they will, after victory, have contributions to make to the country's temporary administration and to the welfare of the Iraqi people. It will be necessary to provide humanitarian relief, organize basic services, and work to establish security for the liberated Iraqis. Our work will aim to achieve the objectives outlined by my colleague, Under Secretary of State Grossman. I will not repeat those initial five objectives that he mentioned, but they are very important and I will just summarize them in a few words.

That we aspire to liberate, not occupy the country; that we are going to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; and likewise eliminate the terrorist infrastructure; safeguard Iraq's territorial integrity; and begin the process of economic and political reconstruction.

If there is a war, the United States would approach its post-war work with a two-part resolve: a commitment to stay and a commit-

ment to leave. That is, a commitment to stay as long as required to achieve the objectives that we have just listed. The coalition cannot take military action in Iraq to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and the Iraqi tyranny's threats to the world as an aggressor, as a state supporter of terrorism, and then leave a mess behind for the Iraqi people to clean up without a helping hand. That would ill serve the Iraqis, the United States, and the world.

But it is important to stress also that the United States would have a commitment to leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people. Iraq does not and will not belong to the United States, the coalition, or to anyone else.

As Iraqi officials are in a position to shoulder their country's responsibilities and they have in place the necessary political and other structures to provide food, security, and other necessities, the United States and its coalition partners will want them to run their own affairs. U.S. post-war responsibilities will not be easy to fulfill and the United States by no means wishes to tackle them alone, will encourage contributions and participation from coalition partners, from nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, other international organizations, and others.

Our goal is to transfer as much authority as possible, as quickly as possible, to the Iraqis themselves. But the United States will not try to foist onto those who are not in a position to carry them burdens that cannot be managed.

The faster all the necessary reconstruction tasks are accomplished, the sooner the coalition will be able to withdraw its forces from Iraq and the sooner the Iraqis will assume complete control of their country. Accordingly, the coalition officials responsible for post-conflict administration in Iraq, whether military or civilian, from the various agencies of the government will report to the President through General Tom Franks, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, and the Secretary of Defense.

To prepare for all this, as Secretary Grossman mentioned, President Bush directed on January 20 the creation of a post-war planning office. Although the office is located within the policy organization in the Department of Defense, it is staffed by officials detailed from departments and agencies throughout the government. Its job is planning and implementation. The intention is not to theorize, but to do practical work.

In the event of war, most of the people in the office will deploy to Iraq. We have named it the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and we describe it as an expeditionary office. It is charged with establishing links with United Nations specialized agencies and with nongovernmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq. It will reach out also to counterpart offices in the governments of coalition countries and to the various free Iraqi groups.

The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall on the commander of the U.S. Central Command as the commander of U.S. and coalition forces in the field. Various parts of our government have done a great deal of work on aspects of post-war planning for months now. Some of this was outlined by Under Secretary Grossman. He mentioned the interagency working group that has been doing contingency planning for humanitarian

relief. That group is linked to the U.S. Central Command and has established links with the U.N. specialized agencies and the NGOs involved in humanitarian relief efforts.

It has developed a concept of operations that would facilitate U.N. and nongovernmental organization provision of aid. It would establish civil-military operations centers by means of which U.S. forces would coordinate the provision of relief and restart the U.N. ration distribution system using U.S. supplies until the U.N. supplies and the NGO supplies can arrive.

There are other interagency groups planning for reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq, also planning for the vetting of current Iraqi officials to determine with whom we should work, and working on post-war elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The new planning office's function is to integrate all of these efforts and make them operational. It is building on the work done, not reinventing it.

I would like to spend a moment if I can stressing in particular the crucial task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. We have begun detailed planning for this task, which includes securing, assessing, and dismantling Iraq's WMD capabilities, its facilities and stockpiles. This will be a huge undertaking. The point that Senator Biden made about the magnitude of the task is very well taken. This is one of a number of tasks whose magnitude is very large.

The Defense Department is building the necessary capabilities for this WMD elimination effort. We will have to first locate Iraq's widespread WMD sites and then be prepared to secure the relevant weapons or facilities or rapidly and safely disable them so they are no longer a threat to coalition forces. This will have to be done in many places and as quickly as possible.

The mission, though, does not end there. After hostilities we will have to dismantle, destroy, and dispose of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile capabilities and infrastructure. Equally important will be plans to redirect some of Iraq's dual use capability and its scientific and managerial talent to legitimate civilian activities in a new Iraq.

Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely on the U.S. military forces. Other U.S. Government personnel can contribute. Coalition partners can play an important role, and the United Nations, IAEA, and other international organizations should be in a position to contribute valuably. Of course, the new Iraqi Government will also have a key responsibility here.

Eliminating all nuclear, chemical, and biological stockpiles, facilities, and infrastructure will take time and we cannot now even venture a sensible guess as to the amount of time.

Now, on the subject of oil infrastructure, the U.S. and its coalition allies may face the necessity of repairing Iraq's oil infrastructure if Saddam Hussein decides to damage it, as he put the torch to Kuwait's oil fields in 1991. Indeed, as I am sure you know, we have reason to believe that Saddam's regime is planning to sabotage Iraq's oil fields.

Detailed planning is under way for resumption of oil production as quickly as possible to help meet the Iraqi people's basic needs. The oil sector is Iraq's primary source of funding. As noted by

Under Secretary Grossman, the United States is committed to preserving Iraq's territorial integrity, so we are intent on ensuring that Iraq's oil resources remain under national Iraqi control, with the proceeds made available to support Iraqis in all parts of the country.

As Senator Biden noted, there is an awareness even inside Iraq of the importance of preserving those oil assets as national assets. No one ethnic or religious group will be allowed to claim exclusive rights to any part of the oil resources or infrastructure. In other words, all of Iraq's oil belongs to all of the people of Iraq.

The administration has decided that in the event of war the U.S.-led coalition would protect Iraq's oil fields from acts of sabotage and preserve them as a national asset of the Iraqi people and rapidly start reconstruction and operation of the sector so that its proceeds, together with humanitarian aid from the United States and others, can help support the Iraqi people's needs.

Just as we have warned Iraqis in a position to control the release of weapons of mass destruction that they should not obey orders to use WMD, we are warning them not to commit an atrocity in the form of the destruction of Iraq's oil infrastructure.

Now, again as Under Secretary Grossman stressed, we are working in an area now and we are discussing here today work where important decisions have yet to be finalized within the administration. This is a good opportunity to have a real consultation and we are eager for your input into all of these matters. We have not yet decided on the organizational mechanisms, for example, to do this work regarding the oil infrastructure. We will be consulting on this, in addition to our consultations here with you and with other Members of Congress, will be consulting with parties in various countries, including Iraqi experts and groups.

Now, I think this may be a good point at which to address head-on the accusation that in this confrontation with the Iraqi regime the administration's motive is to steal or control Iraq's oil. The accusation is common, reflected in the slogan "No War for Oil." But it is false and malign. If there is a war, the world will see that the United States will fulfill its administrative responsibilities, including regarding oil, transparently and honestly, respecting the property and other rights of the Iraqi State and people.

The record of the United States in military conflicts is open to the world and well-known. The United States became a major world power in World War II. In that war and since, the United States has demonstrated repeatedly and consistently that we covet no other country's property. The United States does not steal from other nations. We did not pillage Germany and Japan. On the contrary, we helped rebuild them after World War II. After Desert Storm we did not use our military power to take or establish control over the oil resources of Iraq or any other country in the gulf region.

The United States pays for whatever we want to import. Rather than export its power to beggar its neighbors, the United States, as probably no group of people more than this committee knows, has been a source of large amounts of financial aid and other types of assistance for many countries for decades.

If U.S. motives were in essence financial or commercial, we would not be confronting Saddam Hussein over his weapons of mass destruction. If our motive were cold cash, we would instead downplay the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction and pander to Saddam in hopes of winning contracts for U.S. companies.

The major costs of any confrontation with the Iraqi regime would of course be the human ones. But the financial costs would not be small either. This confrontation is not and cannot possibly be a moneymaker for the United States. Only someone ignorant of the easy-to-ascertain realities could think that the United States would profit from such a war, even if we were willing to steal Iraq's oil, which we emphatically are not going to do.

Now, returning to the Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, I would just like to give you a few comments about how it is organized. There are three substantive operations within the office, each under a civilian coordinator: humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and civil administration. A fourth coordinator is responsible for communications, logistics, and budgetary support. These operations are under the overall leadership of Jay Garner, a retired lieutenant general who held a senior military position in the 1991 humanitarian relief operation in northern Iraq. He is responsible for integrating the work of the three substantive operations and ensuring that the office can travel to the region when necessary and plug in smoothly to CENTCOM's operations.

The office has only just begun the task of estimating the cost of post-war work. It is clear that the overall Iraq reconstruction and relief budget would require a fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriation. Timing of a supplemental is important. Delays would hinder relief and reconstruction programs.

Because the commander of the U.S. Central Command will have a key role in the administration in Iraq, many have thought that our plans are based on what the allies did in Germany after World War II, but that is not the case. Our intention in case of war would be, as we have said, to liberate, not occupy, Iraq. Our administration would involve Iraqis as soon as possible and we would transfer responsibility to Iraqi entities as soon as we could.

The following are examples, just notions, of the ways in which Iraqis might play a progressively greater role in administering the country even in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. An Iraqi consultative council could be formed to advise U.S. and coalition authorities. A judicial council could undertake to advise the authorities on the necessary revisions to Iraqi's legal structure and statutes, to institute the rule of law and protect individual rights. As my colleague noted, a great deal of thinking has already been done under the State Department leadership with various Iraqis on the issue of judicial reform.

A constitutional commission could be created to draft a new constitution and submit it to the Iraqi people for ratification. Major Iraqi governmental institutions, such as the central government ministries, could remain in place and perform the key functions of government after the vetting of top personnel to remove any who might be tainted with the crimes and excesses of the current re-

gime. Also, town and district elections could be held soon after liberation to involve Iraqis in governing at the local level.

In conclusion, regarding post-war planning, much preparatory work has been done, but much more remains. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance will serve as the U.S. Government's nerve center for this effort going forward. We look forward to consulting with this committee and the Congress generally as we develop our ideas and plans for post-conflict Iraq reconstruction. War is not inevitable, but failing to make contingency plans for its aftermath would be inexcusable.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

POST-WAR PLANNING

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you today about efforts underway in the Defense Department and the U.S. Government to plan for Iraq in the post-conflict period, should war become necessary.

If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq, they will, after victory, have contributions to make to the country's temporary administration and the welfare of the Iraqi people. It will be necessary to provide humanitarian relief, organize basic services and work to establish security for the liberated Iraqis.

Our work will aim to achieve the objectives outlined by my colleague, Under Secretary of State Grossman:

- First, demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States aspires to liberate, not occupy or control them or their economic resources.
- Second, eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear program, the related delivery systems, and the related research and production facilities. This will be a complex, dangerous and expensive task.
- Third, eliminate likewise Iraq's terrorist infrastructure. A key element of U.S. strategy in the global war on terrorism is exploiting the information about terrorist networks that the coalition acquires through our military and law enforcement actions.
- Fourth, safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq. The United States does not support Iraq's disintegration or dismemberment.
- Fifth, begin the process of economic and political reconstruction, working to put Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country. The U.S. government shares with many Iraqis the hope that their country will enjoy the rule of law and other institutions of democracy under a broad-based government that represents the various parts of Iraqi society.

If there is a war, the United States would approach its post-war work with a two-part resolve: a commitment to stay and a commitment to leave.

- That is, a commitment to stay as long as required to achieve the objectives I have just listed. The coalition cannot take military action in Iraq—to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and the Iraqi tyranny's threats to the world as an aggressor and supporter of terrorism—and then leave a mess behind for the Iraqi people to clean up without a helping hand. That would ill serve the Iraqis, ourselves and the world.
- But it is important to stress also that the United States would have a commitment to leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people. Iraq does not and will not belong to the United States, the coalition or to anyone else.

As Iraqi officials are able to shoulder their country's responsibilities, and they have in place the necessary political and other structures to provide food, security and the other necessities, the United States and its coalition partners will want them to run their own affairs. We all have an interest in hastening the day when Iraq can become a proud, independent and respected member of the community of the world's free countries.

U.S. post-war responsibilities will not be easy to fulfill and the United States by no means wishes to tackle them alone. We shall encourage contributions and partici-

pation from coalition partners, non-governmental organizations, the UN and other international organizations and others. And our goal is to transfer as much authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis themselves. But the United States will not try to foist burdens onto those who are not in a position to carry them.

*Security and Reconstruction*

Administration officials are thinking through the lessons of Afghanistan and other recent history. We have learned that post-conflict reconstruction requires a balance of efforts in the military sphere and the civil sphere. Security is promoted by progress toward economic reconstruction. But economic reconstruction is hardly possible if local business people, foreign investors and international aid workers do not feel secure in their persons and property.

To encourage the coordinated, balanced progress of economic and security reconstruction in a post-conflict Iraq, President Bush has directed his administration to begin planning now.

The faster the necessary reconstruction tasks are accomplished, the sooner the coalition will be able to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and the sooner the Iraqis will assume complete control of their country. Accordingly, the coalition officials responsible for post-conflict administration of Iraq—whether military or civilian, from the various agencies of the governments—will report to the President through General Tom Franks, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, and the Secretary of Defense.

*The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance*

To prepare for all this, the President directed on January 20 the creation of a post-war planning office. Although located within the Policy organization in the Department of Defense, this office is staffed by officials detailed from departments and agencies throughout the government. Its job is detailed planning and implementation. The intention is not to theorize but to do practical work—to prepare for action on the ground, if and when the time comes for such work. In the event of war, most of the people in the office will deploy to Iraq. We have named it the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and we describe it as an “expeditionary” office.

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is charged with establishing links with the United Nations specialized agencies and with nongovernmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq. It will reach out also to the counterpart offices in the governments of coalition countries, and, in coordination with the President’s Special Envoy to the Free Iraqis, to the various Free Iraqi groups.

The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall upon the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in the field. The purpose of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is to develop the detailed plans that he and his subordinates will draw on in meeting these responsibilities.

Various parts of the government have done a great deal of work on aspects of post-war planning for months now. Several planning efforts are underway.

An interagency working group led by the NSC staff and the Office of Management and Budget has undertaken detailed contingency planning for humanitarian relief in case of conflict with Iraq. The group also includes members from the State Department, USAID, the Office of the Vice-President, Treasury, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the CIA. The group is linked to U.S. Central Command. It has also established links with the UN specialized agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian relief efforts.

This group has developed a concept of operations that would:

- facilitate UN/NGO provision of aid,
- establish Civil-Military Operations Centers by means of which U.S. forces would coordinate provision of relief, and
- restart the UN ration distribution system using U.S. supplies until UN/NGOs arrive.

Other interagency groups are planning for:

- the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq,
- vetting current Iraqi officials to determine with whom we should work, and
- post-war elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The new planning office’s function is to integrate all these efforts and make them operational. It is building on the work done, not reinventing it.

*Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction*

Detailed planning is underway for the task of securing, assessing and dismantling Iraqi WMD capabilities, facilities and stockpiles. This will be a huge undertaking. The Defense Department is building the necessary capabilities.

This will be a new mission for the Department and for our nation. It is complex and will take place as part of military operations, continuing into the post-conflict period.

We must first locate Iraq's widespread WMD sites. We must then be prepared to secure the relevant weapons or facilities, or rapidly and safely disable them, so they are no longer a threat to coalition forces. This will have to be done in many places and as quickly as possible.

But the mission does not end there. After hostilities, we will have to dismantle, destroy or dispose of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile capabilities and infrastructure.

Equally important will be plans to re-direct some of Iraq's dual-use capability and its scientific and managerial talent to legitimate, civilian activities in a new Iraq.

Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely to the U.S. military forces. Other U.S. government personnel, including those within the DoD, the Department of Energy's laboratory system, and in other government agencies can contribute.

Coalition partners, including many NATO Allies, have nuclear, chemical and biological defense-related capabilities and expertise that can play an important role. The UN, IAEA and other international organizations should be in a position to contribute valuably to the elimination effort and perhaps to ongoing monitoring afterward.

The task of eliminating all nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles, facilities and infrastructure will take time. We cannot now even venture a sensible guess as to the amount. The new Iraqi government will also have an important role to play.

*Oil Infrastructure*

The U.S. and its coalition allies may face the necessity of repairing Iraq's oil infrastructure, if Saddam Hussein decides to damage it, as he put the torch to Kuwait's oil fields in 1991. Indeed, we have reason to believe that Saddam's regime is planning to sabotage Iraq's oil fields. But even if there is no sabotage and there is no injury from combat operations, some repair work will likely be necessary to allow the safe resumption of operations at oil facilities after any war-related stoppage.

Detailed planning is underway for resumption of oil production as quickly as possible to help meet the Iraqi people's basic needs. The oil sector is Iraq's primary source of funding. As noted, the United States is committed to preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. So we are intent on ensuring that Iraq's oil resources remain under national Iraqi control, with the proceeds made available to support Iraqis in all parts of the country. No one ethnic or religious group would be allowed to claim exclusive rights to any part of the oil resources or infrastructure. In other words, all of Iraq's oil belongs to all the people of Iraq.

The Administration has decided that, in the event of war, the U.S.-led coalition would:

- protect Iraq's oil fields from acts of sabotage and preserve them as a national asset of the Iraqi people, and
- rapidly start reconstruction and operation of the sector, so that its proceeds, together with humanitarian aid from the United States and other countries, can help support the Iraqi people's needs.

The Administration has not yet decided on the organizational mechanisms by which this sector should be operated. We shall be consulting on this important matter with many parties in various countries, including Iraqi experts and groups.

*"No War for Oil"*

This is a good point at which to address head-on the accusation that, in this confrontation with the Iraqi regime, the Administration's motive is to steal or control Iraq's oil. The accusation is common, reflected in the slogan "No War for Oil." But it is false and malign.

If there is a war, the world will see that the United States will fulfill its administrative responsibilities, including regarding oil, transparently and honestly, respecting the property and other rights of the Iraqi state and people. The record of the United States in military conflicts is open to the world and well known.

The United States became a major world power in World War II. In that war and since, the United States has demonstrated repeatedly and consistently that we covet no other country's property. The United States does not steal from other nations. We did not pillage Germany or Japan; on the contrary, we helped rebuild them after

World War II. After Desert Storm, we did not use our military power to take or establish control over the oil resources of Iraq or any other country in the Gulf region. The United States pays for whatever we want to import. Rather than exploit its power to beggar its neighbors, the United States has been a source of large amounts of financial aid and other types of assistance for many countries for decades.

If U.S. motives were in essence financial or commercial, we would not be confronting Saddam Hussein over his weapons of mass destruction. If our motive were cold cash, we would instead downplay the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction and pander to Saddam in hopes of winning contracts for U.S. companies.

The major costs of any confrontation with the Iraqi regime would of course be the human ones. But the financial costs would not be small, either. This confrontation is not, and cannot possibly be, a money-maker for the United States. Only someone ignorant of the easy-to-ascertain realities could think that the United States could profit from such a war, even if we were willing to steal Iraq's oil, which we emphatically are not going to do.

#### THE STRUCTURE AND FUNDING OF THE OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Returning now to the new Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance: There are three substantive operations within the Office, each under a civilian coordinator: Humanitarian Relief, Reconstruction, and Civil Administration. A fourth coordinator is responsible for communications, logistics and budgetary support. These operations are under the overall leadership of Jay Garner, a retired Lieutenant General who held a senior military position in the 1991 humanitarian relief operation in northern Iraq. He is responsible for organizing and integrating the work of the three substantive operations and ensuring that the office can travel to the region when necessary and plug in smoothly to CENTCOM's operations. His staff consists of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Office of Management and Budget.

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance has only just begun the task of estimating the cost of post-war humanitarian assistance. In addition, it is working to identify the projected post-conflict costs of dealing with the Iraqi armed forces, including the costs of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating Iraqi troops into civilian society.

Except for the Defense Department, the USG is currently operating under a FY 2003 continuing resolution. This has affected the level of funding that can be made available now, as agencies have access only to limited amounts of money.

In any case, the overall Iraq reconstruction and relief budget would require a FY 2003 supplemental appropriation. Timing of a FY 2003 supplemental is important. Delays would hinder relief and reconstruction programs.

As part of our post-war planning, CENTCOM has also established a Combined Joint Task Force that will be responsible for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. The task force will work closely with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to facilitate relief and reconstruction activities.

#### THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREE IRAQIS

Because the Commander of the U.S. Central Command will have a key role in administration in Iraq, many have thought that our plans for Iraq are based on what the Allies did in Germany after World War II. But that is not the case. Our intention, in case of war, would be to liberate Iraq, not to occupy it.

Our administration would involve Iraqis as soon as possible, and we would transfer responsibility to Iraqi entities as soon as possible. Following the initial period of U.S./coalition military government, we envisage a transitional phase in which responsibility is gradually transferred to Iraqi institutions, leading to the eventual establishment of a new Iraqi government in accordance with a new constitution.

The following are examples of the ways in which Iraqis might play a progressively greater role in administering the country. While final decisions have not been made, and, in the nature of the case, cannot be made until the actual circumstances are known, these examples illustrate various mechanisms under consideration:

- An Iraqi consultative council could be formed to advise the U.S./coalition authorities.
- A judicial council could undertake to advise the authorities on the necessary revisions to Iraq's legal structure and statutes to institute the rule of law and to protect individual rights.

- A constitutional commission could be created to draft a new constitution and submit it to the Iraqi people for ratification.
- Major Iraqi governmental institutions—such as the central government ministries—could remain in place and perform the key functions of government after the vetting of the top personnel to remove any who might be tainted with the crimes and excesses of the current regime.
- Town and district elections could be held soon after liberation to involve Iraqis in governing at the local level.

Regarding post-war planning, much preparatory work has been done, but much more remains. The Office of Reconstruction and humanitarian Assistance will serve as the U.S. Government's nerve center for this effort.

We look forward to consulting with this Committee and with the Congress generally as we develop our ideas and plans for post-conflict Iraqi reconstruction. War is not inevitable, but failing to make contingency plans for its aftermath would be inexcusable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Feith.

Let me mention we have once again great attendance by the committee and I will ask unanimous consent that we have a 5-minute rule. With 12 members currently present, that is at least an hour of questions if members roughly respect the 5 minute period. And we have a distinguished panel and another round following that. So I will begin, and please start the clock on me.

Secretaries, let me just mention specifically that in the New York Times this morning there is criticism that NGOs, nongovernmental organizations, are not able to get needed answers, support, and other things. I am pleased to know the office was set up 3 weeks ago, and clearly General Garner cannot do everything at once, but at the same time we should note that a great deal of the money, the international support—particularly in the initial feeding and shelter—and other attentions to the humane situation, will come not only from NGOs in our country and other countries, but is a very important part of the budget, which is currently being formulated.

The New York Times article this morning details the criticism. Another New York Times story addresses the recruitment of a leader who might take part in the Government of Iraq later on, but also states that our government has come to the conclusion that we will not support the idea of an initial government in exile to be foisted upon the Iraqis.

Clearly, another London meeting may occur, where various contentious groups may come together. We would like as a committee to be briefed from time to time on what is going on with regard to the murky shadows of exiled Iraqis, to their aspirations, and to how Iraqis on the ground might feel about all this. This is the transition period, but we want to make sure the transition period is just that—as opposed to some pre-transition or pre-military phase or what have you, as you describe it.

Now, the oil question that you have raised, Secretary Feith, is very important. The papers also have polls which you have cited at least tangentially, that show large majorities of people in other countries believe our sole objective in all of this is oil. That is wrong. You have stated that categorically.

But the issue will not be cleared away without implementing a policy for the admission of the oil fields including how the people of Iraq are to receive the benefits, and in fact addressing how much of this operation that you are describing might be paid for through

oil revenues. There is a distinct connection: if the oil wells are destroyed, the revenues do not come in. That changes the budget situation, which the Iraqi people on the ground now ought to understand, as well as the Russians, the French, all the people that likewise in a murky way we discuss as potential members of the coalition, or the Security Council. All these parties are publicly discussing oil, and it really cannot be hidden behind the bushes.

Now, to the extent that there is a distinct plan on our part to be, as you suggest, transparent, and to think in terms of the humane treatment of the Iraqi people and their future, that can be stated and that can be organized. As you say, you cannot do everything, but it is still out there. It needs to be finalized in a hurry because that is in the nub of many of the consultations diplomatically at the U.N. now, and I am hopeful that everybody is mindful of that.

Let me just ask as my question: With this organization clearly in the Department of Defense, but, not exclusively that, you have detailed people from many departments, and that is important. You establish a chain of command, General Franks and/or others who are there on the ground, and they try to administer the country, at least keep the territorial integrity, get to the weapons of mass destruction. You probably need military authority to do both of those.

How do you begin the transition? In other words, how do you begin to identify? Does General Franks identify political leadership? Are there other persons in his administration who are detailed to sort of scout the horizons for a President Karzai or for whoever may arise or for a group of such promising people?

In other words, the audacious aspect of what we are attempting in Iraq is not just eliminating weapons of mass destruction arising from our September 11 genuine fear of weapons that may come and be proliferated but likewise we are trying to create a changed State in Iraq that will be different, that will offer some hope to all the States in the surrounding territory, that will be so good that it exists and that it continues, as opposed to an experiment that fails and becomes a vacuum, like the former Afghanistan.

How does this transition start? Who is responsible for it?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me start with a couple of answers and then I would be glad, obviously, for Doug's assistance here. Let me first, if I could, talk a little bit about the nongovernmental organizations since, as you raised it, they are extremely, extremely important. In fact, we believe as you look through all of the effort that has been made on the humanitarian and the reconstruction areas, without NGOs this will not be possible, it will not be possible to accomplish this task.

We have been focused on our relations with NGOs. There is now a weekly meeting, civil, military, where we have about 30 NGOs represented. So that coordination I think is happening in a much more systematic way.

No doubt, though, sir, that there was—it was slow in getting NGOs the licenses they need to go into Iraq. The reason this got slowed down, as both Under Secretary Feith and I learned, is of course the NGOs wanted to import or take things into northern Iraq or into Iraq that of course were sanctioned, that were under

the Oil for Food Program, that were under OFAC licenses. And it took us some time to work our way through that.

I can report to you now that, with good work between the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department, we have now cleared away a very large amount of that backlog for our own people to work in Iraq, some NGOs to work in Iraq, and we are down, at the State Department anyway, to a backlog of two NGOs as opposed to about 25 a week or so ago.

So we are working on this. There is still more work to do. But I just want to emphasize the importance of nongovernmental organizations.

Second, just to pick up the point that you made about where we stand. We actually have come to the conclusion that now is not the time to have a provisional government or a government in exile because, as I tried to say in my testimony, yes, we are working with some extremely good, talented and wonderful people who are outside of Iraq, but we have to also take into account the views of people inside Iraq.

I think, as Secretary Rumsfeld has said and I know Secretary Powell has said, a lot of this has to come from the bottom up. That is a very important answer to the question about how it will be maintained and how it will go on for more than 6 or 8 or 10 months or even a year.

Finally, that leads me to say that how exactly this transition will take place is, as you say, perhaps opaque at the moment. But what we are planning for is with the Future of Iraq Project, with our efforts to publicize our campaign inside of Iraq, with the fact that I hope Iraqis will consider this, if there has to be a military operation, as liberation, that there will be people who will come up and want to participate in the future of their government.

That is what we expect, that is what we hope, and that is what we will be planning to achieve.

Mr. FEITH. Mr. Chairman, I think that much of the issue that you have raised about how a transition would occur is not knowable precisely right now. But what we have been working on through the various groups that Under Secretary Grossman is talking about is developing principles and guidelines how we would approach the question of encouraging, cultivating, and permitting to function new Iraqi leadership after a conflict.

It is not our thinking that we are going to be able to impose particular people or even a particular governmental system on the Iraqis. I think that we recognize that it would not be a right thing to do and it probably would not even be something that we could pull off if we attempted it. The governmental structures that exist right now may be, as I mentioned in my testimony, may be usable to some extent within a reconfigured Iraq where the technocratic aspects would be perhaps salvageable to some extent, even though the fundamental politics of the country would no longer be tyrannical and would, on the contrary, we hope build democratic institutions for the benefit of the people of Iraq.

The point that you made about oil, Mr. Chairman, is obviously at the fore of everybody's mind. We have given a great deal of thought to the importance of securing and, if necessary, repairing and producing the oil. We do not have final decisions within the ad-

ministration on exactly how we would organize the mechanism to produce and market the oil for the benefit of the people of Iraq.

Obviously, it would be beneficial to have that done to the maximum extent possible by Iraqis, by a mechanism that would be international in nature and show the world the points that I made in my opening statement, that our intention is to be completely honest, transparent, and respectful of the rights, the property rights in particular, of the Iraqi State and people.

This is something where the actual decisions will be made through a consultative process with lots of parties. We have begun our thinking. We have laid down some principles. We are beginning the consultative process, but the final decisions have not yet been made.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I would just encourage acceleration. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank both witnesses for being here.

Secretary Feith, I think your explanation of the response to "we are going for oil" needs to be repeated and repeated and repeated. I was recently on French television when I was at the World Economic Forum and a group of French journalists asked me if this is about oil and I said yes. And they said, Ah, America admits it. I said, it is about French oil, it is about French oil, because they are the ones with significant investment, they are the ones with a significant opportunity. They are the ones, along with the Russians, who have a phenomenal opportunity, they think, under Saddam to be able to benefit.

So I think that should be repeated. And again, I thank you both for being here, and you are not the ones to whom I am directing this. I have been publicly and privately, I think, as supportive as I can be of this administration. But I must tell you, I think it has been close to irresponsible that we did not have the office that you are talking about now set up until 3 weeks ago. I think it is irresponsible.

I think the comments of the Secretary of Defense as recently as this summer with us, where he said to us—and I am paraphrasing—that he did not think there would be a need for any large commitment of U.S. forces after a victory because this is a country rich with oil and well-trained people. Secretary Weinberger, as Mr. Feith will remember testifying when he testified, told us this was just a red herring to keep us from going on, the people who raised this issue were people who really did not want to deal with Saddam Hussein.

It does disturb me that, although you say that how this transition is going to take place is not knowable, you have guidelines. Certain things are knowable. At least you should know them by now, with all due respect. Even though you may find this bevy of incredibly neutral technocrats and bureaucrats who will be accepted by the Kurds, the Shia, and the Sunni, who are not part of the security apparatus, to keep the water running, the lights on, the traffic flowing, et cetera, they have to answer to somebody.

Who is that going to be? Is that going to be an American general? Is that going to be, like we have in Bosnia, the EU or some European? Is it going to be the United Nations?

Those decisions I cannot fathom, when we are 3 weeks away from war or 5 weeks away from war possibly, you do not know the answer to yet. You have not made a decision yet. They are monumental. The debate is still going on in the press, at least, as to whether or not the model is going to be a MacArthur model in Japan or a, for lack of a better phrase, as is often used, a Kosovo model, where you have someone else taking the responsibility day to day.

Somebody is going to have to make the judgments. Somebody is going to be sitting in a chair and it will not be a technocrat, who when you have 2,000 Kurds standing on the outskirts of Kirkuk saying, we want our houses back, we want our property back, somebody is going to have to negotiate that. Somebody is going to be standing there, as my friend the former Governor of Ohio knows from all his work he and I did in the Balkans, somebody.

And you have not figured out whether that is going to be a U.N. official backed by American forces and others, that is going to be an EU official, that is going to be a NATO official, that is going to be an American.

So my question is this. Rather than tell me—and you have done more than generically respond—but generically what the guidelines are, what are the missions that you believe, the military and the civilian side, are going to have to be fulfilled in the first 6 months after the shooting stops? By missions I mean: securing the borders—I am not telling you what the missions should be. I am just giving you illustrative.

What are the missions that you must know by now must be undertaken by some entity other than an Iraqi entity at the front end of this? What are the missions? Not even who is going to do them. What are the missions? Preventing ethnic conflict, securing the borders? You mentioned one clearly we focused on, correctly, is securing the oil fields or getting them back up and running.

What are the missions that must be fulfilled and can only be fulfilled by some outside entity or group of people, outside entity overseeing an indigenous group of Iraqis, that must be fulfilled to prevent this country from splitting apart like a gyroscope out of kilter?

I thank you for listening to me and I am anxious to hear your answer.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Biden, let me try to answer all that I can, and I know Doug will have some views as well.

Senator BIDEN. All you have to do is answer the mission part. You can respond to my comments.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I would like to respond to the question of the decision of what runs that section two, the middle section if you will.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I am worried about section one.

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, but I think it is related and important if you do not mind, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. GROSSMAN. One of the reasons that we have not made this decision or, I should properly say, the President has not made this decision is if you list, as you did, the possible groups that could take on that mission, who do you list? The United Nations, the European Union, the United States. I think you will understand that from our perspective, and perhaps we are doing this too slow, but

from our perspective I cannot answer the question yet of whether we want to have a United Nations transitional authority until I know what the United Nations is or is not going to do if there has to be military conflict.

For example, if we go through, as the President said last week, and he now welcomes and supports a second resolution and we are successful in getting a second resolution and 15 to nothing or something less than 15 to nothing the United Nations says yes, Saddam Hussein has not met his obligations under 1441, let us go, then the United Nations' role possibly in a transition or in the first 6 or 8 weeks could be a big one.

Senator BIDEN. Marc, you are the single best negotiator I have observed in my last 10 years here. You know darn well the way you would be talking with the United Nations is to say: Look, if you guys are in on the deal here this is what we would like you to do. What they wonder about is whether or not you want them in on the deal. And if that does not work, you should be talking to the EU.

You can walk and chew gum at the same time. You do not have to wait to see what they are going to do. One of the problems is they are worried that you all do not have a plan. Every European leader I have met with in the last year is worried you do not have any plan, because they have heard all this rhetoric about no nation-building, heard all this rhetoric about we are warriors, we are going to fight the war and we are going to leave.

They have heard all this rhetoric and, guess what, they believe our rhetoric. Fortunately we do not, but they believe it.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Just let me come back. Let us say that the opposite—

Senator BIDEN. I apologize for—

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, you make a fair point. But in terms of a negotiation right now, the United Nations—this issue is to the United Nations. It is to the Security Council. The Security Council has a decision to make about whether it is going to back its 15 to nothing vote under 1441. I will speak purely for myself here, and again I say no decisions have been made.

But you can see a completely different path, Mr. Biden, if the United Nations Security Council votes again 15 to nothing for a new resolution. Then it seems to me we might consider a role or some role for the United Nations. I say, no decisions have been made. That is my view.

But if the United Nations does not meet its responsibilities, then it is very much harder, I think, for us to come and argue in front of all of you that in a part of phase one or part of phase two that we would turn this over to some international body. I do not know the answer to that question, but I just want to let you know that it is not for lack of thinking about it. It is the fact that you have got, from our perspective, you have got to get the sequence right.

I believe the same thing would apply to the European Union. I would guess that if you went to an EU meeting today and you made a proposition to them, the first thing they would say is, well, when—is there going to be another U.N. Security Council resolution? We would say: We sure hope there is—

Senator BIDEN. A 10-second interruption. We have had no trouble saying all along: Look, we want the U.N. to go with us, we want a U.N. resolution; if we do not get that U.N. resolution, we will go ourselves. You could easily have been saying: We want you all to participate in this, we want this to be a joint operation, we want this to be a joint occupation, we want this to be run by the United Nations, if in fact you say that. And by the way, if you do not, then we may have to do it ourselves. You all have not done that.

I have talked to several Foreign Ministers. I have talked to all those foreign heads of state. Unless they are not telling me something you are telling them, I do not think you have told them any of that.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, part of the—I do not mean to get into a colloquy here, but part of the challenge of course is that we are here today to talk to you about our plan for humanitarian reconstruction, for political reconstruction. I think it is right that we would be consulting with the U.S. Senate before we do much more with a lot of people outside of the United States.

So we are here—

Senator BIDEN. You are good, pal. You are good.

Mr. GROSSMAN. We are here to do consultation and this is what we are trying to do.

So I think people should be in no doubt about our plan. Let me try to answer the question that you posed about every 6 months—or for the first 6 months, excuse me. You hit I think all the important ones: security; we both emphasized weapons of mass destruction; trying to bring basic human services to Iraqis. One of the things that I think is very impressive, and we are glad to consult further on this or provide further information, USAID for example has laid out a very detailed plan for their operations in the first months, months 1 to 3, 3 to 6, and areas of water, sanitation, public health, humanitarian, sea port, airports, establishing food distribution, emergency electricity.

So as I said in my introduction, we now have a stack of these plans that are not just ideas, but actually lay out 1, 3, and 6-month timetables, and I would be glad to put them into the record and I think you would be interested in them and take a look at them and see the mile markers and you can see our goal is to make real progress.

Senator BIDEN. That is two functions. You only named—are they the only two functions? In other words, what two—you said humanitarian. Are we going to secure the borders? Are we going to secure the borders of Iraq? Is that a mission?

Mr. FEITH. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Is that going to require troops on the Iranian border? Is it going to—I mean, what is the mission? What are you anticipating?

Mr. FEITH. Senator, it is hard to answer a lot of these what-ifs because a lot depends on future events that we do not know. As Secretary Rumsfeld likes to say, he says he does not know whether, if there is a war, it is going to be “4 days, 4 weeks or 4 months.”

A lot depends on, if there is a war, what the nature of the war is, how much destruction there is, how much cooperation one gets,

how many Iraqi units defect. There are enormous uncertainties. And the most you can do in planning is develop concepts on how you would proceed, not rigid plans based on some inflexible assumptions about how future events are going to unfold.

That is our problem. You know that as well as we do. So what we have done is we have been thinking this through as precisely as we can in light of the uncertainties.

Now, on one question that you posed, just so that there is no lack of clarity on that, if there is a war and if U.S.-led coalition forces come into control of Iraq, then the responsibility for administering the country in the immediate aftermath of the war—and the administration is the entire range of missions that you could imagine that any responsible authority would need to perform for the benefit of the people of the country. That entire range of responsibilities falls to the military commander. It would fall to General Franks.

The goal then would be, when he has those responsibilities in his hands, to do the things that I outlined, that Under Secretary Grossman outlined, in our opening statements, which is make as much use of international contributions as we can so that we spread the responsibilities and burdens, and help get as much international involvement and legitimacy into our work there, to work as quickly as we can to find Iraqis to whom we could transfer responsibility so that it is clear that we are liberating and not occupying the country.

Those are the kinds of missions that we would perform. There would be no question about who ultimately would be responsible if we wind up leading the coalition that takes control of the country. It would be the military commander. There would be no vacuum of authority. But there would be a process that would begin immediately to try to bring us sector by sector into the transition phase that Under Secretary Grossman talked about.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming before us this morning and we are grateful for your leadership and your efforts. These are not simple tasks, as you have laid out. There are no specific answers to any of these questions.

But as I have listened to the exchange here, it seems to me, and using, Secretary Feith, your last comment about international legitimacy, that if you are making the case—and this is what I am understanding, the case that you both are making—that the great uncertainties of a post-Saddam Hussein rest to a considerable extent on our coalition partners who will be with us, their role in whatever we have to do, United Nations, NATO, IAEA—in fact, you mentioned in your testimony, Secretary Feith—although you did not read it, it is in here, reference to those organizations—then are we not wiser to bring our coalition partners along here, rather than laying down a time line, as we have heard the last couple of weeks, either you do it our way or we will do it?

I think your arguments, at least this morning what I have heard, argue very strenuously and I think correctly to working our way

along with our coalition partners. I might read a Newsweek piece that came off the wire yesterday, and it quotes a State Department official, not by name. I know that is strange in this town. But let me read it to you because, Secretary Grossman, you might know about this. This Newsweek story that appeared on the wire yesterday says:

"Administration officials are keenly wary of a long-term occupation in the heart of the Arab world, where anxieties about Western invaders date back to the Crusades. 'Every day you get past 3 months, you have got to expect peacekeepers to have a bullseye on their head,'" one State Department official tells Newsweek.

As you have laid out the framework for the office that we intend to set up—again I go back to your original points—much of this is uncertain. But can you tell this committee which nations specifically have committed specific resources to a post-Saddam Iraq? Surely you must have some budgetary numbers. You mentioned a supplemental. Surely you must have some numbers of people it would take. Uncertain, I know that.

But as much time and precision that you have put into this—obviously you are proud of it and it is impressive—to disconnect that from any budget numbers or timeframe or people seems to me not to be very realistic.

So I would appreciate hearing from both of you on those questions. Thank you.

Mr. FEITH. Senator, the United States has been talking with friends around the world on this subject for a long time. I hope that Senator Biden's remarks do not lead anybody to think that we have not been engaging our various potential coalition partners in discussions on this subject. We have been. I mean, I could understand that—

Senator BIDEN. Who?

Mr. FEITH. Well, I am reluctant to get into the who because of the political realities and diplomatic realities, with which you are all familiar.

Senator HAGEL. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. If you are having a problem now getting into it, what the devil do you think you are going to have a problem when we get in there?

Mr. FEITH. Well, Senator—

Senator HAGEL. With real men and women on the ground and in a war and trying to rebuild Iraq. And if you cannot define any of this now—

Mr. FEITH. Let me suggest the following way to think about it, which is the way we have been thinking about it within the administration. We have been talking with scores of countries about this whole issue of potential contributions to a coalition effort in Iraq for many months now. As we have these discussions, the countries in effect fall into different baskets.

There are some countries that say: We are with you in very specific ways no matter what. There are other countries that say: We will be with you in certain ways, and the ways range from, as we were talking about before, contributions of combat personnel or access, basing, and overflight rights. or in some cases some countries have specifically said: We are not interested in being involved in

the war, but we would be interested in being involved in stability operations afterward.

But there is a great sensitivity, that many countries are not interested in having their role publicized because it depends on—they are not interested in making public commitments until other things happen, whether the U.N. acts or acts in a certain way, whether there is another U.N. meeting or there is another, second resolution, or whether the second resolution says some particular formula or not.

So we are not in a position, although we have had extensive consultations and we have ideas about who is willing to contribute what—it would not be good coalition management for us to be publishing lists of what countries have told us they are interested in doing under what circumstances. That is why we have to be a little guarded in how we talk about this. It is not that we have failed to talk to people and it is not that we have not pinned down possible contributions to the extent that countries are willing to be pinned down at this point.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator Hagel, with Doug's permission, perhaps if there was some way, Mr. Chairman, that we could transmit that information to you in a classified way, we would be glad to do it. It is all laid out—

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that very much.

Mr. GROSSMAN. We are not trying to duck your question here, but I think you can understand the difference between saying it and giving you a list in public. But we are very glad to give you an update on exactly where we stand in all of these consultations.

Senator HAGEL. If I might make one more point, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your indulgence. I go back to where I started, and you gentlemen understand this better than most of us because you have the responsibility of putting this together. You keep using the term "coalition," "our coalition partners." Again I say, does that not say something about the point of trying to bring our coalition partners along with us, NATO, United Nations, Security Council, because we are going to need them after this. And you have said that. In fact, we cannot get to much below what you have just presented today because you do not know.

Thank you.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator Hagel, may I? I, with the chairman's permission, was going to respond to exactly that point. Again, possibly a difference in perspective, but I think if you go back to the debate in this country in July and August of last year, when the debate was about what is the United States going to do, is the United States going to act alone, will the President of the United States involve the international community in this, and then look at what the President said on the 12th of September, which is what I thought was a very effective speech at the United Nations and essentially turned this debate around.

I think it was the beginning, sir, of a very public effort to bring our partners along. We spent, all of us, 7 or 8 weeks—I cannot remember which one—negotiating Resolution 1441, which was a way to bring partners along. You will remember when we started that negotiation. What would you have all bet that it was going to be

15 to nothing? Not much. But 15 to nothing was the outcome, and I think that brought a large number of people along.

I think the fact that President Bush has said last week that he welcomes and would support another resolution in the United Nations would do more of that. And if you look at NATO, which, as you and I have talked about a number of times, a very important part of this, we took a lot of criticism for not involving NATO in Afghanistan, like it or not. But Paul Wolfowitz went to NATO on the 2nd of December or 3rd of December of last year and laid out a whole series of things that NATO might be able to do in Iraq.

I think it is terrible what has happened these last few days with NATO. But I must say, sir, from my perspective anyway, it is not for the lack of us trying to bring people along. I think there is some reluctance to be brought along in some of this.

But if you look at the statement of the Vilnius 10, if you look at the statement of the 8 other countries in Europe, if you look at the fact that 16 of 19 allies are prepared to move along with George Robertson, who I think has done a wonderful job in this, we are trying to do this. Are we 100 percent successful? No, sir, but I think our objective is to meet your objective, which is to bring along as many people as we possibly can.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you for the response. I would just say on behalf of both of my colleagues, Senator Biden and Senator Hagel, that we are all of one mind that a lot of people have to be brought along. Senator Biden has just shared with me a Washington Post survey this morning which indicates that two-thirds of Americans are prepared to support military action if necessary, but a huge number are not with us on what we are talking about today. In other words, they have not even come to the table of understanding.

That is our fault here in the Congress. It is your fault in the administration. We are playing catch-up ball. And the same, as Senator Hagel has said, with our allies, who have publics likewise, even if their leaders are up front affirming through the Vilnius letter and others their support.

Senator BIDEN. And 56 percent of the people in that poll say if we have to stay for 2 years and spend \$15 million a year, which is the lowest estimate I have heard, they are against doing that. And 46 percent of the Republicans polled who support going to war with Iraq oppose staying for 2 years at \$15 million a year—\$15 billion a year. You have got a lot of work to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank both of you gentlemen and I know you are getting some pretty tough questioning. And these are the basic questions. I guess what I am still confused by is, why did we give the President a blank check to go ahead with this before we had the answers to these questions? How can we expect our allies to join us when we do not have the answers to these questions?

That is what is going on here. We gave the President the authority to go ahead and do this before we knew what we were really getting into. So I frankly have sympathy for your task here, in that we are trying to make this up as we go along. This is the funda-

mental question: What happens after, the day after or the 10 years after?

I agree with you that it is a wonderful vision to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people need to be liberated from Saddam Hussein. How exactly that can happen, how legitimately that happens, and at what cost are important questions. But that has to happen.

But just yesterday the President asserted that the Iraqi Government is placing troops in civilian areas to create human shields for its military. In light of this information and various informed scenarios focusing on the likelihood of urban warfare in Iraq, the United States may well be drawn into fighting that results in fact in heavy civilian casualties if we go to war with Iraq.

Then, under your scenario, we are going to turn to the same people who lost loved ones and were injured in the conflict and the same people who have been told over and over again the lie that U.S. sanctions are the cause of all their hardships in recent years and we are going to tell these people that the U.S. military will be governing Iraq and looking out for their welfare.

I know that many Iraqis will be delighted to see Saddam Hussein go. But I am also concerned that under these circumstances the United States may well find itself asserting authority over what may well be a substantially hostile people.

So let me ask you, what kind of stability can be consolidated in such an antagonistic situation? And if you then factor in the many, many actors who will be incensed by the notion of a U.S. occupation of a Middle Eastern country, I have to ask, what kind of conditions will U.S. soldiers be facing for months on end?

Mr. Grossman.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator, thank you. And I appreciate the fact that you recognize where we are on this. If I could make one general point, which is that when you say that we need to do a better job in putting out answers, I say that is absolutely true and I want to report to you and to the chairman that Doug and I yesterday asked that many, many, many of the slides and the briefings on all of these things be declassified, so that we might be able to come to you and show you the work that has been done on the humanitarian and reconstruction. That is a challenge for us at the moment, but I hope we will break through that over the next couple of weeks, so that you can see that there are answers we would like to give you in public. I apologize, we just cannot do that right now.

In terms of what are the challenges we face, all of those revolve around two things, it seems to me: one, the commitment that both Doug and I made to you that our objective here is to stay in Iraq as long as it takes but not one day longer, and that will be a judgment that we will have to make as we go there if there is military action; second, that if the United States is the authority in Iraq it will be the job of that authority, of all of us, to make sure that Iraq for the very first time in a very, very long time is run for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

I believe that is a case that can be made, and if it is a case that can be made in the humanitarian area, in the reconstruction area, and in the oil area, I think we will allow ourselves some space to transit quickly to Iraqi authority.

For example, 60 percent of Iraq's people today get their food through the Oil for Food Program through a government handout. The economy does not work. There is infrastructure there that has been decaying the last 10 or 15 years. What we learned in Afghanistan was that if we could quickly do things that show people that there is a tangible benefit to this change, then we are able to bring people along.

I do not say to you for a second that this is an easy thing, but I think it is a doable thing.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask you this. I mean, obviously you are operating with different scenarios.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you give me some sense of how long this might take under different scenarios? What are the different scenarios you are working with in terms of turning over the occupation from the American forces to the Iraqi people? You must have some kind of a timeframe in mind. I do not mind if it is several different ones, but some sense of what we are talking about here?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Sure. Let me sort of give you an insight into how thinking has evolved on this. I think when Doug and I first started on this 6 or 8 or 10 months ago we saw this as a rigid thing. We would do phase one for  $x$  number of months, phase two for  $x$  number of months, phase three for  $x$  number of months. But as we have learned more about this and as we have made more proposals to our bosses, what we have come to conclude is that you could have this transition take place at different rates in different places.

For example, let us say that you went into the Ministry of Health and, after getting rid of the top  $x$  layers and dug down and found, as you said or Senator Biden said, that there are very competent people working in the Ministry of Health, that you might be able to transition the Ministry of Health back to Iraqi control quite rapidly. But if you went over to the ministry of weapons of mass destruction, that might take a very long time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Give me one scenario where that is all done; how much time does it take? Give me one estimate of how long you think the entire process of turning all those over takes?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Twelve years.

Senator FEINGOLD. Twelve years?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think some of the feelings on both sides of the aisle here are that there is a kind of a disconnect between the rhetoric we are hearing on all the rosy scenarios and a strong feeling of what might be another scenario and why are we not hearing some more about a worst-case and what are we prepared for in that instance?

It seems to me worst case would be that this is not viewed as or interpreted as a liberation. It is interpreted by many people, not only in Iraq but around the region, as a war on Islam and then we see all around the region, whether it is Jordan or Saudi Arabia, governments toppled. This is a worst-case scenario.

How are we prepared for that? Not only, as we saw years ago, looking back in history, did not Chiang Kai-shek and Mao get together to fight the Japanese? Will the Sunnis and the Kurds get together to fight the invaders? What happens then? Do we have an exit strategy? Or do you have plans? Are you being forthcoming?

Then is it on into Syria if we have problems there? Is it on into Saudi Arabia if there are problems there? I think those are our questions.

Mr. FEITH. Senator, it may be useful to take a step back from this issue of post-war planning and just remind ourselves for a moment of why we are talking about any of this at all. On September 11, 2001, we got hit and it was a big surprise for the country and the world, and it helped highlight that we live in a world that does not unfold like a script written in advance.

We are living in a world full of uncertainties and some of those uncertainties, which—I mean, I know that Senator Lugar was a pioneer in helping call attention to some of the kinds of dangers that weapons of mass destruction pose to us over a very long period of time. What September 11 helped focus us on is that, as bad as that problem of weapons of mass destruction proliferation was, when you link it to the terrorist problem it exists in aggravated form, because the whole concept of, for example, deterring proliferant countries needs to be reassessed if it turns out that those dangerous rogue states can use weapons of mass destruction through terrorist organizations in a way that does not leave any fingerprints and does not have a return address. You cannot deter such a country.

So we are dealing with very serious threats and great uncertainties, there is no question about it. I think that many of the questions here reflect the frustrations that we cannot provide greater certainty talking about the future. But we cannot. It is an essential part of our national security thinking and in particular our defense thinking, embodied in the documents that we use within the Pentagon for planning, it is an essential part of our thinking that there are enormous uncertainties and you cannot answer a lot of these questions precisely, but you can think about them as carefully as possible.

When we consider what it is that is at stake and we think about the risks to us, the President has decided that the risks are such that we have to insist that Iraq disarm. He has said it is either going to disarm cooperatively or we are going to lead a coalition of the willing to disarm it by force.

We have been thinking for a long time about what happens in the post-war period if we do have to disarm Iraq by force. But the same kinds of uncertainties that you have when you are talking about military threats apply to the post-war period. What we are planning for is we are planning to ensure that we can fulfill our responsibilities. We are looking to fulfill them in a way that takes into account all of the considerations that have been raised here, all of which are enormously important. We do not dispute—

Senator CHAFEE. I see the yellow light on. Do you have a plan, either an exit strategy or some kind of planning if this turns into a debacle, if everybody's against us on this?

Mr. FEITH. We are planning—the short answer is yes, we are planning for worst-case eventualities. What I would like to assure the committee is that every one of the—

Senator CHAFEE. When will you share those plans with us?

Mr. FEITH. Well, we are in the process today and we will be happy to talk further, both publicly or in closed session. Some obviously involve classified information, but some do not. The process of—this is the first hearing you have had on the subject and we are here and we will be happy to pursue the conversation with you.

What I do want to say, though, is that all of the anxieties and the questions and the worst-case projections that you have made I think are well grounded. I mean, these are all things worth worrying about and these are all things that we have in fact been worrying about.

Senator CHAFEE. I know my red light is up and I will just say that in both of your testimonies it was all so rosy. It was democratization, without the understanding that, suppose we democratize and an anti-American government is elected. It is a real possibility, but it was not a thread of either of your testimonies, and that is what I found surprising.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree very strongly with Senator Feingold. The questions that we are asking today should have been asked and answered before the President was given unilateral authority to go into Iraq. Now it is 4 months later, after he has got that authority, and you are sitting here doing the best you can, and you are not giving us much.

I agree with Senator Chafee's point, you have given us a rosy scenario. And the American people are smart. I think Senator Biden said this from day one: They want to know the truth.

So if I go home and I am asked, you know, what is the worst-case scenario, what is going to happen to our men and women over there, what is going to happen, I cannot give them an answer. It is not enough for me to say, well, they are going to tell me next week. They need to know.

You know, I have to say, maybe you cannot have one plan. I agree with that. But you got to have four or five or six or ten for every problem that we face. I have to say, Mr. Feith, you are being very honest with us. You are saying there are enormous uncertainties. You have used the word "uncertainties" more than you used any other word, and it is honest. But it is very disconcerting.

I can tell you, my people at home are anxious, and if they are watching this they are going to be more anxious. I do not know if they are more anxious about being told they have got to get duct tape and plastic to cover their windows at home in case there is a terrorist attack here, or listening to you say, gee, we just do not know.

The things we do know are that there are enormous uncertainties here and we do not have answers. Now, I have read reports produced by this committee, both sides, that say—some reports are that 500,000 Iraqis might be killed, might. We pray to God if this goes that way we do not have to kill anybody. We pray to God they

throw down their arms and we all sing Kumbayah together. We hope that. That would be the most wonderful thing, you know, to have peace without fighting.

But if it goes wrong and we do kill so many people, as Senator Feingold says, as we try to run this country how are they going to look at our men and women in uniform? Will they see them as liberators? Will we explain, gee, we had to do it; Saddam Hussein would not disarm, so we had to kill 500,000 people? And will we be alone?

I remember the first gulf war, how proud President Bush was, and rightly so, President Bush I: These are the people who are helping us, these are how many troops they are going in with, they are going to be by our side. Here is how much money they are giving. And in the end, Mr. Chairman, 88 percent of the costs were picked up by our friends.

I cannot tell my people at home what is going to happen. So do we know if Saddam is going to use his weapons of mass destruction? CIA says yes. I do not know what your contingency calls for, how we clean that up; whether he puts his oil fields on fire, what is the ecodamage there; what happens next.

I just use this opportunity to say that our allies are trying hard to resolve this another way. Speaking for myself, someone who believes that Saddam must be disarmed, he said he would be disarmed, he must act to disarm.

I do not think that we should be showing a lack of respect to our allies, who today came out together, and one of them is a man of whom President Bush said: "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He is an honest, straightforward man." That is President Bush about Mr. Putin.

Well, Mr. Putin is standing today with several of our allies and, as I understand it from today's news, 11 of the 15 Security Council members say the same thing: Give inspections a chance.

Now, as for me, we will see the next report by Mr. Blix on Valentine's Day and it is going to be very important to see what happens from there. But as we look here at post-war Iraq, I have a gnawing feeling that we are already agreeing that, even though the President said he has not decided to go to war, that we are going to go to war, without a lot of our allies.

I have to use this opportunity to say that as I think of the burdens that will be laid out, that will be on the shoulders of our men and women there, without—"who knows" is your answer as to how much help we get moneywise or with people, our friends helping us in the field—I say there is a lot more work that I hope you will do with us, in hearing us.

As it is, this would be a precedent-setting attack, the first time the United States has launched a preemptive strike. I know the President feels he has everything going for him to substantiate that attack. But as I look at all the scenarios, I think the best one is if we can avoid war. That is the best scenario, and that we can work with the people of Iraq to form democracy. And I still come back to that and I just may be in a minority here, but I want to say that.

Thank you.

Mr. FEITH. Thank you, Senator. If I may, I would like to make a distinction between plans and predictions. When we have been asked here this morning in a number of respects to give our assessment in the nature of a prediction of what is going to happen, how long an occupation may take, how easily one might transition politically and the like, and it is in that regard that I stressed uncertainty, because we are not in the predicting business.

That is what I was referring to when I was talking about uncertainties. On the other hand, planning we have to do. And I think that Senator Chafee's point is a good one when he talks about plans have to take into account a full range of possibilities, from good case to really bad case.

I do want to assure the committee that when we talk about all of the key functions that are going to need to be performed in post-war Iraq, we have thought about them across the range from worst case to very good case. In the case of oil, for example, if Saddam utterly destroys Iraq's oil infrastructure that is the worst case, and that has been taken into account. That makes for a horrific problem for reconstruction. It's enormously expensive to repair it and you do not have the oil revenues in the interim to repair it. But we are planning with that in mind.

We have also planned for—

Senator BOXER. How much will it cost to repair it?

Mr. FEITH. I think the estimates are in the neighborhood of—I do not have them precisely. I think they are in the neighborhood of something like \$8 to \$10 billion.

Senator BOXER. And who is going to pay for it?

Mr. FEITH. Well, that is a question.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. There is uncertainties.

Mr. FEITH. I am not suggesting that—there are all kinds of ways of handling that issue and we are studying the various ways of handling the issue of oil and what kind of support there might be in the world markets for investing in Iraqi oil after a conflict.

But oil is one example. Humanitarian relief, we have thought through from best case to worst case the question of whether the U.N. and other humanitarian relief agencies can get in quickly with the large flow of food that they have been providing for years. But we have also planned for a worst case where they stay out or they are not in a position to provide food aid.

I do not want to belabor it by going through the long list of functions that we are talking about, but I do want to assure you that your point is very well taken on the importance of doing one's planning, not on the basis of a specific prediction, but on the basis of having to deal with the range of possibilities from good to bad.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grossman.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Just two points quickly. One is just to emphasize the point that Doug just made and we have perhaps not made very well today, that in all the areas, Senator, that you have talked about—weapons of mass destruction, oil, humanitarian, reconstruction—there are very, very detailed plans that, as Doug says, run from worst case to best case. As I was describing to Senator Feingold, I picked one out on aid, on aid, water and sanitation, running from immediate post-conflict to 18 months.

So those are all available to you. We are glad to provide them and we are glad to brief them in detail, because there are just stacks of these things and I think we are trying to do this seriously.

Second, I just wanted to say that when you say that we would like to disarm Saddam Hussein peacefully, that is of course our position as well.

Senator BOXER. Good.

Mr. GROSSMAN. And I do not believe, Senator, that it is any disrespect to our allies that we have a disagreement about how to do that, in the sense that we believe that the reason there are inspectors in Iraq today is because the Security Council voted 15 to nothing for Resolution 1441. And we believe that there would be disarmament of Saddam Hussein if—

Senator BOXER. Mr. Grossman, my time is up, but can I say, you say there is no disrespect. Listen to what they say, because I may treat you in a way that I think is fair and you say, you know, the Senator did not respect me at all. And I just think when you have friends you have got to think about how they feel, OK, even if you disagree. Maybe you call them "old Europe," maybe it hurts their feelings, you know.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I accept that. But there is one other group here that deserves our respect and that is, in my view, the U.N. Security Council. And we have a 15 to nothing vote in 1441 and we want to try to get a second resolution. So I think part of the respect that we are trying to give to the Security Council is respect that is deserved from others as well, if I could put it that way.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both these gentlemen for your testimony here and your answers to these questions.

In looking at this issue of military action, everyone wants all sorts of certainty in what is going to happen afterwards. It is absolutely impossible to give an accurate projection or prediction as to what will happen. This is akin to diagramming every play of a rugby game. You do not know how it is going to come out, where it is going to be fumbled, when you are going to have to pitch it out and move forward.

I think that this uncertainty, though, should not paralyze us, should not paralyze us from going forward with our goal, and that is the disarmament of Saddam Hussein from these weapons of mass destruction, the delivery systems, and his ties to terrorism.

War and its after effects are always situation-dependent. I am one who likes to be guided by principles and I think that the principles that Secretary Grossman went forward with—that this is a war to liberate the people of Iraq, that we want to obviously eliminate their chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, their nuclear programs and delivery systems. We want to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in Iraq, and of course safeguard the territorial unity of the country.

I think these are very important points to make to our allies and those who may not be with us but are democracies, to understand here are our motives, here are our goals.

The other thing that I would also mention—and this is frustrating—is that in this reconstruction if a war or military action, is needed, I know that our military planners like to avoid as much as possible collateral damage or civilian damages. This is very frustrating. The President mentioned it yesterday, in that Saddam Hussein looks at the Iraqi people as shields. But I know that our country puts the value of human life very high and will try to avoid that.

Clearly, we are going to have everyone who is with us, whenever these decisions are made by the Security Council or others, in the event that military action is necessary. Those countries that are with us certainly will participate. I am hopeful that those who do may not see the need for military action, will in the future, will join in and recognize the importance of security and rebuilding in Iraq if a war is necessary. They do have valuable resources.

The bottom line is, no matter how uncertain or how difficult this period may be, we do need to move forward. The people of Iraq, and hopefully as many of them will survive any sort of military action as is necessary, will see the benefit of removing this oppressive, tyrannical regime. I feel that inaction or being paralyzed or worrying endlessly and coming up with every excuse not to act—the world and the neighbors of Iraq will be much safer if that regime is disarmed from these chemical and biological weapons and means of delivery.

So as we go forward there are a lot of these questions, but because you cannot answer or predict everything perfectly should not be a reason for us not to act.

Let me followup on a few of these issues that have arisen generally from Senator Hagel and to some extent Senator Biden. The nations—and I know you do not want to list the nations for diplomatic reasons. Do you believe, though, that the nations that, let us say, may decide against participating in any military action to disarm Saddam Hussein will offer assistance in transitioning or rebuilding Saddam Hussein? And I put it in several categories: say those that are in Europe and those that are neighbors, Arab countries? And I know you cannot mention—I would love to have the listing, but could you give us a sense, do you think that they would help in rebuilding even if they decide they are opposed to military action?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, Senator Allen, I do. When we went to seek assistance from the 51 countries that we identified as possible partners in this, we asked for assistance in three categories. One of those categories was in post-conflict support and we got quite a number of positive responses. As I said to the chairman and Senator Hagel, we are glad to provide that to the committee.

Senator ALLEN. Would that also apply for Arab countries that are nearby as well?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator ALLEN. That is good.

Have you had any talks—this has to do with within Iraq—talks with any of the opposition leaders? And if so, I do not want to

breach any diplomacy or efforts, but if you have had those talks how would you characterize those talks, because those individuals, opposition leaders, can be very important in a post-Saddam Iraq?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Do I take your question to be opposition leaders inside of Iraq?

Senator ALLEN. Well, opposition leaders—you are not going to have many inside Iraq who are alive.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator ALLEN. I am talking about opposition leaders externally.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. We have had extensive conversations with them. In fact, last August, Doug and I had the first meeting with a group of six, a group of six opposition leaders, which we thought was very successful, and we have continued on through the President's Special Envoy, Zal Khalilzad, who is actually in the area now talking to opposition leaders.

As Doug very rightly reminds me, of course we do have conversations with people who are opposed to Saddam Hussein in northern Iraq because of the great work that our people do and that they do in terms of what is going on there.

Senator ALLEN. If I may followup, in these discussions, whether external or the three major groups in Iraq, are they in agreement with the guiding principles that you have enunciated in your testimony this morning?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, I think they are.

Senator ALLEN. That is important.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Anticipating this post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, I ventured to Afghanistan a couple of times last year, went to Bosnia, to see what I could learn. And I was struck, first of all that it always takes longer in occupation. We thought maybe we would be in Bosnia for a year and we are now in the seventh year.

I was also struck in Bosnia that, even though we were there in a rather substantial military presence, there are war criminals on the loose, one we think in Bosnia, the other one perhaps in Serbia, the two most notorious. And I am just curious as to your thoughts of how that might be different in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, we hope it would be different because we hope that we would not *x* number of years later have these people running around. As with everything else we have reported to you today, there is a group of lawyers and law enforcement people working on a plan to consider how to deal with Saddam Hussein, his top lieutenants, his family, how to bring them to justice. That is something that I know is very high on the priority list of our military forces should military force be required.

These are decisions that also are headed toward our President, but I believe you would find, Senator, if we had a chance to brief you on them that the planning for this has been extremely well done and is very well thought out.

Senator NELSON. Well, if that planning is well done and well thought out and would be executed and be successful, perhaps you ought to apply that planning to Bosnia.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely. But as you did, sir, we have tried to learn in each area. I mean, when you say that we went to Bosnia for what we thought was going to be a short amount of time, I remember talking to Senators Lugar and Biden. I mean, this was a collective mistake, if I might say, on all of our parts in trying to set a date instead of trying to lay out a series of goals and objectives.

I appreciate what Senator Allen said about these particular goals and objectives. So, although I guessed for Senator Feingold how long this might take in a specific project, what we are going to do is be there until we have achieved these objectives.

Further, sir, I think it is fair to say—and I know we have shown this slide before in this committee—it is also important to know again the radical slide down of American forces in KFOR in Bosnia. I think we have been quite successful there in doing what people wish us to do, which is achieve certain objectives, but not maintain large numbers of foreign troops if we do not have to.

So I hope we have learned some lessons. I take your point exactly and we would like to do a better job.

Senator NELSON. And I hope for you the same. But I will tell you, I am highly skeptical that if we pulled out of Bosnia right now if there would not be the continuation of the slaughter that there was 7 years ago there.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, of course we are not pulling out of Bosnia. Senator NELSON. But we are drawing down.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely.

Senator NELSON. That is what you said.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. And we are very proud of that, because we have been able to draw down and, with all due respect, although Bosnia-Kosovo are not perfect, it has not returned to what it was 7 years ago.

Senator NELSON. The long and short of it is that it is going to be a long time, and I am not arguing that. I am just stating what has been hitting me in the face as a hard reality of life in a post-war occupation.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely.

Senator NELSON. In last September the CBO said that the U.S. occupation force would likely require 75,000 to 200,000, at a cost—and this staggered me—a cost of \$1 billion to \$4 billion per month. That is what CBO said. What do you think?

Mr. FEITH. Senator, I am just not in a position to predict that. And I do not have at my fingertips even the work that has been done within DOD on the subject, let alone the CBO project. But it is something that I will be happy to get you our best thinking on for the record.

[At the time of publication a response had not been received.]

Senator NELSON. Well, I would assume that the chairman, that that would be one of the things that he would absolutely be insisting on.

Let me just finally ask. Today the New York Times reported that General Franks said in an interview that the government was co-ordinating with the international relief organizations to prevent a civilian crisis in the event of war. Can you detail to us who are the organizations you have been working with and how will that work?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, Senator. Let me take for the record the exact number of NGOs. But what we are doing and have from the very beginning is make sure that the NGO community and the international relief organizations, some of them, the United Nations for example, are very tightly tied together with General Franks and with CENTCOM and with all of us.

As I said previously, there is a meeting each week among 30 non-governmental organizations, that both the Pentagon and the State Department are represented. We are trying our very best to solve their problems. They have been involved in the planning, in our planning from the very beginning. President Bush in releasing \$11 million to keep the planning going has been for precisely that effort.

As I said in answer to another Senator, these NGOs are absolutely key to our ability to get this job done. We learned that in northern Iraq, General Zinni and I, in 1991. Without the help of the nongovernmental organizations and the international organizations like the World Food Program, we cannot accomplish this task. This is a huge priority for us and, as I said to Senator Boxer, I think if you went through all of the aid ideas, for example, on the areas that are in their responsibility, you would find NGO, NGO, NGO, international community.

So we are trying to be lashed up with them as successfully as possible. But I will provide for the record an exact list of who attends this meeting and what organizations they are.

[The following information was subsequently provided:]

NGOs in regular attendance at the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration's meetings on humanitarian relief in Iraq:

InterAction, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps International, World Vision, Refugees International, CARE, Kurdish Institute, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Services, American Refugee Council, International Medical Corps, American Friends Service Committee, International Aid, Northwest Medical Team, and Air Service International.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here and sharing the nitty-gritties of this with this really difficult process. I was looking at this, comparing it to Afghanistan. The thing about Afghanistan that is different—there are a number of things different, but there was a process, a local process, that loya jirga process, that everybody kind of agreed to as a way that you can come at some sort of governance in Afghanistan. You can have the local communities elect representatives and send them to a national kind of convention that had a long-standing system, and set up an agreement and buy-in by the population of Afghanistan, and you can arrive at a system of governance there. Afghanistan has a number of other great problems, but there was a system that people could agree to.

Iraq, I have not been able to identify one, and I am gathering really it is tough for people to identify. I have worked with the Iraqi opposition for a long period of time now, with the INC, Iraqi National Congress. They have had their difficulties. I was in London meeting with them in December. I know both of you gentlemen

have met with them. And they were really setting their differences aside and doing a very nice job, I thought, of pulling together, and a broad set of opposition groups.

These are exterior oppositions. They are working with people interior, primarily in the north, some in the south. But I was quite impressed at how far forward they had gone, how much they were cooperating and working together and really pulling together.

I appreciate your working with them, with the INC and with other groups, although I do note, as the chairman did when he first started your questioning, which must seem to you guys like hours ago—it is like coming up, being in a dentist's chair for hours, to get us to press on you. There was a New York Times article today, continuing to have this question of working with the INC versus recruiting some additional new leadership.

To me this is the real nuts and bolts, one of the real nuts and bolts tough problems in the transition period that you have talked about. You have got a post-Saddam period and then within that you have got to have some leadership arise, Iraqi leadership arise, to run Iraq, because we do not want to run Iraq. We are not going to run Iraq. It will be Iraqis that do this.

Is there still this level of debate within the administration on whether to engage the INC or somebody else of leadership to come forward from Iraq interior? Can you, if you can, disclose any of the thinking that is going on about that very specific, yet critically important problem?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Let me try and then ask Doug for some help. The answer to the question about whether there is still a big debate going on in the administration about all this is no, sir. Doug and I last July kind of looked up from our pencils and paper and said: You know, why are we spending all this time fighting with each other over what Iraqi opposition? We ought to do this together.

So you will recall perhaps that last August we invited the six major groups, including, very much including the INC, to meet with both of us together. And we tried to show them that we had a unified front and we were hoping to encourage them therefore to have a unified front. And I do not say it has anything to do with us, but, like you, we see a lot of positives there.

So we are continuing to work with all of these groups. I know that you know, Senator, since it is money that you all have authorized, we continue to provide the INC with a considerable sum of money and am glad for the record to break that down over the last few months. So the debate in this administration—

Senator BROWNBACH. Mr. Secretary, could I on that point?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, of course.

Senator BROWNBACH. I do not mean to interrupt you, but I just want to make sure to get this before my time is up. The TV Liberty that they were operating is not operating now and they are saying that their lack of funds for being able to operate that television and radio, which I think would be a critical communication component—I hope that can be resolved near-term.

Mr. GROSSMAN. We would like to get started with that TV and radio right away again. We have money set aside for it. As I understand it, and I will be glad to give you a further answer, is what

we need is a clean request for TV and radio and then it can be funded. But we will work on that.

If I might just say one word about Afghanistan, Iraq, and the question of governance. Absolutely right, you are faced in a sense with mirrors here. In Afghanistan you had no bureaucracy to speak of and you had no money to speak of, but there was a loya jirga process so we could see our way forward.

In Iraq, of course, there is a talented bureaucracy that we hope we can kind of take the top off of and then use, and of course there is money, there is oil. Yet the way forward, as you describe it, through an established loya jirga-like system is not there. But it is one of the reasons that we have spent so much time and so much effort on these Future of Iraq Projects, so that we have a way forward, we have an idea for a constitution, we have an idea for laws.

Exactly as you say, those things then need to be legitimated in some way by the people inside of Iraq. But we are not going to show up there and then try to figure out what to do.

Senator BROWNBACK. I hope you will continue to work with these outside oppositions along with inside oppositions. And I agree we should not show up and say, OK, here is the new leader of Iraq, but that we should use all of this talent that has been very dedicated for a period of years to confront Saddam Hussein, to remove Saddam Hussein, and to liberate the Iraqi people.

I think one of the things we lose sight of here is how much they are and have suffered, the Iraqi people. Their worst nightmare is what they have been living, and I hope we can identify and see and work with them very closely as we move on forward.

Mr. FEITH. Senator, when you asked about the INC it reminded me that Senator Allen had raised the question whether the principles that we have laid out in general for the kind of government we would like to see arise in Iraq are shared by Iraqi opposition groups. One of the principal accomplishments of the INC was organizing conferences of multiple groups over the last 10 years or so where they themselves promulgated principles that all of the major Iraqi opposition groups now subscribe to, that are principles that we support.

Now, I take Senator Chafee's point that you should not look at that through rose-colored glasses. We do not in any way underestimate how difficult the problems are going to be of getting these people to actually work together and develop a kind of smooth co-operation in a country that does not have a history of a democratic political culture and the kind of cooperation that we would like to foster.

It is going to be very difficult and we do not want to be overly rosy in projections about it. But nevertheless, we should not be blind to the good news that at least there have been accomplishments at the level of principle, and the Iraqi opposition deserves some credit for lining up behind the I think very admirable principles.

Mr. GROSSMAN. May I say something? Just one other thing, Senator, and that is that Zal Khalilzad has been out for a couple of weeks talking to Iraqi oppositionists and why do we not just offer, either to members or staff as you wish, a briefing when he returns. I think it would be helpful to put all this into perspective.

Senator BROWNTACK. I think that would be helpful. I would note, those principles are democracy, human rights, an open economy. I mean, they are the basic things that we stand for, is what this opposition is pushing aggressively. These basic principles are ones that will truly liberate the Iraqi people when they are implemented.

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNTACK

It is a true shame that France and Germany have dealt a blow to NATO's authority by blocking efforts of the majority of members from helping Turkey defend against a possible Iraqi attack. It is a real measure of the French and German desire to undermine the American position that they are even willing to leave a fellow ally out in the cold.

We have shown the world specific evidence of Saddam's intent to deceive inspectors—with conversations between Iraqi military officials discussing the fact that they are evacuating weapons and ammunition.

As if this is not enough, we have satellite photographs of the Iraqi military digging holes, moving equipment or burying things at inspection sites shortly before inspection teams arrived. This indicates that the Iraqis are aware of where inspectors are going—and therefore, these inspections are not random, and allow Iraqis to avoid detection.

It is clear that Saddam is not disarming, is not cooperating with inspectors and remains a danger to the world community. We must work with the Iraqi opposition groups to end this threat and end the brutality he has imposed on the Iraqi people.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Brownback. That would be helpful, to alert the gentlemen on that briefing. I think this would be of interest to us.

I would just mention parenthetically, the committee tomorrow at 9:30 will talk about Afghanistan, governance of Afghanistan, and work along our way there.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, first let me in anticipation commend you for holding that hearing tomorrow morning on Afghanistan. I think it is extremely important, and I do not think we are focusing sufficiently on that matter, and that an operation which was initially largely successful may be slipping away from us from lack of focus and lack of commitment of resources and support. I think it is a very important hearing.

Secretary Grossman, I have two questions I want to put to you just very quickly. How many U.S. troops did we have in Europe that we sustained there over a very long period of time? The figure of about 300,000 seems to stick in my mind that we had in the region year in, year out, as part of the containment strategy of the Soviet Union. Is that correct, that figure?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think if you go back some years it is in the 300,000 range.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, it is down now.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think it is considerably less today.

Senator SARBANES. I know, it is about 100,000 now, I think. But for quite a sustained period of time when the tensions were up it was at about 300,000, was it not?

Mr. GROSSMAN. That is my recollection.

Senator SARBANES. OK. And the other question I wanted to put to you—I have been following the NATO issue right now dealing

with Turkey and I see that Turkey has just formally made a request, I think a day or two ago; is that right?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, they requested consultations under article 4 of the charter yesterday.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, yesterday.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Now, prior to this had the request for this NATO support come from Turkey?

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir, it had come from the United States. If you will recall—

Senator SARBANES. So the United States in effect was making a request on Turkey's behalf or substituting for Turkey, or what?

Mr. GROSSMAN. No. When Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz went to the North Atlantic Council on the 2nd or 3rd of December—I apologize, I cannot remember which day—he wanted to lay out for NATO and the Council the kinds of things that NATO might be able to provide if we had to fight in Iraq, not just about Turkey but generally. But two or three of the things that he proposed did have to do with the defense of Turkey, air defense for example, chem-bio defense, and we were hoping that we would start some planning in the NATO military councils for that, for that effort.

Senator SARBANES. Well, under article 4 must not the country itself make the request?

Mr. GROSSMAN. The country itself must make the request under article 4. We were hoping, Senator, that it would not come to Turkey actually having to make an article 4 request. We were hoping that the alliance would recognize, first, that it had a job, could do a job in Afghanistan if it so wished; and second, that Turkey, being on that front line, had some needs. We were absolutely hoping that they would not have to pull out their NATO handbook and read article 4.

Senator SARBANES. William Nordhaus, a very distinguished economist at Yale, in December wrote a long article in the New York Review of Books, "Iraq, the Economic Consequences of War." In that he points out that the CBO estimate that the occupation of Iraq would cost between \$17 billion and \$45 billion per year. He says this may be too low if the post-combat environment in Iraq is hostile and its dangers resemble those on the West Bank more than those in the Balkans.

What is your figure—I put it to both of you—on the costs of the occupation per year?

Mr. GROSSMAN. The single most unsatisfactory thing we are going to be able to do here today is not give you a figure. Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, both said that it is not a knowable figure. Secretary Powell said the other day he did not know the answer to that question, and if he did not know it I do not know it. I apologize. We are stuck.

Senator SARBANES. You have no idea? You have no ballpark estimate?

Mr. GROSSMAN. So much of it, Senator, as the person you just quoted, depends upon what happens. As Secretary Rumsfeld said—I hope I get this right—you know, is it 4 days, 4 weeks, 5 weeks? How much destruction is done by Saddam Hussein?

Senator SARBANES. Surely there must be some scenarios downtown. How long is this war going to last under your estimate, Secretary Feith?

Mr. FEITH. The quotation from Secretary Rumsfeld that Marc Grossman was just referring to, he said: "I have no idea whether it is going to last 4 days, 4 weeks, or 4 months." And we do not know.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Could I just say, though, that there is a lot—as Doug said before, we are in a distinction between prediction and planning. We have tasked a huge amount of planning and that planning, as we are glad to show you, comes with a price tag. We have an idea, for example, if we have to feed Iraqis for a certain number of weeks, how much that will cost, how much to restore the water systems. But that is, it is not a total set of figures, which is why at this time, at this day, we cannot argue one way or the other with an article either from CBO or in the New York Review of Books.

Senator SARBANES. Well, what is your estimate on how long the occupation would last?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Again, it depends on a number of things. It depends on how long the war lasts, how much destruction is done. As I tried, probably not very well, to answer Senator Feingold, when we started to think about this, Senator, we, I think both of us, felt that there would be a start date, a stop date, a start date, a stop date, for the various phases. I do not think that any more.

I think, for example, as I answered before, that, let us say that you could go into the Ministry of Health and the bureaucracy there except for the very top has not been perverted by this particular regime. You might be able to turn over efforts at the Ministry of Health to Iraqis before you might be able to turn over the ministry for weapons of mass destruction, for example.

So we, as I said in my opening statement, we are trying to think through this not so much in this day, that day now, but transitioning authority as quickly as possible to Iraqis wherever possible.

Senator SARBANES. Well, my time is up. I invite you to give us your rosy scenario. Why do you not just give us your rosy scenario of how the war will go and how the occupation will go and what it will cost us?

Mr. GROSSMAN. We have actually been accused all day here of doing nothing but giving rosy scenarios. I will repeat what I said to Senator Feingold. He asked me my personal opinion, one scenario, one AID project only; he asked me, "how long will it take." I told him 2 years. That 2 years is no better or worse than any other estimate, sir, but I give it to you because I would like to answer your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you have a difficult task before you, looking into the future. Just a quick observation. I went to law school and law school had a class called torts. The function of that class was to look at everything that could go wrong, and it impacted lawyers.

When I had a chance to lead a city, I had to kind of hold my lawyers at bay at times. There are many, many worst-case scenarios, but you would never lead a city—and we were able to lead my city into better times—if all we looked at was the worst-case scenarios. You could not lead a country if all you did was look at worst-case scenarios.

I think, though, it would be very clear to say that a post-Saddam Iraq is going to be a better place, fair guess, than Saddam in control of weapons of mass destruction, in control of biological agents. Just as I know there has been a lot of discussion about Afghanistan, but a post-Taliban Afghanistan is a better place today. I think few would argue that. Are there uncertainties out there? But they are a better place.

My question goes to understanding the uncertainty and difficulty you face, but the kind of answers that we are trying to get here so the American public can feel more comfortable. I always believed I had to have a path, I could look at a path with different variations on how to lead my city to a better place.

So my question then is, as you look at the possibility of a better Iraq, perhaps not democracy as we know it, but understanding that you have the Kurdish situation, understanding that you have the Sunni-Shi'ite cleavages that are out there, in your planning and in scenario and however you have done this have you laid out various paths, various visions, to say, yes, we can pull those pieces together so that there will be a brighter future? You are not giving us money and you are not giving us time right now, but I need to know have you kind of played it out and say, yes, you know, if *a*, *b*, and *c* happens we can create, we can have in place an Iraqi-ruled regime in which there is a place for the Kurds and there is a peace with the Sunnis and the Shi'ites and, by the way, if Saddam has not destroyed the oil—and I really appreciate the comment that you made that the warnings are being sent out destruction of oil will be treated like release of weapons of mass destruction. And if you have still got that educated bureaucracy and you have still got the infrastructure, tell me and let me know, is that vision out there and can you talk a little about it?

Mr. FEITH. Senator, the short answer to the question of whether we have some idea of how the different institutions of the government might come together is “yes,” that that is the subject matter of the work that Marc Grossman talked about in the Future of Iraq Project, where—one of the issues here is we understand that if there is a war and we come into control of Iraq that we have major responsibilities. And there is a certain American trait, a kind of engineering instinct. There is a problem, we go out, we solve it.

But at the same time that we have this thought in our head that there are these problems and we may have ways of solving them, we have in mind points that a number of the Senators here have made that this country belongs to the Iraqis, it does not belong to us. Even if we wind up coming in control of it, it is their country. We have to concern ourselves with legitimacy, international legitimacy and legitimacy within Iraq.

We have to approach our task with a sense of responsibility, but a sense of modesty. That is perhaps—the requirement to balance constantly between taking into account what the Iraqis think and

what will work in Iraq and what will really be organic and function well there, given the history and culture of that country and the fact that we are trying to put it up to a level that it has never achieved in the realm of good government, with broad-based, responsible government that takes into account all of the different groups, as you are highlighting, in the country from the Kurds to the Sunni Arabs to the Shi'ite Arabs and the Turkomans and the Syrians—I mean, there are all kinds of groups there.

What we have done is we have worked with various Iraqi groups. We have introduced our own thinking, we have brought thinking in from other quarters, about what kinds of judicial reform, what kinds of constitutional arrangements, what kinds of administrative arrangements, could be successful in keeping the country together as a unified country and providing both freedom and economic prosperity to people based on the development of democratic institutions that might work.

It is very hard to tell you precisely what we plan to do because so much, as we have talked about all morning, depends on how events unfold. But I could tell you that a great deal of thought has been given to the kinds of considerations that I think you rightfully highlight as crucial to the success of our policy and the possibility of happiness for Iraq in the future.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for arriving late. We had Alan Greenspan appearing before the Banking Committee, so some of us who are on that committee were necessarily away.

Mr. Chairman, of all the hearings we are holding on Iraq, I think this is the most significant one, because I think most of us accept the notion that the military conflict, while we hope it will go well, we will prevail in this. It is the after costs and effects here that really do require some thought.

I was not here for all of the hearing, but I am told anyway that there is the reluctance of the administration to get into much detail about cost and time. Certainly all of us here understand the inability to get too definitive about this. But I must also tell you, at least express my disappointment as we try and lay this out, within some parameters I think the American public have a right to know what we are getting into here. Even if their scenarios do not turn out to be quite right, it gives them at least some sense of it. And I am disappointed that we cannot at least have some broader outlines of what the time may be beyond what is included in the testimony.

So I would like to raise just a couple of questions because, Mr. Feith, in your testimony here on page 2, when you talk about the commitment, you talk about the length, that is a commitment to stay as long as required to achieve the objectives you have just listed. And if you go with the five objectives that you listed there, the idea that you are going to get these done in a couple of years seems to me awfully naive.

I mean, part of what may be worthwhile here—I do not know if we have done this at all, but to talk a little about the history of Iraq. Maybe many people do not know the history, but the history

is one of sort of a cobbled-together nation at the end of World War I by the European powers, principally England. So you have taken over the last 80 years basically tribal relationships and created a nation State, and for the last 40 of it, half that time, under a dictator.

When I read item No. 4 here, that is to safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq, the United States does not support Iraq's disintegration or dismemberment, now that looks to me like you are going to be a little longer there than 24 months when you consider the factions that are going to emerge.

I wonder if you might address that point. And in conjunction with that, there has been some troubling news that has come out that some of the exile groups in Iraq are forging a relationship with very conservative religious elements in Iran, and I am very interested in knowing whether or not the secular State of Iraq may be forfeited to something along more conservative religious lines that Iran is under today in the aftermath of our efforts there.

So I want you to go into the history a little bit and tell me why you think that nation-building here and holding this together is something that can be achieved in, using your response to Senator Feingold, 2 years.

Mr. FEITH. First of all, Senator, the 2 years was my esteemed colleague Under Secretary Grossman's estimate.

Senator DODD. You are passing the buck already.

Mr. FEITH. And I do not think I want to venture into the prediction business. The question that you ask about keeping Iraq together is a serious question. You are correct that Iraq is a country that was manufactured, as it were, by the victorious allies after World War I. It did not exist as a country before that.

But there are many countries around the world that did not exist before World War I and that have developed a sense of national identity and unity. It is our policy that we favor preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq and we think that that is important for the stability of the region. There are many countries in the area that have a strong interest in that and we share that interest. At the same time, we do not—

Senator DODD. This is even after the weapons of mass destruction—let us assume we have eliminated those. We are going to stay around then and try and build this nation?

Mr. FEITH. As we have been discussing, we understand that we have a responsibility, if there is a war and if we lead a coalition that comes into control of Iraq, we have a responsibility to do the kinds of things that you alluded to and that both Marc Grossman and I talked about in your testimony.

Senator DODD. Even if it is not their will to do so? There may be some who prefer not to necessarily be under the nation State of Iraq, but might seek some other alternative political structure.

Mr. FEITH. Well, there is a country of Iraq. It is our position that its territorial integrity, the preservation of its territorial integrity, is in our interest, and we have been told by the various groups that we have talked about across the spectrum of Iraqi politics to the extent that we can tap into it that there is unanimity in favor of preserving Iraq's territorial integrity among the major groups.

So I do not think that we have anybody that is arguing with us in principle that Iraq should be broken apart.

Senator DODD. Could you touch on the comment just quickly on the Iranian religious, to the extent is that report accurate? Are there other communications, contacts, some relationship developing between the Iraqi exile community and the religious conservatives of Iran?

Mr. FEITH. There are. Iran is right next door and Iran has a large number of Iraqi refugees in it and those refugees are connected with Iraqi refugees and exiles in other countries. So those kinds of contacts exist.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Grossman.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator, I feel the slight need to defend myself against the charge of naivete here. Senator Feingold asked me if I could name one date in one plan and I said 2 years, and the reason I did that is a number of the plans, for example from AID about the humanitarian issues, run from the end of conflict to 18 months to 24 months.

I think, as we answered Senator Nelson, though, and as I said to Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, I think it would be a big mistake for us to set some kind of a date. That is why we set these principles, and these are principles that are hard to achieve.

Senator DODD. I agree. I do not disagree with that. I just think when you start, even using your 2 years—and I do not want to play “catch you” with the 2-years. But I think we are talking about a much longer time here.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I think it is very important to be very level with the American public about this. It is going to be very costly and it is going to take a long, long time. And it is better to say that up front in a way than to sort of delude people into believing somehow that this is going to be a short-term deal at relatively low cost, particularly if we have to pay the bill ourselves. It is going to be very expensive, it is going to take a long, long time, and we are going to be there for years in putting this together, particularly if we are doing it alone. And it is going to be very difficult. It is not easy to do it.

I think it is better to lay that out than to sort of create this illusion somehow that this is going to be a relatively painless, short-term deal. My sense is, while you are not necessarily saying that, that is the impression that gets left. And I think that is a mistake. I think it is dangerous.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Fair enough. If that is the impression we have left, it is going to be hard and it is going to take long. In both of our testimonies the phrase we used was, “we would stay there as long as it took.”

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement I would like to have inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record.

Senator VOINOVICH. As we continue to confront the challenges presented by Saddam Hussein in his pursuit of weapons of mass

destruction, it is clear that we must, as you have, give due consideration to what will be required in the aftermath in regard to our efforts to disarm him. I think that we have to make it clear that he has to be disarmed.

But I think that we have tried to emphasize today that the world will judge the success of any U.S.-led initiative not by what happens to secure a military victory over Saddam Hussein should the use of force be required, but instead by what is done to secure a new lease on life for the people of Iraq and, I think also very importantly, for Iraq's neighbors, who have had to live with the threat of Saddam Hussein for a long period of time.

I think that it is also important to discuss, and I would be interested in your comments, the impact that our efforts will have to help achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, given the role that Iraq has played in destabilizing the region. One of the real questions among the Arab nations is, is this nation committed to a Palestinian State? And until the terrorism is lessened, and we know that Iraq is one of the prime movers in that terrorism, we are not going to have an environment where we can move on and affirm the State of Israel and create a Palestinian State.

I think that what should be talked about is the fact that this is an important step in the right direction in terms of achieving that goal that we are committed to.

I think it also should be made clear that, as others have said, this is going to involve considerable resources, financial and otherwise, and it is going to require not only the long-term commitment of the United States, but our partners in the U.N. and other allies; and we need to tell the American people forthrightly about what the costs would be.

I think that we ought not to hide it. I agree with some of the other Senators here. We need to let everyone know that we are committed to stay in Iraq as long as need be. And I think we ought to talk about realistic numbers, not 2 years, 3 years. How long have we been in Bosnia? 1992-1993. Kosovo, we have been there since, what, 1999. And we have seen that if we do not have the kind of commitment that we need to have, there can be consequences for example, my opinion is that if we had done our job better in Kosovo we would not have had the destabilization in Macedonia.

You have got the Iranians on the border there. Who knows what they are going to do. You have got the Kurds. Securing the border is very, very important here. And I think it is really important to our Arab friends and I think to our allied friends that we lay it out: We are going to be there, we are going to get the job done; we hope that you join with us. If you do not join with us, we are going to have to run the books.

You know, that is not bad sometimes, because too often when we have kind of divided up the responsibility, when something gets done it does not go the way we would like it to go.

Now, you are talking about plans for the future and I want to congratulate you and I hope that some of the Senators that spoke to you today at least read, if they were not here to hear your testimony, I hope they read your testimony. I think you have done a fine job of laying out all of the things that need to be done.

But I do believe that you need to talk more about how long you are going to be there and be forthright, OK. I mean, we need to do that. We need to level with the American people. We need to let them know that if we go forward with this, it is going to be a sacrifice and there are things in this country that we are not going to be able to do because of our commitment there, because we think it is important to secure the safety and well-being of people in our country.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the past several weeks, this committee has continued to closely examine developments in Iraq. We have heard from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and our Ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, concerning the reality of the dangerous situation before us.

There is no doubt that the international community was loud and clear in its call for Iraq to disarm last November, unanimously adopting UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441, giving Iraq one last chance to comply with its international disarmament obligations. However, as confirmed by chief UN weapons inspectors in their January 27, 2003 report to the Security Council, despite our most sincere hopes, Saddam Hussein has refused to disarm and continues to violate the terms of UNSCR 1441.

Critical decisions will be made in the coming days and weeks. While the international community has yet to determine the next step it will take to address Iraq's continued defiance of UNSCR 1441, the United States cannot and will not sit idly by while Saddam Hussein continues to thumb his nose at the international community. The time has come for the United Nations to stand up to the Iraqi dictator, once and for all. As Secretary of State Colin Powell argued in his presentation before the United Nations last Wednesday, "Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world."

As we continue to confront the challenges presented by Saddam Hussein and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, it is crucial that we give all due consideration to what will be required in the aftermath of our efforts to disarm Iraq, whether through the use of military force or some other means.

The world will judge the success of any U.S.-led initiative not by what happens to secure a military victory against Saddam Hussein, should the use of force be required, but instead by what is done to secure a new lease on life for the people of Iraq and for Iraq's neighbors, who have had to live with the threat of Saddam Hussein. It will also impact our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is clear that this will involve considerable resources, financial and otherwise. It will require not only the long-term commitment of the United States, but also partnerships with the United Nations and our friends and allies abroad. It will be costly, and we should not underestimate what will be required of us.

As we gather today, I am glad that we are continuing to raise and discuss important questions about plans to restore stability and promote a better life for the people of Iraq. There are long-term objectives to which we must commit ourselves, and we must be prepared to see our efforts through during a period of time which will likely span the course of many years, rather than months—with some saying it could take at least ten years.

I again thank the chairman for scheduling this important hearing, and I thank the witnesses for taking time to appear before the committee today. I look forward to their testimony.

Senator BIDEN. Bingo.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator, may I, and on behalf of Doug, just thank you very much for your comments on our testimony. We did the very best we could and, as I said, this was really a consultation rather than perhaps a different style hearing. I think we both also would completely agree with the point that you make on the Middle East. If we could bring down levels of terrorism, which Iraq is certainly a partner in this, of terrorism, we would all be a lot better

off and we would do much quicker the job toward getting toward President Bush's vision of a Palestinian State and an Israeli State living side by side in peace.

Might I also say to you, Senator, and to the chairman and the ranking member, we both have taken clearly the request and the admonition that we start being able to talk about numbers in open and we will both take that back. As I said, we are trying to declassify lots of this planning to propose it to you, and I recognize the question of numbers.

Finally, I think it is very important that we be as straight as possible with people about the enormity of this task. That is why we both said we would stay there as long as it takes and why, Senator, I think it is important, as you said, that we set goals for ourselves and not dates. Our job is to get this job done that we want to in Iraq. And as long as it takes, that is what it will take.

Mr. FEITH. Senator, on your point about the effect on U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict of a possible war in Iraq, I think there are a number of connections. One is the one that you highlighted, that the Saddam Hussein regime has been a supporter of Palestinian terrorism and in particular some months ago Saddam Hussein offered payments to the families of suicide bombers to encourage suicide bombing. And there are other connections that they have in support, that Iraq has over the years and currently provides to Palestinian terrorist groups who are blocking any hope for progress toward Arab-Israeli peace.

There is an additional point also and that is if it is possible to realize some of the plans that we have discussed here today to encourage the creation of democratic institutions in Iraq, one effect of that if we are successful would be I think to encourage, to inspire, Palestinians to create for themselves democratic institutions that would help create the kind of interlocutor for the Israelis that could make serious progress toward peace much more realistic.

I think that was an essential point in President Bush's June 24 speech of last year, when he talked about finding a way forward for Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy through the creation of a new leadership and better institutions on the Palestinian side so that the Israelis have a proper interlocutor.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member for a final thought.

Senator BIDEN. I want to read a quote to you that was in a joint session of Congress: "We of today shall be judged in the future by the manner in which we meet the unprecedented responsibilities that rest upon us, not alone in winning the war, but in making certain that the opportunities for future peace and security shall not be lost."

That was Cordell Hull. That is from a report that I am sure, knowing you both and as competent and bright as you are, you have already read, by the Council on Foreign Relations.

What I was talking about, Marc, was not what exactly we are going to do, but I was looking for the kind of chart that exists in the back of this report, that lists out specifically key economic objectives, key security objectives. I know you have done that, and if you have not done that you should all be fired. But I know you

have done that. We have a right to know what that is. We have a right to know what that is.

The last point I will make: I remember, Marc, being with you and then going down and seeing the President, and the President said: "What do we do about Iraq?" And I said: "Mr. President, you have not laid out for our European friends your vision of a post-Saddam Iraq. What is your vision of a post-Saddam Iraq? Lay it out in detail. What is your vision?"

I think the more you flesh this out publicly for the American people and, quite frankly, to our allies, who you have shared some of this with, the better chance we have of avoiding a war, because the better chance we have of getting them, and if there is a war so we do not leave General Zinni's successors high and dry 2 years from now sitting in Baghdad wondering why in the world we are putting money into a tax cut or into Medicare instead of giving them all the money they need.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just thank both of you for the generous contribution of your time and thought to this. I would just comment that much has been made of Bosnia and Afghanistan and the learning experiences there, and likewise the problem of public opinion with regard to both of those situations and this one. My view is that we really have to outline, and you have helped us enormously and hopefully will continue to do so, what the stakes are for our country and the totality and responsibilities that entails.

I would just say that at least most of us around this table are among the vanguard of the faithful who stood fast, whether President Clinton was threatened or President Bush was threatened with a congressional vote to pull out. People who are exasperated with having anyone left in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan make these motions, and they arise suddenly. They are impulsive, they are emotional, and they come from the people of the United States who are tired, who did not understand why we were over there to begin with and what we are doing.

Now, we know that, and we know that Iraq is a very, very large undertaking, involving billions of dollars and many years. And if there is not a buildup of public consensus now, maybe those of us around the table, and the two of you, will be arguing strenuously that we have let down the Iraqis, the world, the United States, and so forth, and people will run right over us.

That is why it is so important—and you are doing this on behalf of your principals and the President—to share with us as much as you can, as quickly as possible. That is the reason the committee has had four significant meetings in a week and a half and another one tomorrow. We are pushing our members to the floor to get opportunities like this one. Now, 13 members have questioned you today much more extensively in the 5 minutes they were allotted. And your answers likewise have been extensive, as they should have been.

So we are almost at the 3-hour mark in the hearing and we still have a distinguished panel ahead of us. But we thank you very, very much and ask for you to stay closely in touch.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. FEITH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now it is a privilege to call before the committee Colonel Scott Feil, the executive director of the Role of American Military Power, Arlington, VA; General Anthony Zinni, retired former Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, Washington, DC; and Professor Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

Gentlemen, I am going to ask you to testify in the order in which you finally have been seated or reseated and have accommodated staff there very diplomatically. I will ask first of all for General Zinni's testimony, then for Colonel Feil, then for Professor Cordesman.

Let me just say at the outset, in the event you wish to submit your statements in total for the record, all will be published, so you need not make that request, but proceed as you wish with your testimony.

General ZINNI.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. ANTHONY C. ZINNI, (USMC, RET.),  
FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND,  
WASHINGTON, DC**

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, the approach I am going to take in my comments really goes back to about 1998, when we actually looked at this situation. I was the commander in chief, I guess now combatant commander—I cannot say "commander in chief." I was the combatant commander of U.S. Central Command and we had just gone through a string of confrontations with Saddam Hussein. We mobilized troops and brought them to Kuwait under Vigilant Warrior and a set of other exercises, and we had bombed after the UNSCOM inspectors were forced to leave.

At that time what concerned me was that if we had to execute our war plan I was confident in the first parts of it, the military parts; I did not have the same degree of confidence in the phases following, the post-conflict environment. I had personally served in Somalia, three tours. I was in northern Iraq with the Kurds. I was in the former Soviet Union when we tried to do some reconstruction work there, and I did the planning in Bosnia when I was on the European Command staff.

I knew what could be involved in everything from basic humanitarian operations to full reconstruction or nation-building. I worried about another scenario that was not addressed in any of the war plans and it was the implosion of Iraq, not the explosion. We always assume that the war would kick off by Saddam invading or re-invading Kuwait or doing something unacceptable that caused our response. But we saw, and our friends in the region saw, fissures and cracks, admittedly small at the time, but could lead to a collapse.

I thought that a collapse, a collapsed State of Iraq, would present the same problems as a post-conflict State of Iraq. I asked the interagency to come together to work a plan. I was interested in what we were going to do. Frankly, there were reasons for this, not only to identify the problems of what had to be done, but I did not

want the military to be stuck with this problem, as is always the case.

We did that, I must say with mixed results. I cannot say I had enthusiastic support from all agencies, but I did from some. And it helped us identify some of the problems. I would point to the Council on Foreign Relations studies and many other studies, studies done by Tony Cordesman and others, that have listed what has to be done. But few studies tell you how to do it, and that was my concern.

I want to make one other point before I sort of get into what I discovered in doing this. The combatant commander does not go home. The idea that there is an exit strategy or we leave is naive. You stay. The gulf war may have ended in 1991, but CENTCOM for 12 years after was in Iraq, flew it over, "no-fly zones," "no-drive zones," maritime intercept operations, occasional bombings—an average presence of 23,000 troops from all services. The war never ended.

We are not going to go home from whatever we do in Iraq. There are things in this part of the world that are too important for us to think that this is a go in, do the job as best we can, and pull out.

I want to address the issue of anything is better than what you have. Senator Coleman, I would say that we threw the Soviets out of Afghanistan with the idea that, Soviets out, got to be better than anything can follow, and we left them with the Taliban eventually. So anyone that has to live in this region and has to stay there and protect our interests year in, year out does not look at this in sort of finite terms, as a start and an end, as an exit strategy, as a 2-year tenure. As long as you are going to be there have a U.S. Central Command, you are going to be out there and have to deal with whatever you put down on the ground.

What I felt the first question I would ask if we went in, which was sort of addressed by Marc Grossman: What is it you envision as an end State? Is it a transitioned Iraq, a magnificent democracy, or is it something less than that? I mean, is it truly this transformed Iraq that we have heard about? Or are we just going to get rid of Saddam Hussein and hope for the best with some decent law and order, territorial integrity basically put in place, maybe a federation of States that operates on their own?

What is it that you want? If you do not have the vision going in, then the military and all the other agencies of government and the international agencies do not know where to go.

I saw the problem in four areas. The first area was security, and I would just give you an example of the kinds of things—this is certainly not all-inclusive—that I saw we had to do on the ground. We had to under the security dimension maintain law and order, provide for force protection, be prepared to do peacekeeping missions, protect threatened groups, deal with civil unrest and acts of retribution, counter external threats, and develop local security capabilities. That is just a few. I mean, this list could go on and on.

The second part was the political part, and that would require such things as establishing an interim or transitional government, laying the foundation for a final form of governance, ensuring co-ordination of all these activities—the political element will have to

be the lead—developing the principles and procedures for establishing civil functions, dealing with procedures for accountability, and coordinating the regional and international involvement that we might have.

The third area was the economic area, and here I felt this would involve dealing with issues such as energy production, employment restructuring—just by the way, about 40 percent of the paychecks come from the government in this country, and if the government goes down where are the paychecks coming from?

In addition to that, we saw that regional economic impacts would have to be taken into account. This is not only going to affect Iraq. It is going to affect Jordan, it is going to affect Kuwait, it is going to affect countries around the country and in the region economically, too.

We have to deal with the status of foreign debt and war reparations. Everybody is talking about pumping oil and we will do this to reconstruct the country. What about the foreign debt and the war reparations that are still owed? There are others out there that have claims to the money and the production. Who will sort that out?

We have to restructure the economic base. I think that has been addressed by the previous panel, about how it is not the kind of economic base that will allow for a country that is solid in any way economically for the future. And we are going to have to solicit and manage donor contributions.

The fourth area I titled recovery and reconstruction. This begins with the immediate and long-term humanitarian needs, and again that has been described here and you can imagine what this could be based on what kind of catastrophe the war causes and Saddam generates. We are going to have to be involved in infrastructure repair and replacement, consequence management, WMD accountability, and the reestablishment of services throughout the country.

Now, I wrote myself ten little lessons learned if I ever had to do this and I would just like to go through these in conclusion. The first thing I said to myself was each of these four areas needs a separate structure. You cannot saddle the military with all these functions and you cannot address these functions without an organization to deal with them. That does not mean that some parts of the security organization, for example like the military, might not help out in recovery or humanitarian needs. But you need a separate, distinct organization that is running this on the ground.

The second point is everything has to be coordinated. I have seen the disasters in Somalia and elsewhere when coordination mechanisms fail. Those mechanisms for coordination have to be sold, they have to be established from the lowest remote point on the ground to the highest decisions that may be made back here or in New York or Brussels or wherever.

The third point is that the resources and the organizations required must be identified, provided, and efficiently and effectively managed. The military cannot be stuck with this problem. We do not do economics and we do not do political business very well. We will do the security piece and we hope we can train and pass that off eventually, but it is going to be tough.

These efforts must be planned for and the structures and resources established before the military action begins. The effort does not start after military action, but runs parallel to it. There cannot be any gaps. If we think we are going to win the war, stop the shooting, and start this process, we are in for a disaster. It is going to start concurrently and run parallel and run long after the fighting stops or subsides.

We should do everything under international institutions if at all possible, and I think the reasons for that have been laid out and I will not go into them. Our motives will always be suspect in this endeavor and it will be difficult to get partners in a messy day-after business. But the cover of international organizations will make this easier. International organizations, private volunteer agencies, nongovernmental agencies, are critical to success. They have to be empowered, encouraged to do the necessary work, and they have to work in close coordination with whatever we do on the ground.

My other point is you need somebody in charge. The disaster of Somalia—when I got on the ground in Somalia I saw five separate military chains of command, not to mention the differences in the humanitarian and the political end of the business going on on the ground and the reconstruction. Somebody has got to be in charge. That does not mean that somebody commands forces and agencies, but has the coordinating authority. And whatever agency or individual that is going to take charge of this thing has to appoint somebody on the ground that runs the show.

Remember, the commander in chief, who we have now identified, as I heard in this previous discussion, as the leader here, has a region to run that just happens to have a few other problems in it, too. I do not want to speak for General Franks. He does an outstanding job in my view and he was a successor that I recommended. But he has more things to do than just run a post-conflict Iraq.

Internal order will be the most critical factor in keeping positive momentum and progressing toward full reconstruction. No. 1 task is keeping order in this country. The tribal retributions, the revenge killings, the opposition groups and others that will be jockeying for position, opposition groups that will stream across the border, all sorts of things can disrupt this.

There are things in this country that we are going to have to deal with that no one has really talked about. There is a major Iranian opposition group in here, the MEK. What do you want me to do with that if I am the commander in chief? Do I lock them up, do I send them back across the border to be slaughtered? Exactly what happens to them?

There are millions of little issues like this that are not talked about, that are going to be major problems when you are on the ground, and whoever goes in is going to have to have the guidance.

My eighth point is that images in this region are everything, particularly in the early stages of the mission. We are going to need intelligent and active information operations that will make or break the mission from the very beginning. What appears on Al-Jazeera TV and everything else in the region is going to determine

success, maybe even more so than the actions on the ground, and all the explanations afterwards will not counter those first images.

The regional nations and agencies should be a part of this effort if possible. We need Islamic agencies, Arab agencies, involved in this process. At the same time, regional involvement that works counter to the objective has to be prevented. Now, we are going to have to pick and sort through those pretty carefully. There may be a lot of regional powers and interests that rush in there that do not have the same objective as we do.

The final point is that the decision on the scope of this vision has to be made right away. Do you want a transformed Iraq or do you want simply a transitioned Iraq? Everybody in the region, not to mention the world, will be watching what we leave in this particular situation.

And we had not better disappoint the region, as we did when we pulled out after the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan. We have a situation in Afghanistan where it is on the edge now and people are watching that, old friends like Pakistan who felt disappointed and betrayed—not necessarily they were; they feel that way—and certainly Afghans that feel that way.

Reconstruction of a nation is a tough job. And I would just make one pitch for my brothers that are still in uniform: Do not stick them with this mission solely.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Zinni follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. ANTHONY C. ZINNI, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.)

While I was the commander of the U.S. Central Command, we ran an inter-agency exercise to address issues dealing with a post-war Iraq or an Iraq that imploded and required our intervention. I did this because a number of leaders in the region expressed concern about our ability to deal with these issues and because I felt we had not planned for these as well as we should have. In addition, from my experiences in a number of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, the Former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, I knew that the possible scope of the problems and the difficulty of the tasks required much more planning and preparation. I also knew that other government agencies had to be involved in this planning since the requirement is not solely a military one. My comments are based on this background.

In addressing the issues that might be faced in a post conflict Iraq, the first question that has to be answered deals with the end state envisioned or desired. Do we want to transform Iraq or just transition it out from under the unacceptable regime of Saddam Hussein into a reasonably stable nation. Transformation implies significant change in forms of governance, in economic policies, in regional status, in security structure, and in other areas. Without a determination of the scale and scope of change desired, it is not possible to judge the cost and level of effort required. Certainly there will not be a spontaneous democracy so the reconstruction of the country will be a long, hard course regardless of whether a modest vision of the end state is sought or a more ambitious one is chosen.

We should be careful whose predictions of potential outcomes of the situation that we accept. No one can be sure about exactly what the scope of the problems will be once military action begins. We can only provide a broad bracket of the scope of the potential challenges we would face. The "it depends" answer to assessments will be the best analysis we can offer in most cases. A reasonable middle of the road assessment is probably prudent for planning. Overall it will not be as good as the optimists predict or as bad as the pessimists describe.

A lot of thought has been given to the kinds of problems and tasks that we will face in the aftermath. I have read several recent studies and pieces produced by groups of knowledgeable people. Generally these works have, in my opinion, captured the broad requirements and the issues very well. Defining the problem, however, is only half the task. The other half deals with how you solve the problem. I have not seen a lot of specifics in this area. By this I mean descriptions of the

organizations needed, the assignment of responsibilities, the lines of authority, the coordinating mechanisms, the resources necessary, and other hard recommendations on what is needed on the ground.

There are four areas or categories that all efforts will fall under. These are the security, political, economic, and recovery/reconstruction dimensions of the problem. They cannot be worked separately or in sequence, so close coordination between these functional areas is vitally important. Also, they do not begin after military action starts but must begin ahead of the fighting, run parallel to it, and continue well after it ends or subsides. The tasks in each of these areas will be considerable. I can offer a few examples for each.

The security dimension will require tasks to be performed such as maintenance of law and order, force protection, peacekeeping, protection of threatened groups, dealing with civil unrest and acts of retribution, countering external threats, and developing local security capabilities. The political part will require such things as establishing an interim or transitional government, laying the foundation for a final form of governance, ensuring coordination of all activities, developing the principles and procedures for establishing civil functions, dealing with procedures for accountability, and coordinating the regional and international involvement. The economic area would involve dealing with issues such as energy production, employment restructuring, regional economic impacts, status of foreign debt, restructuring of the economic base, and soliciting and managing donor contributions. The recovery and reconstruction element will deal with the immediate and long term humanitarian needs, infrastructure repair and replacement, consequence management, WMD accountability, and the reestablishment of services. Again, these tasks are just examples and certainly are not the complete requirement; but, they give a sense of the scope of the post conflict demands.

I would offer several points of advice from my experiences and analysis of what has to be done in a post conflict environment.

1. Each of the four areas mentioned needs a separate structure, on the ground, to work the tasks in that area. That doesn't mean that organizations with primary duties in another area cannot be tasked to support, such as the military, a part of the security element, assisting in humanitarian efforts; however, it does mean there has to be a distinct organization accountable and in charge of each of these functional areas.
2. Everything must be closely coordinated. A coordinating mechanism(s) needs to be in place and clear lines of authority must be established. There will be natural friction between the areas so, at some level, there must be an ultimate authority that can provide immediate decisions and deconfliction directions.
3. The resources and organizations required must be identified, provided, and effectively managed. The military cannot be stuck with the whole mission as has happened in the past.
4. These efforts must be planned for and the structures and resources established before military action begins. The effort does not start after military action but runs parallel to it. There should be no gaps.
5. We should do everything under international institutions if at all possible. Our motives will always be suspect in this endeavor and it will be difficult to get partners in the messy "day after" business, but the cover of the international organizations will make easier, maybe even inviting. International agencies, private volunteer agencies, and non-governmental agencies are critical to success. They must be empowered and encouraged to do the necessary work in close coordination with our governmental agencies.
6. You need someone in charge on the ground. That doesn't mean that person has to command all forces and agencies but it does mean he, or she, has to have coordinating authority.
7. Internal order will be the most critical factor in keeping positive momentum and progressing toward full reconstruction. This task will be the priority.
8. Images are everything, particularly in the early stages of the mission. Intelligent and active information operations will make or break the mission from the beginning.
9. Regional nations and agencies should be a part of the effort if possible. Regional involvement that works counter to the objective has to be prevented.
10. The decision on the scope of the vision must be made early. Is it Iraq transformed or Iraq simply transitioned?

This is a broad description of the requirement as I see it. Certainly there are experts in each of the areas I mentioned who are far better qualified than I am to

address the specifics in their area of expertise. I am happy, however, to answer any of your questions as best I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Zinni. Without knowing what is going to happen with our next two starring witnesses, I just thought that was a boffo performance. We are prepared to send you on the road, and I appreciate it very, very much and we have all made notes.

Now, Colonel Feil, we have had you here before. We appreciated once again your insights at that time and please proceed today.

**STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, (U.S. ARMY, RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ROLE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER, ARLINGTON, VA**

Colonel FEIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to—I do not have a cane or a straw hat, but I will try to do as good a job as General Zinni.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and members of the committee, sir. The tremendous challenges that would face the United States and its partners in Iraq can be organized into our analytical categories that we used in my project of: security, economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. While those groupings are useful for analysis and for organization and for the application of resources, it is imperative that any approach to Iraq in a post-conflict situation begins with a presumption that only a comprehensive plan, executed through integrated yet decentralized actions, will be successful. While security is the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction efforts, progress in those other three areas have direct impact on the long-term internal and external security capabilities and the situation of Iraq.

The general security tasks that need to be accomplished after a conflict in Iraq have been addressed and are fairly straightforward, but they are larger in scale and resources required than anything we have seen in the recent past. First, the regime must be deposed. The leadership must be found and, if alive, detained for purposes of either standing trial as international war criminals or participating in whatever justice mechanism the Iraqi people determine meet their needs.

Second, the security services must be dismantled and reorganized. All of Saddam's special security organizations, organized for the protection of the regime, such as the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Security Service, the Special Security Service, the General Intelligence Directorate, the General Security Services, and the Special Protection Apparatus—as you can see, he has a lot of organizations devoted to his protection—have to be disbanded and their members detained and vetted. That may number up to 50,000 people right there.

Those internal security forces performing the day to day enforcement of civil and bona fide criminal law, as opposed to political repression, must have their leadership changed. But the bulk of the rank and file will be essential to the preservation of order. The national police force and the frontier guard, totaling perhaps an additional 70,000 men, must have their leadership reorganized.

The level down to which commanders will be removed will vary based on their record and the overall policy. The leadership of the national police and the border guard should be constrained by thorough monitoring and joint operations with international civilian police deployed throughout the country. The process of recruiting, training, and organizing those civilian police and police monitors, numbering about 4,000 to 5,000 in my estimate, must begin now.

The Baath Party needs to be completely disbanded and its leadership detained and put through a vetting process. Within the context of dismantling the regime, the bureaucracy must be reorganized. Those elements that were used as instruments of repression and to protect the regime must either be disbanded or redirected. One of the first ministries to be thoroughly revamped must be the Ministry of Information.

Those involved in technical work or the provision of services must be vetted, retained, and used by the military and civil administration to provide essential services to the population. To date there have been discussions and planning, but the most glaring gap in the above areas has been the hesitance to organize civilian police and police monitors to integrate with the coalition military to provide a seamless security structure.

The Iraqi army must be reorganized. The Special Republican Guards and the Republican Guards will have to be dismantled. The default assumption must be that the members of these organizations are not qualified to continue to serve in a reformed Iraqi army unless proven otherwise. The national army will need new leadership, but once again the rank and file should be amenable to retraining and reorientation. This is easier said than done and will require significant investment of coalition forces in time and labor to conduct the disarmament and demobilization of hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

The reduction in security manpower means that up to 300,000 to 400,000 men will be released into the economy. During the reorganization process, many of the soldiers in the Iraqi army, excluding the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, may be used in supervised public works projects or closely monitored and supervised security tasks.

Concurrent with the removal of the regime and the reorientation of the security forces, coalition forces must continue the effort to seize and control the Iraqi WMD program in its entirety. This objective will be a primary effort during the military campaign and it must continue at the same level regardless of the progress made in any conventional combat that discovers those elements of the WMD program.

Just from the public record of what Iraq has been unable to account for since 1998, this is a massive undertaking. In addition to controlling the weapons and the delivery systems themselves, facilities and records will need to be secured. It is expected that almost 70 Presidential compounds alone may have evidence of WMD programs. Securing and searching those compounds will be labor-intensive and require significant ground forces to ensure entry and control.

Finally, finding, detaining, and debriefing personnel involved in the WMD programs will be essential. It has taken 4 months of in-

spections to speak to a handful of the 1,000 scientists and engineers believed to be engaged in WMD programs. Integrated military and civilian teams will have to fan out and work in the cities, the countryside, and along the borders to ensure that no weapons, documents, or personnel leak out of the country.

Security for the population is the third high priority task. Here much depends on the course of the fighting that results in the removal of the regime and the seizure of the WMD program elements. Clearly the potential for humanitarian crisis is large. There are several factors that contribute to this situation. Due to conditions imposed by a number of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, humanitarian aid agencies do not have the infrastructure established within Iraq comparable to what they had in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Therefore the immediate administration of humanitarian assistance will fall to the government agencies, either military or civilian, that arrive during the course of combat operations.

Should Saddam's forces withdraw into the cities and conduct urban warfare, there will be increased civilian casualties, which will put additional burdens on military and civilian medical assets.

A qualitatively different problem is very possible with the spread of biological or chemical contamination. This could come about as the result of overt employment by Saddam or his military leaders. There is also the risk of inadvertent release based on action by coalition forces, given that we will not have perfect and complete intelligence on the location of Iraq's WMD and may destroy facilities containing stocks of chemical or biological weapons.

In either case, military assets for chemical and biological reconnaissance and decontamination are limited and will be primarily occupied with supporting coalition forces. There are no significant assets other than coalition military units that have a capability to assist a contaminated civilian population. NGOs are not prepared to provide services in a contaminated environment, multiplying the humanitarian problem should that condition exist.

The fourth major priority is to prevent factional violence and prevent armed groups from seizing assets, territory, or population as Saddam's forces loosen their grip. The biggest threat to coalition long-term objectives will arise if a security vacuum exists between the time Saddam's forces withdraw or cease activity and the arrival of American and coalition forces.

Inherent in preventing factional and ethnic fighting and reprisals is the ability to provide local policing within a framework of a non-arbitrary legal code, with objective judges and a humane correctional system. Policing and establishing the rule of law is a fundamental linchpin connecting the security issue to social, economic, and governance issues in Iraq.

National codes are enforced and respect for law takes root at the local level. Recent history has provided evidence of the false dichotomy between military security that focuses on heavy weapons, organized groups, and overtly political resistance and personal or human security that is a function of local knowledge, competent policing, a functioning criminal and civil justice system, and community involvement.

This comprehensive approach to providing security for the population requires significant interagency, NGO, and international governmental organization involvement if the military is not to be swamped. A deployable justice package must be organized now and the personnel identified, organized, and trained. An inability to provide a seamless security situation for the population of Iraq as a State will produce conditions that will lead to crime, corruption, alternative sources of political and economic power and rule-making, and will undermine the eventual successor Iraqi administration.

Finally and most important for the long-term viability of Iraq and the legacy of the coalition, Iraq's oil resources must be retained and developed for the benefit of the people. Facilities must be secured, including the fields and the associated infrastructure. Possession of these untapped resources could confer extraordinary economic and political power to various groups. Although military action in Iraq does not constitute a war for oil, the peace achieved and the type of governance attained will owe much to the way the oil sector and Iraq's external debt and reconstruction costs are managed.

Finally, the borders must be protected, obviously. That is an integral task that goes along with preserving the territorial integrity and also these other operations to get to the WMD programs, prevent any leakage, and also detain the personnel that we think need to be detained.

Given the enormity of these tasks, I still believe that a force of about 75,000 American military personnel will be required for up to 1 year as the minimum force to stabilize the situation, accomplish those tasks outlined above, and establish the conditions for sustainable peace and a capable Iraqi State. This force can be reduced as the situation stabilizes. The rate of transformation, which is what the Iraqis accomplish, and the rate of transition, which is what we do, will determine our coalition withdrawal and the type of forces that can be withdrawn first.

Much has been done to address these issues, but much more operational movement must take place. The government has attempted to pull together the requisite expertise to define the conditions and the requirements for success. However, the effort to implement procedures and organize resources is still fragmented and there has been more activity than movement.

From an American perspective, what is needed is a clear articulation of American goals for Iraq, the delineation of the tasks America expects to accomplish, what America will assist with, and what is expected of coalition and Iraqi partners and the subsequent dedication of resources, i.e., people, equipment and funds, to the effort.

Finally, the United States must articulate its transition strategy. The criteria that will govern the transition from military agency to civilian agency and from outsider to insider in the execution of the post-conflict reconstruction tasks must be developed, promulgated, and integrated into the supporting plans. The United States must articulate the balance between American responsibility as outsiders, setting parameters and assisting the process, and the local ownership of that process.

America must not let responsibility for the outcome become an open-ended commitment on our part or let our presence create unnecessary dependencies. Conversely, local ownership cannot become a rationale or a buzz word for meager support and abandonment.

Once the process begins, dynamic assessments are required based on measurable and previously established criteria. Substitution of time lines for measurable progress in achieving the goals of reconstruction has led the United States and the international community to unsuccessful half-measures and minimalism in other situations. Time lines are not an issue as long as the timeframe is tied to some measure of performance and progress and is a real part of the process.

We can be successful at this if success is adequately defined and if the resources match the intent. However, my estimation is that at this stage the planning process in this area has not kept pace with the military preparations for the campaign and the agencies who can resolve the outstanding issues are running out of time to do so.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Feil follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. SCOTT R. FEIL, U.S. ARMY, (RET.)

SECURITY IN A POST-CONFLICT SITUATION IN IRAQ

Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to offer testimony to the committee with respect to the security situation that would exist in Iraq should the United States lead a coalition of military forces in deposing Saddam Hussein and dismantling his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

Attached to this statement is a Report of a Commission on Post Conflict Reconstruction, which is the result of a two and one half year study on the subject from a general American policy standpoint, conducted by the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "A Wiser Peace," a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which builds on the project and commission report and addresses the situation in Iraq, is also attached. These reports contain focused recommendations on the long-term implications of repeated engagement in post conflict reconstruction activities and the immediate issue of Iraq. American and international involvement in these efforts can come about either as a result of interventions to preserve peace and assist countries emerging from conflict, as in the Balkans, and East Timor, etc., or as a result of American and multi-lateral military action as a victorious party to a conflict, i.e., in Panama and Afghanistan.

The tremendous challenges that would face the United States and its partners in Iraq can be organized into major analytical categories of executing tasks in providing security, economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. While these groupings are useful for analysis, organization, and application of resources, it is imperative that any approach to Iraq in a post conflict situation begins with a presumption that only a comprehensive, holistic plan executed through integrated, yet decentralized actions will be successful. While security is the foundation for post conflict reconstruction efforts, the other three issue areas, or pillars, have direct impact on the long-term internal and external security capabilities and situation of the nation.

In fact, the lack of planning and preparation for such integration and coordination has bedeviled previous efforts in this area. The World Bank estimates that 50% of countries that emerge from a conflict situation are back in a conflict status within five years. That is a disturbing statistic given the stakes in Iraq. The coalition, under American leadership, cannot leave the success of these efforts within that country, with its population, strategic location, and resources to the odds of a coin flip. The resources exist to enhance the probability of success. Much has been done to marshal these resources, but much more remains to be done. The preparations for a military campaign continue to capture the bulk of the attention of both the populace and the government, while the less glamorous efforts to prepare for the aftermath continue to lag. Americans will evaluate the effort much more on what

is accomplished in Iraq after a military campaign than what is destroyed during the campaign. So will America's partners, the Iraqi people, and any potential adversaries around the world.

The tasks that need to be accomplished are well known.

First, the Iraqi regime must be deposed. The leadership must be found and if alive, detained for the purposes of either standing trial as international war criminals, or participating in whatever justice mechanism the Iraqi people determine meets their needs. Second, the security services must be dismantled and reorganized. Full disbandment and detention of personnel must apply to those agencies involved in repression and the protection of the regime. All of Saddam's special security organizations organized for the protection of the regime (the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Security Service, the Special Security Service, the General Intelligence Directorate, the General Security Services, and the Special Protection apparatus, etc.) must be disbanded and their members detained and vetted. This may number up to 50,000 personnel. Those security forces performing the day-to-day enforcement of civil and bona fide criminal law, as opposed to political repression, must have their leadership changed, but the bulk of the rank and file will be essential to the preservation of order. The national police force and the frontier guard, totaling perhaps an additional 70,000 men, must have their leadership removed. The level down to which commanders are removed will vary based on their record and policy. The leadership of the national police and border guard will be new and their behavior should be constrained by thorough monitoring and joint operations with international civilian police deployed throughout the country. The process of recruiting, training and organizing those civilian police and police monitors, numbering about 4000 to 5000 must begin now.

The Ba'ath party needs to be completely disbanded and its leadership detained and put through a vetting process before they are released to the general population.

Within the context of dismantling the regime, the bureaucracy must be reorganized. Those elements that were used as instruments of repression and to protect the regime must be either disbanded or redirected. One of the first ministries to be thoroughly revamped must be the Ministry of Information. Those involved in technical work or the provision of services must be vetted, retained, and used by the military and civil administration to provide essential services to the population. As examples, electricity, water, sanitation, transportation, etc., are sectors which can be rapidly insulated from the political processes and continue to work.

Much of this will take civilian political and technical acumen, with partners from the military coalition and partners the United States cultivates from the diaspora and within Iraq. To date, there have been discussions and planning, but the most glaring gap has been the hesitance to organize civilian police and police monitors to integrate with the military to provide a seamless security structure.

The Iraqi Army must be reorganized. The Special Republican Guards and the Republican Guards will have to be dismantled. The default assumption must be that members of these organizations are not qualified to continue to serve in a reformed Iraqi Army unless proven otherwise. The National Army will need new leadership, but the rank and file should be amenable to retraining and reorientation under new leadership. This is easier said than done and will require significant investment of coalition forces in time and labor to conduct the disarmament and demobilization of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, in a process that gathers information and releases parolees (in the military use of the term) in an orderly fashion. That process must be seamlessly connected to a reintegration program that puts former soldiers back into society ready to be a productive citizen rather than an unemployed burden on government services and a continuing security risk. Eventually, the reformed Iraqi armed forces could number between 150,000 and 200,000, but the process of creating a credible force of this size will take at least one to two years. The reduction in manpower means that about 300,000 to 400,000 men will be released into the economy over that same period. In the interim, many of the soldiers in the Iraqi Army, (excluding the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard) may be used in supervised public works projects or closely monitored and supervised security tasks.

Woven in with the dismantling of the regime and the restructuring of the security services, the second major objective must be to seize and control the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, (WMD) program in its entirety. This objective will be a primary effort during the military campaign, and it must continue at the same level regardless of the progress in any conventional combat. Just form the public record of what Iraq has been unable to account for since 1998, this is a massive undertaking. The number of munitions, the amount of chemicals and biological material will require a significant search and security effort. It can be expected that, in addition to se-

lected targets comprising members of the regime, the effort to find and control weapons of mass destruction would consume most of the committed special operations forces. Chemical units, after accompanying the combat elements through the military campaign will then have to support this effort and it will take a significant portion of American and coalition assets to accomplish this critical task. However, in addition to controlling the weapons and the delivery systems themselves, facilities and records will need to be secured when found during the campaign, and then further coordinated efforts will need to be undertaken to ensure that the international community has a complete picture of the Iraqi programs. Records and physical evidence of the programs and the location of the assets will be critical to achieving one of the salient objectives. It is expected that almost 70 presidential compounds alone may have evidence of the WMD programs. Securing and searching those compounds will be labor intensive and require significant ground forces to ensure entry and control. Finally, finding, detaining, and debriefing personnel involved in the programs will be essential. It has taken us four months of inspections to speak to a handful of the one thousand scientists and engineers believed to be engaged in WMD programs. A comprehensive effort to secure the entire WMD program places not only a physical burden on security forces, but also requires additional coordination measures with technical experts. The WMD search and seizure effort will rely on intelligence provided by other agencies, and the operational work will require teaming in the cities, the countryside and the borders to ensure that weapons, documents, or personnel do not leak out of the country. America and the international community cannot afford to repeat some of the mistakes and hesitancy with regard to wanted personnel that were made in the Balkans.

This takes considerably more intelligence and technical expertise than exists within the military. Military forces can seize and secure weapons, facilities, and personnel that are encountered and identified during combat and immediately thereafter, but to investigate and ferret out the entire network of programs will take a combined civilian and military effort.

Security for the population is the third high priority task. Here, much depends on the course of the fighting that results in achievement of the removal of Saddam and the seizure of the WMD program elements. Clearly, the potential for a humanitarian crisis is large. There are several factors that contribute to this situation. Due to the conditions imposed by a number of the UN Security Council resolutions, humanitarian aid agencies do not have infrastructure established within Iraq, comparable to what they had in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Therefore the immediate administration of humanitarian assistance will fall to the governmental agencies, either military or civilian, that arrive during the course of combat operations. The requirement to secure the largest cities and population centers will occupy a large number of conventional ground forces, and in order to minimize numbers, the coalition will have to rely on mobility advantages conferred by aviation. Maintaining the ability to see, prevent, and if necessary, react, to impending population crises will be essential.

The force must have the mandate and capability to regulate movement, both across borders and within the country. This is not a requirement designed to inhibit legitimate population movement covered under the Geneva Conventions and other customary laws of war. However, to achieve the primary objectives of regime change and disarmament, the security forces must have the ability to ensure that people and material that must be controlled does not escape by taking advantage of these laws.

A significant humanitarian risk exists on two dimensions. Should Saddam's forces withdraw into the cities and conduct urban warfare, there will be increased civilian casualties, which will put additional burdens on military and civilian medical assets. This is a problem of scale, which can be accommodated with the deployment of additional military and NGO medical capacity. However, a qualitatively different problem is very possible with the spread of chemical or biological contamination. This could come about as the result of overt employment by Saddam or his military leaders. There is also the risk of inadvertent release based on actions by coalition forces, given that will not have perfect and complete intelligence on the location of Iraq's WMD and may destroy facilities containing unknown stocks of chemical or biological weapons. In either case, military assets for chemical and biological reconnaissance and decontamination are limited and will be primarily occupied with supporting coalition forces. There are no assets other than coalition military units that have the capability to assist a contaminated population. NGOs are not prepared to provide services under contamination conditions, multiplying the problem. The demand for action to assist populations may inhibit military operations, and it will certainly become a first priority when hostilities cease, due to public pressure. It is worth noting that a significant portion of these reconnaissance and decontamination

units are in the reserve components, and there will be competing demands from the theater of operations and American local governments, who will be under some pressure to retain this capability for consequence management at home, especially under a heightened homeland security alert status.

The population must be secured from reprisals, both in violence to persons and the seizure of property. This means being able to control the population in terms of movement and assembly until legitimate authorities can gather the facts and sort through claims and counter claims. Decades of humanitarian abuse and internal resettlement have created the potential for people to settle scores and to assert their right to return to currently occupied land and homes.

The fourth major priority is to prevent factional violence and prevent armed groups from seizing assets, territory, or populations as Saddam's forces loosen their grip. The most dangerous time for the establishment of precedent counter to coalition overall goals for the people of Iraq will come if a security vacuum exists between the time Saddam's forces withdraw, or cease activity, and the arrival of American and coalition forces. The Kurdish parties, most notably the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, plus other parties and expatriate Iraqis, could total 5 million people. It is important to note that the two major Kurdish parties were part of the December Iraqi Opposition Conference in London that brought together some 57 opposition groups. Although the follow up January meeting to select a leadership committee was canceled it is interesting to note that the KDP and PUK leadership met in Ankara on February 6.

Other armed groups will occupy both the attention and the forces of the coalition in Iraq. Most notable are the Ansar al Islam, noted recently in the press as operating in the northeast portion of the country which is not under solid control of the Hussein regime. This force is estimated at about 1,000 fighters and has been active in developing crude chemical weapons capability. The Shi'ite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq is an Islamic opposition movement that has been based in, and supported by Iran. While possessed of no love for Saddam Hussein, its leader is also opposed to American military occupation of Iraq. Any cooperative agreement with SCIRI must be viewed as one of convenience that will continue in force only so long as coalition and SCIRI interests converge. SCIRI has been reported to have combat elements of brigade size that could move into the eastern portions of Iraq and the Shi'a south, exacerbating elements of both Iran-Iraq regional politics and inflaming religious cleavage that will already be a source of concern to security forces and civil authorities.

It is heartening to note that most scholars and experts assess significant potential for Iraq not to fracture. For the safety of the Iraqi people, their economic and political future, and the security of the region, the country must be preserved as an integral political entity. Borders must be retained, and while there will be significant military and humanitarian movement across the borders, any attempt to redraw the Iraqi map must be resisted with the same resolve the coalition will bring to the military campaign to unseat Saddam. To this end, the United States must reassure regional partners that American intent is to preserve Iraq and the coalition must dissuade any opportunistic meddling in Iraqi affairs from potential regional adversaries. In the on going constituting process for a new Iraqi government, due diligence must be paid to intra-state political arrangements that place more emphasis on political and regional divisions, rather than ethnic or religious separation.

Inherent in the security of the population, preventing factional and ethnic fighting, preventing reprisals, etc., is the ability to provide local policing within a framework of a non-arbitrary legal code, with objective judges and a humane correctional system. Policing and establishing the rule of law is a fundamental linchpin connecting the security issue to the humanitarian situation in the country. While national codes may be developed and promulgated, those codes are enforced and respect for law takes root at the local level. Recent history has provided evidence of the false dichotomy between military security, that focuses on heavy weapons, organized groups, and overtly political resistance, and personal security, that is a function of local knowledge, competent policing, a functioning criminal and civil justice system, and community involvement.

This comprehensive approach to providing security for the population requires significant interagency, NGO and IGO involvement if the military is not to be swamped. A deployable justice package must be organized now, and the personnel identified, organized and trained. An inability to provide a seamless security system for the population and Iraq as a state will produce conditions that will lead to crime, corruption, alternative sources of political and economic power and rule making, and will undermine the eventual successor Iraqi administration.

Finally, and most importantly for the long term viability of Iraq and the legacy of the coalition effort, Iraq's oil resources must be retained and developed for the

benefit of the Iraqi people. Facilities must be secured, including the fields and the associated infrastructure. There are several major fields, including Kirkuk in the north and the Rumalia fields near Basrah in the south. There are over 2,000 individual wells in these fields and others, plus at least two major pipelines that transport the oil to Turkey and Syria. Iraqi oil sector professionals, (as opposed to the political deal makers at the highest levels) must be retained to operate the fields and work with international partners to improve the efficiency of the existing production facilities, while conducting exploration to realize the potential of future production. Iraq's oil production facilities are fragile. They have suffered from almost two decades of technological neglect and politically motivated exploitation. Production efficiencies have been sub-optimized in order to support regime political goals, and that has reduced return on what little investment and production there has been. Therefore securing the oil sector, physically, financially, and politically is absolutely critical.

Iraqi oil potential is significant, ranked as being second only to Saudi Arabia with 112 billion barrels in estimated reserves and perhaps as much as 220 billion barrels. Iraq only has developed 15 of 74 evaluated fields, and of the 526 known "structures" that may contain oil deposits, only 125 have been drilled. Clearly, possession of these untapped resources could confer extraordinary economic and political power. Although military action in Iraq does not constitute a war for oil, the peace achieved and the type of governance attained will owe much to the way the oil sector is managed.

The history of the connection between resource wealth, governments and people illustrates a hard fact. Governments that derive revenue directly from resource exploitation generally are not accountable to the population, despite protestations that the government owns the resources in the name of the people. If some sort of participatory governance is to have any meaning in Iraq, then private Iraqi commerce should generate the wealth through market mechanisms, which the government can then tax for the purpose of providing government services. A healthy relationship between the governed and the government is built upon accountability in policy and budgets. A government with an independent source of revenue has no requirement to heed the people. Therefore it is imperative that the future structure of the Iraqi oil sector be determined with a broad representation of the Iraqi people, including the indigenous oil sector, in partnership with foreign private investors and oil technology providers. A significant hurdle that must be overcome on day one is to engage the indigenous Iraqi oil sector technocrats and professionals. They have a reputation for a perspective that is highly professional and highly insulated from politics.

Given the enormity of these tasks, a force of about 75,000 American military personnel for about one year will be required as the minimum force to stabilize the situation, accomplish the tasks outlined above and establish the conditions for sustainable peace and a capable Iraqi state. This force can be reduced as the situation stabilizes. That transformation process resulting in a sustainable, capable state is as much a function of integrated action on the part of civilian and military agencies after the fight as it is on the fight itself. The rate of transition, (what the outsiders do) and the rate of transformation, (what the Iraqis do), will determine the rate of coalition withdrawal and the types of forces that can be withdrawn first.

Much has been done to address these issues, but much more operational movement must take place. The government has attempted to pull together the requisite expertise to define the conditions and requirements for success. This started many months ago, and in several locations. The Naval War College, the National Defense University, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command, and the Army War College are just a few of the many military organizations that have conducted conferences, table top exercises, and simulations to flesh out the plans and requirements. The interagency has been busy with exercises like Millennium Challenge and others, improving the ability of the government to coordinate. The Department of State has organized the Future of Iraq Project, with working groups of experts from around the globe, including members of the Iraq diaspora and opposition, with the intent of driving planning and resource requirements in sixteen different post conflict issue areas. They organized the Iraqi Opposition Conference that met in December, but which has not yielded the kind of constituting process that is required to hit the ground with military forces and receive the reins of government from a coalition military or civil administrator. United States Central Command, as expected, has been working diligently on the plans for post-conflict Iraq, and the Department of Defense has established a new office to oversee a broad range of military and civilian issues that are expected in the aftermath. All of the government efforts have reached out, in one way or another to the public community of policy institutes, non-governmental organizations, and expert citizens of many

countries. Additionally, there have been informal and formal contacts with international government organizations. A lot of information has been exchanged and the magnitude of the problem has been well defined.

But the effort to implement procedures and organize resources is still fragmented and there has been more activity than movement. From an American perspective, what is needed is a clear articulation of American goals for Iraq, the delineation of the tasks America expects to accomplish, what America will assist with, and what is expected of coalition and Iraqi partners, and the dedication of resources, i.e., people, equipment and funds, to the effort. America will lead the effort. Difficult as it may be, the United States needs to present a plan for comment, review, revision and implementation. Experience shows that circulating a draft is more effective than asking all concerned to start with a blank sheet of paper. At present the military effort is as nearly ready for post-conflict as it is for the military campaign, and the rest of government is supporting the military preparations for the campaign. But with respect to post-conflict reconstruction, the United States and the international community are still "getting ready to get ready." The President and the Congress need to establish interagency authority and accountability now, and resources need to be pre-positioned.

Finally, the United States must articulate its transition strategy. The criteria that will govern the transition from military agency to civilian agency, and from outsider to insider in the execution of all the post-conflict reconstruction tasks must be developed, promulgated, and integrated into the plan. The United States must articulate the balance between American responsibility as outsiders setting parameters and assisting the process and the local ownership of that process. America must not let responsibility for the outcome become an open-ended commitment to establishing a particular brand of representative government in a place where the history, culture, and traditions may not furnish a suitable foundation. Conversely, "local ownership" cannot become a rationale for meager support and abandonment. This balance can only be achieved by working through the difficult planning and coordination efforts and making decisions about the levels and types of support ahead of time. The idea that "no plan survives first contact" only means that plans need adjustment. It does not obviate the need for detailed planning and coordination. Good plans anticipate change and have the resources and mechanisms available to take advantage of opportunities—reinforcing success and ameliorating setbacks.

Once the process begins, dynamic assessments are required—based on the criteria. Substitution of timelines for measurable progress in achieving the goals of reconstruction has led the United States and the international community to unsuccessful half measures and minimalism. Timelines are not an issue, as long as the time expected is tied to some measure of performance and success—a real part of the process.

Post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq can be successful—if success is adequately defined and if resources match intent. But time is short, the planning process has not kept pace with the military and diplomatic timeline, and the agencies who can resolve some of the outstanding issues are running out of time to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Feil.  
Professor Cordesman.

**STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, Senator.

As I have listened to the testimony this morning, it has struck me that one of the issues we have not really talked about is how any kind of nation-building effort in Iraq will affect the broader issues of regional security. I think unfortunately that is a serious mistake. The reality is that, regardless of what happens in Iraq, the broad problem of proliferation in the region will continue. There are six other countries that will be actively involved.

We can have the best plan in the world to disarm Iraq and execute it, but the intellectual capital and skills to make weapons of mass destruction will remain regardless of how many documents we find or seize. Iraq will still have the dual use facilities to rap-

idly return to the production of chemical and biological weapons. It will probably rapidly acquire the technology, if it wants it, for long-range UAVs. You cannot disarm a sophisticated State. It is an oxymoron.

And, if you do not think beyond that, you really do not understand this region. We will also have to free the new Iraqi Government at some point from sanctions. When we do so existing arms control agreements, many of which have not been agreed to in depth by other countries in the region, will be an issue.

I have never heard anyone who advocates this war—and I have to say in general I do—explain to me why one of the other major regional problems in this area of the Middle East will not be at least as intense after this war as it is today. I see no one who has ever explained in even the crudest way for any country in the Arab world, or around Iraq, a single scenario as to how our creating a new regime inside Iraq changes a single neighboring State, overcomes its internal problems, leads to any broader implications.

I think it is inevitable that the moment this war is over we will suddenly look at the near-civil war in Iran, at the problems of the second intifada, at whatever the situation is in Islamic extremism, and all of those problems will come to the surface.

Moreover, we need to remember our limited span of control. History goes on long after peace processes, and in some period 2, 3, or 5 years from now Iraq will no longer be significantly under our influence.

Now, let me add to that some other complications. We talk about a “coalition of the willing.” Well, we have only one real ally here, or at least the leadership of one real ally. That ally is Britain. We have two regional allies which share our security objectives, Israel and Kuwait. We have no regional ally in the gulf which fully shares our values, which has our culture, or which seeks for democracy as we want it.

Broadly speaking, in terms of public opinion throughout this region, we will be a “coalition of the unwilling.” Even in Kuwait there are no public opinion polls which show broad support for this war. Moreover, the administration statements earlier this morning come far too late. We had a failed public diplomacy under Clinton. We have had a failed public diplomacy under Bush. And, there are only two public figures in the United States whose voices can matter on an issue like the reconstruction of Iraq, the President and the Secretary of State. Until they say what Under Secretary Grossman and Under secretary Feith said here this morning, what was said here will have almost no influence throughout the Middle East region.

Now, having said that, we have to accept the fact that on the day we go in—not the day when we win—but on the day we go in, we will have the Arab world and every bit of the media in the Arab world blaming us for everything wrong in Iraq. There will not be any tolerance. It will not be an intellectual argument. We will inherit the wind: the results of 30 years of mismanagement by a ruthless dictator.

We also have to face the fact that in this region people believe in conspiracy theories. Moreover, public opinion poll after public opinion poll shows only one polarizing issue in foreign policy, the

Second Intifada. Some 70 percent of the Arabs in this region blame us in large part for its outcome. I hope we can change some of these perceptions, but we really need to understand what we are getting into. That is why in my formal testimony I talk about peacemaking and nation-building as potentially a self-inflicted wound.

But let me go on to the particular areas I was asked to address, the Iraqi military and the security services. I disagree a little with Colonel Feil on details, but these are not forces we fully understand.

I will not go through the list of Iraqi security services. I have outlined and described them in the paper that I hope will be included for the record. I think the problem is their organization and role are more subtle, and that we need to parse them out more carefully. There are some closer to Saddam than others. One of the problems, as we saw in Russia, is that very often some of the best, most educated people have become associated with these tools of the regime, just as was true in the KGB.

Another problem we also face is what to do about the Iraqi regular army. The regular army has had no rearmament, no modernization, in 10 years. It has been through three wars. It will go through whatever the fighting is. And finding a way of rebuilding that force will be an immediate task, not simply winnowing through it, but figuring out how you convince the Iraqis that you have actually given them a new balance of security.

There are other issues within the Iraqi civilization or civil society that I think we need to address. I fully agree with Colonel Feil that the Ministry of Information is a problem, but so is everything else. Throughout the structure of the Iraqi Government there are clan and family ties, and there are people who are part of the Iraqi security apparatus, people who are tools of the regime. There is no ministry, no government, no community, free of these people.

Iraq has no legal profession in the classic sense. You can only study law if you take an oath of loyalty to Saddam. There is no rule of law and what there was has been confused by a shift to tribal courts manipulated for the regime's power.

There is the problem of tribe and clan, which cuts across religious and ethnic divisions, and these will require us to look very carefully at the tribal origins and patterns of people throughout the Iraqi Government. People do not remember this, but you cannot be an academic operating inside Iraq without having met the regime's litmus test, and for people in engineering and the sciences their past ties to weapons of mass destruction will be a critical issue. So you are talking about reviewing Iraq's academic structure, at least the higher education of Iraq as well.

I do not know how we are going to do all this, but I would make a few quick suggestions. One, there is a predilection in the United States for talking about war crimes trials. I think such trials are part of the problem, not part of the solution. If we do hold such trials the threshold must be extremely high. Decent men have been caught up in 30 years of dictatorship. How much we punish them is something that all of us have to ask ourselves about: What would we have done in these regimes?

If there is a model, it may be the South African truth commission, a way of getting very unpleasant issues out into the open without punishing everyone in sight.

Ultimately, this must be done by Iraqis. I cannot think of a worse model than having American jurists and American legal advisers trying to show the Iraqis how to do this, or people from within NGOs. That to me is a recipe for discrediting what needs to be done.

Now, in terms of Iraqi military forces, a caution. There seems to be the strange assumption that posture Iraqi forces will exist in a friendly region. They will not. They are not going to be the friends of the Turks, who will have moved into northern Iraq. They are not going to be the friends of the Iranians.

Anyone who lives and works in Iraq is not going to be the future friend of Israel, and any member of the Iraqi opposition who pretends today to be a supporter of Israel in the face of the Second Intifada today will find it remarkably opportune to change that position the moment they acquire any kind of meaningful power. We seem to forget this. It is a dangerous thing to forget.

We are also talking about a country whose history has five branches of government: the three we recognize are the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. The other two are the military and the security services, and the military have considerably more power and prestige historically in Iraq, than do the legislature and does the judiciary.

We have to work with this structure and transform it. My guess is that, whatever we do, we will be only partially successful.

Finally a few comments about disarmament. First there is the civil aspect of disarmament. Where are 350,000 Iraqi soldiers going to go, the men and women in the services, plus another 40,000 to 50,000 in the security services? Remember the Weimar Republic. They may not have income or jobs. Sooner or later they will re-emerge and they will not be on our side.

How do we at the same time return the Iraqi officer corps to create a balance of Kurds and Shi'ites? How do we deal with the fact the Iraqi army should be a reflection of properly distributed power among Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions? I have not heard anyone describe how this is going to be done. As General Zinni pointed out, the issue here is the practical.

Finally, if we do disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, what do we do then? If we do not have some kind of guarantee of extended deterrence, why will Iraq be content to exist alone in this region without weapons of mass destruction or at least the programs to suddenly create them? If we leave Iraq without some mix of containment, arms control, and new security partnerships, why does this bring stability? And if the basic tensions of the Second Intifada and the India-Pakistan conflict are not dealt with in the years that follow, why on earth will having fought this war done this have brought any meaningful regional stability or changed the map or structure of history?

If I had heard the Bush administration say even a few words about these issues, I would be a little more confident. But what I hear is a mixture of pious hope and the belief that the default setting on the civilization of the Middle East is somewhere in the

American Midwest. They seem to feel that if we only push the right switch the entire area will become clones of Americans.

[The prepared statement of Professor Cordesman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

PLANNING FOR A SELF-INFILCTED WOUND? U.S. POLICY TO RESHAPE A POST-SADDAM IRAQ

The hardest part of war is often the peace, and this is particularly likely to be the case if the U.S. goes to war with Iraq. It is not that the U.S. is not planning for such contingencies; it is the quality of such planning that is at issue. Unless it sharply improves, it may well become a self-inflicted wound based on a series of "syndromes" that grow out of ignorance, indifference to Iraq's real needs, and ethnocentrism.

The U.S. does not have to suffer from "Iraq War Peace Syndrome." Some good studies and planning efforts are emerging, but they are the exception and not the norm, in an uncoordinated and faltering effort. Far too often, we are rushing our planning efforts without making adequate efforts to make up for our lack of knowledge. As a result, planners both outside and inside the U.S. government may end in doing more harm than good, and in laying the groundwork for serious postwar friction and problems. In fact, a pattern of Iraq war peace syndromes has begun to emerge that is deeply disturbing.

### *1. The "We Know What We're Doing Syndrome"*

One of the most important things we need to do is to admit our level of ignorance and uncertainty. Far too many "experts" who are now working on postwar planning have (a) never been in Iraq to the point of having practical knowledge of the country, and (b) have concentrated on the threat so long that they have little intelligence data on the workings of its government, civil society, and economy.

More generally, the U.S. government does not have much of the data it needs to formulate a detailed peace plan. Looking back over the last 10 years, we generally failed to seriously examine what was happening inside Iraq in social and economic terms, and to collect and honestly analyze much of the data on social change, the economy, and the way the government functioned.

We should be actively pulling together all that exiles, friendly businessmen and other working in Iraq, the UN, NGOs, and others know about the day-to-day functioning of given national, regional, and local government activities in Iraq. We should be examining existing Iraqi structures and institutions in detail to know what needs changing and what we can build upon. We should be looking at the Iraqi constitution and legal system to see what could be a valid base for change.

More important, we should have teams ready to survey the situation in each area, town, and governate as we advance. We should have teams ready to work with key local and then governate leaders. We should have teams ready to work with the ministries in Iraq's government once we get to Baghdad. We should admit that we really do not know what we are doing, and cannot know until the war unfolds. We should be flexible, and emphasize surveying Iraq's postwar needs in partnership with Iraqis in Iraq at the local, regional, and national level; making minimal changes in working civil structures.

### *2. The "U.S. as Liberator Syndrome"*

We may or may not be perceived as liberators. We are dealing with a very sophisticated and long-established tyranny, and we really don't know how an intensely nationalistic people with deep internal divisions will react, and how the impact of the fighting will affect the people. We don't know how long any support will last by a given group or faction the moment we become involved in trade-offs between them.

We may well face a much more hostile population than in Afghanistan. We badly need to consider the Lebanon model: Hero to enemy in less than a year. We also need to consider the Bosnia/Kosovo model where internal divisions leave no options other than stay and police or leave and watch civil conflict emerge.

A little self-honesty on our past mistakes in nation building and occupation would help; especially when we perpetuate the myth we did so splendidly in Germany and Japan. Things eventually worked out in Germany and Japan because we enforced minimum change and took advantage of existing institutions. We only adopted this approach under duress, however, and because the Cold War forced us to reverse many of our initial plans and policies. Economic recovery took five years. For the first year, people died for lack of medical attention, starved, and suffered. We could

get away with because most of the world was suffering and because of the legacy of anger towards Germany and Japan coming out of the war. We cannot possibly expect such tolerance today.

Couple this to an unpredictable but inevitable level of collateral damage and civilian casualties, to what the word “occupation” means in the Arab world because of Israel, to the historical memory of the British mandate and U.S. ties to the Shah, to Shi’ite tensions over U.S. relations with Iran and the Axis of Evil, and to factional tensions in Iraq, and we are almost certain to face serious problems with at least some major blocs of Iraqis.

No study or that which does not deal at length with these risks, or prepare for them on a contingency basis, can do more good than harm. We should focus on giving Iraqis what they want, and not on giving Iraqis what we feel they want. Our actions should be based on partnership and a high degree of humility, not on occupation and arrogance.

### *3. The “We Lead and They Will Follow” or “Coalition of the Willing Syndrome”*

Our coalition of the willing may well be much smaller than the coalition of the unwilling. We need to understand just how deeply hostile the Arab world is because of the Second Intifada and our ties to Israel. Surveys show around 80% of Arabs, and high percentages of other Islamic nations, see the Palestinians as the key issue in politics and express anger at the U.S. over ties to Israel. We also need to understand that in the Gulf, many Arabs also see the U.S. as responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people under sanctions.

The UN debate shows we face a largely doubtful and antiwar world. In practical terms, we will be subject to relentless Arab, regional, and global examination and criticism from D-Day on. We cannot hope to get an Iraqi, regional, or world mandate to act as occupiers. In fact, if we act in this way, we are certain to encounter massive problems.

Any humanitarian failures at any point will come back to haunt us. So will any mistakes in dealing with Iraqi factions, any delays in transferring power, and any deals with the outside the Iraqis and Arab world see as being at Iraqi expense.

We need to base our peace plans on the reality that we will be judged by their success for years to come, and that any failures can have explosive regional impacts. This time we virtually must succeed and we must be prepared to make the necessary commitment in spite of the potential cost. At the same time, we need to understand just how firm and enduring the linkage will be to our success in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Second Intifada. We may have the luxury of fighting one war at a time, but we do not have the luxury of focusing on a single peace.

### *4. The “Best Case War Syndrome”*

Far too often, we now base our postwar plans only on fighting a best-case war. We have no justification for such planning. We may get serious urban fighting. We may see the use of WMD. We may have to sharply escalate and inflict serious collateral damage. We may see factional struggles and warlords emerge, and we already are caught up in a messy struggle between the Kurds and exile groups like the INC.

No plan is worth considering that does not explicitly examine what can go wrong in the fighting and how it will impact on the post-fighting outcome.

### *5. The “Rebuilding Effort Begins After the War Ends Syndrome”*

Our rebuilding effort in Iraq must begin on D-Day, not after the war. Everything we do from bombing to the first ground contact with Iraqis will be conducted in a media fishbowl, with the world observing and often searching for any fault or flaw. We cannot be perfect, but we can be prepared and act with the knowledge that even seemingly trivial actions during the war can have powerful global effect and shape postwar attitudes.

We must realize that one day after our forces enter any area, the world will hold us to blame for every bit of Iraqi suffering that follows, as well as for much of Saddam’s legacy of economic mistakes and neglect. The first minute of the war is the beginning of the peace, and any plan that does not explicitly recognize this is dangerous.

### *6. The “Let’s Ignore the Iraqi Media and Information Issue Syndrome”*

It seems incredible, but a number of studies ignore the need to provide detailed media coverage to the Iraqi public the moment we go to war, and then to immediately take control of the Iraqi media and Ministry of Information and change them to become legitimate sources of information. Even some good studies of psywar efforts to deal with the Iraqi military treat the problem as one of dealing with the career military and not the Iraqi people and the different factions within it.

We are already engaged in a battle for hearts and minds we have done little to win. We will confront a desperate dictatorship in combat, and what we say over radio and TV, and to the Iraqi people as we advance, may be critical in limiting or avoiding urban warfare and prolonged resistance. We also have to be able to talk to the faction in Iraq and reassure those we plan to work with. The Ministry of Information, the state controlled radio and TV, and the press need to be reshaped the moment we have access to them. The Ministry of Information, in particular, is one of the worst single instruments of repression in Iraq and needs to be abolished or restructured the moment we can do so.

#### *7. The "Overthrow the Regime is Enough of a U.S. Policy Goal Syndrome"*

Our failure to clearly define our postwar policy goals for Iraq is another area where we need early action. In fact, the Bush Administration has already faltered badly. There is serious confusion and hostility in the Arab world and much of the rest of the world over our objectives in going to war.

We face an Arab world where many see us as going to war to seize Iraq's oil, barter deals with the Russians and French, create a new military base to dominate the region, and/or serve Israel's interest. Our lack of clear policy statements has encouraged virtually every negative conspiracy theory possible.

In short, our ultimate intentions in Iraq are already a major issue that vague words cannot deal with. There is a critical need to clarify our intentions in enough detail to show we really will act in the interest of the Iraqi people, to refute the major conspiracy theories that have already developed, and prove we are not a "neo-imperialist" or "occupier." In fact, we need to act as soon as possible.

#### *8. The "UN and the World Doesn't Matter in Shaping the Peace Syndrome"*

We face a massive legal problem that many U.S. studies current ignore. A range of UN resolutions already govern what can and should be done in Iraq, of which "oil for food" is only the most obvious. In the real world, we have only the following options: (a) reject the primacy of the UN and the UNSCR's dealing with oil for food and calling for democracy and human rights in Iraq and create our own plans and structure; (b) rely on the UN to do what it is clearly prepared to do and act for us; and (c) rely on an unpredictable mix of U.S., UN, and NGO institutions we will have to build when and if war comes.

All of these options are bad, but (c) is best and we need to face this fact. We also need to face the fact that we cannot pass our problems on to a non-existent international community that is willing to sweep up after our military parade. We may well get UN and international cooperation but only if we lead and contribute actively. We have to stay as long as it takes, or at least until we can hand a mission over to the Iraqis.

#### *9. The "Democracy Solves Everything Syndrome"*

Broad generalizations about democracy suddenly solving Iraq's problems are mindlessly stupid. Iraq will benefit from added pluralism of the kind already called for in UN resolutions. Moreover, Iraq already has provision for such steps in its existing and draft constitutions. However, the practice in Iraq has been strong men and dictators for nearly half a century. Iraq has no viable political parties, no exile or internal leaders with proven popular legitimacy, and deep ethnic, religious, and tribal/clan divisions.

We also must deal with the different goals and priorities of Iraq's neighbors and the UN. Turkey and Iran will be real constraints on how a future government deals with the Kurds and Shi'ites. This means we already have "non-democratic" priorities. We virtually must enforce territorial integrity, and limit Kurdish autonomy. There will be no valid self-determination or democratic solutions to these issues.

Iraq is not going to become a model government or democracy for years. It faces too many problems in internal power sharing, dealing with regional issues, and developing political parties that can look beyond selfish interests. It faces too many other challenges in terms of developing a rule of law, protecting human rights, and dealing with urgent economic and security issues.

If we try to impose too much of our political system, we will also face growing problems with both Iraqis and the Arab world the moment we try to tell Iraqis how they should govern rather than help them find better solutions. Rather than catalyze other Arab nations to become democratic, we will catalyze Pan-Arab hostility and give the Arab world the impression that we have joined Israel as "occupiers."

#### *10. The "Limited Presence and Peacemaking Syndrome"*

There are U.S. war plans that call for an early U.S. military presence in Kirkuk to ensure that the Kurds do not attempt to seize it and to deter any Turkish movements. It is less clear that the U.S. has clearly tailored plans to occupy Shi'ite areas

in ways that would block Iranian adventures and halt uprisings or efforts at control by Shi'ite factions. There also are some who strongly oppose executing such efforts because of the risk or cost, and who want to avoid a major U.S. military peace-keeping role regardless of the risks.

Some form of clear peacemaking/peacekeeping strategy is vital and past wars provide the lesson that the earlier the U.S. forces are present, the easier the task and the smaller the presence required. In the case of Iraq, this is needed to prevent civil war, halt warlordism, and provide the security needed to rebuild the nation. If it is not done, the alternatives will either be to come in later with much larger resources, or fail in key aspects of shaping the peace.

The U.S. must be prepared from the start to deal with the broader territorial issues—authority over the city of Kirkuk and its environs, shaping their ethnic mix, and control of its key nodes of oil production and distribution. The U.S. must also be prepared to help the Iraqis deal with the constitutional issue—what mix between devolution and centralization will be acceptable to the Arabs and the Kurds alike? (The last time, the issue went to arbitration under the League of Nations mandate, took years and years to resolve, and eventually had to be enforced by the RAF using poison gas. Scarcely the best precedent!)

#### *11. The “Zero-Based Approach to Restructuring Iraq’s Government Syndrome”*

Iraq cannot be treated as an intellectual playground for political scientists or ideologues, and must not be treated as if its people were a collection of white rats that could be pushed through a democratic maze by a bunch of benevolent U.S. soldiers and NGOs. Iraq is a country of 24 million people with a history of more than 80 years. It has a constitution and a draft constitution. It has an existing National Assembly structure, relatively modern legal system, and a history of past autonomy agreements with the Kurds.

Iraq has a strong central structure based on a highly urbanized society. It is critically dependent on food imports and allocating the revenue from oil exports. It has some 23 existing ministries. Some are now tools of repression and must be dismantled or totally rebuilt, but most are vital to running the country. Many of its urban centers and complexes and governates are tailored to local needs. A standardized, cookie cutter approach to local or regional government would fail dismally anywhere in the world. It is a recipe for disaster in Iraq.

There is no Iraqi with real-world experience in governing Iraq in countless largely technical areas vital to the needs of some 24 million people other than the existing structure of government. The courts, the legal system, the lawyers have many flaws, but they are also Iraqi. The rule of law and human rights, and security for the individual, are actually far more important than democracy and they too must be built on the existing Iraqi structure of government.

Yes, we need to work with Iraqis at every level to clean up the existing system. We have to destroy the one existing political party, the Baath, and “de-Saddamize” the existing government while establishing a modern rule of law and reforming the economy. We need to give exiles a role, and not simply exile groups like the INC that have more strength inside the beltway in Washington than anywhere in the borders of Iraq. But, nothing can be zero-based.

#### *12. The “Let’s All Form Another Giant Discussion Group Syndrome”*

Iraq’s mix of internal and external tensions make any slow, bottom-up, or “discussion group”-oriented approach to restructuring power in Iraq a near certain recipe for failure. We don’t have time for time-consuming efforts to create consensus. Cosmetic assemblies and advisory bodies are certain to produce a major backlash.

We may well have to push Iraqis into some new form of power structure within weeks of the end of the fighting. We certainly have no more than months. We don’t have time for long dialogue, although that can be used to adjust the initial arrangements.

We need to take a hard look at Iraq’s existing constitution and draft constitution, and the idea of a constitutional convention and referendum creating a follow-on system has worked elsewhere. This may also allow us to deal with the realities of power struggles by changing Iraq’s current constitution to deal with a tailored form of republic or federalism plus some form of Kurdish-minority rights.

But, we don’t have months in which to get started or more than a year in which to get a new system working. Any peace plan that does not include clear and specific goals from the start, and takes more than six months to get all of the key power sharing arrangements in place, is a failure from the start.

We must find ways to produce rapid power sharing and to reallocate oil wealth and do in ways that emphasize political stability rather than democracy per se. This

is not only a Kurdish issue, it is who will lead the Shi'ites issue, and almost any postwar arrangement will inevitably penalize today's ruling Sunni elite.

*13. The "Let's All Ignore the State's Present Role in the Economy Syndrome"*

More is also involved than governance and human rights. The National Iraqi Oil Company is only the most critical of the many state entities that have to be used to shape and develop the economy. We need to work with Iraqi immediately to clean up the NIOC and other economic institutions that affect development, free up the private sector as much as possible, create an honest Iraqi-based structure for international investment, and put Iraq back on the track to development as soon as possible.

There are very simple issues that must be dealt with immediately, and ideally before the fighting even begins. These include basics like the currency. What will the money be, what will old accounts be worth? How will state salaries and pensions be handled in a de facto command economy where so many depend on the state for income? How will oil for food be handled or replaced at the local level? The functioning of the banking system is equally critical, and is the ability to transfer money in from the outside. Iraq's economy is far too marginal to wait on economic planning and reform. The U.S. must be ready to provide economic reassurance and security from the start.

The economic reform issue is as important as the governance issue. There must be explicit plans to deal with state industry, with a key focus on energy. The issues of freeing up the private sector, encouraging honest foreign investment, dealing with agricultural reform, and creating a body of commercial law are critical.

*14. The "Dismantle the Army and Police Force Syndrome"*

The Revolutionary Guards, the secret police, and other Saddam loyalists are contemptible, but the idea we disband the entire army and security forces and start over with training and ground up new groups is impractical and dangerous.

Many elements of the regular army are nationalist, not pro-Saddam. We don't want 400,000 nationalists in the streets and hostile. We don't want to leave a weak army in service and an angry army in the streets. Germany after World War I showed the impact that can have. By all means clean the army up, clean up the officer corps, provide political training, etc., but leave the professional and competent elements in tact. Leave Iraq with some dignity and co-opt the army rather than destroy it.

Leaving the police in place, after the same purging, is even more important. The first priorities are food and security and then jobs and security. Trying to bring in inexperience mixes of outsiders, training a new police force from the ground up, and recreate a police-legal system interface from the ground up is almost mission impossible in terms of manpower, cost, and timeliness. Cleaning up the existing force is not.

*15. The "Debt and Reparations, Weimar Republic and Let's Make a Deal Syndrome"*

We need to be extremely careful about even a hint that we are bartering away Iraq's post-Saddam future to get political support, and saddling a new regime with hundred of billions of dollars in debt, reparations, and contingency contracts will cripple it, just as we once crippled the Weimar Republic.

We should decide on some policy calling for debt and reparations forgiveness, and the voiding of contingency contracts by the new regime.

*16. The "Oil Income Floats All Boats Syndrome"*

Time for a reality check. The DOE estimates that Iraqi oil export revenues were all of \$14.1 billion in 2001 (including smuggling), out of total exports of all of \$15.8 billion and an economy worth \$28.2 billion in market terms. The GDP is less than one-third of what it was in 1989, and there are two decades of war and sanctions to make up for.

Oil revenues cannot possibly solve all of Iraq's development problems. Real oil wealth per capita will be under 1/10th of its 1980 peak given the rise in population and the drop in oil prices. Oil can still pay for a lot, but not for both rebuilding and development. Consider the following points about Iraq:

- Steady decline in relative wealth since 1982, not 1991; 70% of cut in GDP per capita before Gulf War.
- Massive population growth: 9.1 million in 1970, 22.7 million in 2000 and 36.9 million in 2020. 40% under 15. Unemployment in excess of 25%.
- No longer has oil wealth in relative terms. A little over \$700 per capita today versus over \$6,000 in 1980. See much worse in constant dollars. Around \$23,820 for Saudi in 1980 versus \$2,563 in 2001.

- Dependent on oil for food and “black” sector to operate. Heavily dependent on food imports since late 1970s. Some estimate a 70% dependence on food imports once the economy recovers.
- Medical and educational crisis.
- Many artifacts of a command economy that has been centered around a dictatorship for three decades. Some solid economic institutions but no real market system in terms of distribution, banking, uniform commercial code, insurance, interest.
- Industrial development is weak and has a poor history.
- Oil revenue and development issue is critical, as is sharing revenue, but NIOC has its thugs and killers. Saybolt indicates waterflooding and overpumping; 24 of 73 fields working, and 20-40% of wells at risk.

Yes, money will be a serious problem, particularly if debt and reparations are not forgiven.

*17. The “Disarmament is Quick and Lasting Syndrome”*

We need a clear policy towards Iraq’s military industry and dual use facilities from the start, and we need to understand that a postwar Iraq will exist in a still threatening and proliferating region. Moreover, whatever we get rid of, the human talent and major dual use facilities will remain. Getting rid of nukes also can just push Iraq towards a reliance on biological warfare.

We need both a short term and long term plan to disarm Iraq. The long term plan must include some way to use a combination of UNSCR and national action to limit any risk of future proliferation and possibly some form of U.S. security guarantees to limit the incentive to future regimes to proliferate.

*18. The “No Exit Strategy Syndrome”*

Every past peacemaking effort has shown that an explicit exit strategy is vital. The key in this case is an entry strategy that makes a real peace possible, setting modest and achievable objectives, treating the Iraqis as partners, and leaving when they either want us to leave or are ready to have us leave. It is to avoid any chance of civil war, clearly act in Iraq’s benefit, and plan to leave early rather than late.

*Curing the “Iraq War Peace Syndrome(s)”*

The first step in curing a complex disease like the Iraq War Peace Syndrome(s) is to recognize the nature of the disease. As the previous list shows, this often suggests the cure. The fact remains, however, that we face at least a decade of further instability in the Gulf Region, whether or not we go to war with Iraq, and no matter how well the war goes. Getting rid of Saddam and Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction is an important set of goals if the war goes well. No war, however, can do more than provide a basis for making Iraq somewhat better and then giving the Iraqis control over their own destiny. No outcome of the war can reshape the Gulf or the Middle East.

The idea of instant democratization coming out of the war and spreading throughout the region denies the laws of cause and effect and is ridiculous. So is the idea we know enough about nation building to create an Iraqi United States.

The best we can do is minimize our mistakes and the effect of the law of unintended consequences. To do this requires both realism and commitment. If we rely on miracles and good intentions, or act as occupiers rather than partners, we are almost certain to be far more unhappy on the tenth anniversary of the next war as we were on the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I will ignore momentarily the sub rosa comment of my colleague. Midwest, we will leave it there.

Senator BIDEN. I said it is in Indiana.

Mr. CORDESMAN. As a Chicagoan, Senator, I plead guilty.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

Let me begin another 5-minute round of questioning with our colleagues. I am struck by the difference in the testimony of the two panels. Let me just say, without being defensive with regard to the Under Secretaries of State and Defense, they come here obviously at our request because we think this is very important. Senator Biden and I and other Senators who are here have felt it was im-

portant for a long time. We have really pressed the issue in public comments that we needed to have outlines or some ideas of the plans, which we felt needed to be extensive, describing who was going to be doing it or who would be doing it, who we would work with.

In fairness, the administration has responded with these two excellent public servants. But after they have completed their testimony and been questioned by 13 Senators, we hear from the three of you. Now it seems to me we are getting somewhere. I would say that, starting with the ten points that you made, General Zinni, without necessarily agreeing wholeheartedly, and you would rate them in some way, they are important considerations.

Clearly, we do not have many answers to those ten points, which are raised not really as questions but as considerations if you have success. I hope that I am in error with regard to that, but the thought that we have set up an office in the Department of Defense just 3 weeks ago pulling together interdepartmental people is clearly not on the same pace that all of you have pointed out with regard to our military movements into the area. To the extent that report is any correlation at all, it becomes apparent that whatever is occurring in terms of the planning for what happens after military action, this is way, way behind the curve.

As a matter of fact, many of the questions that you have asked, the three of you, are still not being asked publicly or answered publicly. So one of the values of the hearing was to introduce you to our first panel, or vice versa, so that somewhere in the United States there is some collective wisdom and some sense of history, which some of you have had.

I appreciate especially, General Zinni, you mentioned you have been there before. You thought through these things in 1998. This is not the first time our country or those responsible for CENTCOM have been there. You were. So there is real value in having said that and in having others who are coming up there now at least consult with you, taking your list and working it through as we are attempting to do in our amateur fashion as legislators, as an oversight committee.

So my first hope is that we can help in the coordination in our own government by indicating to the administration, as I do publicly, that what we have heard is not good enough. We are simply way, way behind and this will require accelerated intellectual work and planning.

Now, even after we have done that, we have some of the historical questions Professor Cordesman raises with regard to all the countries around the region. What is to happen to those countries? How is Iraq itself to be defended? We even have the audacious suggestion, finally, that if we are unsuccessful with regard to weapons of mass destruction in the surrounding territory, what do we do about poor Iraq left behind as a country that now we feel exemplifies democracy and freedom, but is not really up to par?

Other countries have solved that problem in the past in a way. We have had a Japanese-American alliance in the Far East for a long time. And even as this committee last week examined North Korea, one of the questions comes up: What if North Korea has weapons and continues to build a stream of them? Let us say they

do not plan to use them, but that is small consolation to the Japanese or even the South Koreans or others in the area, in the same way as terminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will be.

These are very important questions. As you pointed out, there are tribes and dissident sectors in the politics of Iraq now that we really have not gotten to because none of us have been that comprehensive in this committee—maybe some of you have in your scholarship—as to know how many things an administrator will have to do.

Finally, the thought that General Franks cannot do just Iraq; General Franks, CENTCOM, whoever commands that, has a lot of responsibilities. So the question is, Who is in charge? Who is going to be designated in a command chain from the President to the Secretary of Defense to General Franks to there? What will be the chain of command even in our own government? Is this something where the President nominates, or makes several nominations, Assistant Secretaries or whoever in this immediate period, to handle all these civil functions? This includes law and order as fundamental, the boundary integrity, plus all of the problems of adjudication and a legal system that does not exist—and yet must, because of personal security as well as country security.

So I have taken my 5 minutes of questions really simply to make editorial comments. But I am excited about the hearing, about the process at least that still exists in the Congress of raising these questions and having able Americans who are offering us some very substantial answers. You have stimulated this committee and I hope the American people who listen to this hearing.

I turn now to my partner Joe Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. As they say in this business up here, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the chairman.

Fellows, I find myself perplexed. Over the last year roughly, almost year and a half, the President has been generous with his time. He has been patient with me and I suspect, I know, with others. He has had us down, he has had me down alone, he has had the Senator down alone, he has had us down together. And he genuinely is exploring. I believe and I have been saying publicly, not making me the most popular person in the Democratic Caucus, that I believe he has an open mind. I believe he is trying to find the right answers. I believe his instincts are basically good. I do not mean "basically." His instincts are good.

He is obviously a good person. I mean his instincts on what to do in these very difficult decisions he has to make.

The thrust of everything you three have said, with less articulation and less of a base of knowledge, when the President has asked me I have said. And I am sure I am not the only one who has sat with him in the Oval Office, with Dr. Rice, with the Vice President, and gone into these things in some detail.

I know, I have witnessed it with Senator Lugar, I know I am not the only one that has raised these issues. And I walk away wondering, not that he listened, but this is obviously a group of very bright women and men. Secretary Rumsfeld is an incredibly bright, erudite fellow, and he really is. I am not being solicitous. The Vice President is a very bright, hard-nosed guy. Dr. Rice, the Secretary

of State, the two people we heard here today, the No. 2 people—the No. 3 and four, I should say.

And I walk away and I wonder, now why has none of this been done?

Colonel Feil, in any other administration you were in, if you were in the administration, in the Defense Department, I know every commander, general, has to know that these are the questions that have to be answered, whether the same 10, there may be 2, there may be 14. But there is clearly—this is not rocket science, knowing what the problem is.

Why has it not been done? I think it is because—and I would like you to, if you feel free, I mean if you wish to comment, fine; if you do not, I understand. One of you said—I think it was you, general—is it transition or transformation? What is the goal? I think there is a fundamental debate that still exists in this administration, whether it is transition or it is transformation we are committing to.

Because if that debate is settled, then we clearly have, with all the bright people in this administration a much clearer, to use the phrase used by our newest member on this committee, a road map. You know, we would know what road we were going down. Because these questions are so obvious, and the fact that they have not been addressed contemporaneously with the military planning—general, I was with your old military comrades, as I was—as Senator Hagel and I were. He is a military man, Senator Hagel. We were both incredibly impressed, incredibly impressed, with the detail of the planning and the various contingencies about how to conduct this war.

Now, we are smart enough to do that. The idea, professor, we have not addressed these other things is beyond my comprehension. And the only answer I can come up with is not that there are not people who know what they are doing. They are people who have not decided on transition or transformation. My sneaking suspicion is Cheney, Rumsfeld, and company, it is transition. State and the President's occasional comments talk transformation.

I will conclude by saying the only reason why, were the President to ask me, I am inclined to give, quote, "more time" to our U.N. interlocutors has nothing to do with inspections, has nothing to do whether or not we can put 50 times as many inspectors in, whether they are going to find these weapons of mass destruction.

It has to do with we ain't ready yet. We have all the forces there that we need. So I am told, general. You would know better than any of us. We are fully capable of executing the first phase of this operation. How much or how little bloodshed, how much damage we politically as well as militarily have to take is a question. But the reason why, if I were the President, I would be "rope-a-doping" a little bit here and slowing up my deployment and making sure that I talked more with the French about whether there is more inspectors or whether there is not, knowing it is malarkey, is that every one of you said directly or implied if this is not contemporaneously undertaken, if the moment the gun goes off, general, and the first missile, plane, troop flies we do not know darn well what those things, colonel, you talked about and, professor, you talked about, which I will not go into detail because my time is up, unless

they are decided upon at the front end it seems to me this is a prescription for losing, losing overall, having our interests overall a year from now being more in jeopardy in the world and the region than they are now, even though he may be gone.

Because I always ask the rhetorical question when the President says—and God love him, he makes these speeches, and some of them are really good and some of them I walk away scratching my head—when he makes these speeches and others do as well that somehow this is going to answer or make us any safer, taking down Saddam in the near term, from al-Qaeda, from terrorist attacks.

If the Lord Almighty came and sat right down where the photographers used to sit and said, look, folks, guarantee you this will all be done, done quickly and done fine, are we not going to still be on orange alert in this country? And by the way, if the rationale as Mr. Feith offered, in part in fairness to him, was, look, this guy you have to understand has been helping these Palestinians, the road to peace in terms of the—the extreme Palestinians—the road to peace rests in getting rid of this guy, let me tell you: the Iranians make him look like an amateur, the Syrians make him look like a bumbler.

What trouble he has caused with Israel in the Middle East is infinitesimal in my view compared—and he does cause trouble—is infinitesimal compared to the trouble that the Iranians, the Syrians, and others in the region have caused. So is the prescription meaning, once we do that, now we have got to do Syria and Iran?

I just think that we are not ready right now, we are not ready right now. And it worries the devil out of me, unless, unless, the administration knows something none of you know, I can tell by your testimony because I have heard you guys, and something we do not know, that they do have a plan, they are ready to go. I did not get any real sense of—I did not get any real warm feeling from the two who testified before, who are fine men on limited, on short leashes, who are trying to declassify.

So I cannot thank you enough for your testimony. Hopefully it will be sober enough to wake some people up and figure out we have got to get these decisions made contemporaneous, contemporaneous with the execution of force.

I used up my more than 5 minutes, again not with a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I too add my thanks to the three of you.

I think both the chairman and our former chairman spoke directly to the value of having the three of you up here and the presentations that you have made. I wish all senior members of this administration could have, and maybe they did, listen to what you had to say, and I know we will have a record of your testimony.

But everything that Senators Lugar and Biden said in regard to your testimony I agree with. It is not and never has been a question of whether Saddam Hussein can be rehabilitated. He is a threat. He is a problem. But it is more to the point of each of your testimony, not only as to, as you said, General Zinni, the end State—and Senator Biden spoke to that just a few minutes ago—

what it is that we wish to accomplish, how do we wish to accomplish it, with whom, all the questions that you have laid out.

And I would make one additional comment before I ask each of you to respond to a question. As I listened to the three of you and Senators Biden and Lugar, I was struck once again with, as we went around the horseshoe here the last 3 hours with 13 Senators asking these two very dedicated, bright public servants to explain the administration's policy, I was struck with how many times when the question was asked or references should have been used to what is the purpose, what is the point of attacking Iraq or replacing Saddam Hussein, very few times was there any reference to force Saddam Hussein to comply with 17 U.N. resolutions that he has been guilty of violating since 1991.

On the one hand that is a stated objective publicly by the administration as to what we are about here. But as we went around the horseshoe we had variations as to what the point is. As Senator Biden pointed out, Secretary Feith talked about essentially some believe that the Middle East peace process is through Baghdad, and there were other variations of this. I do not happen to believe that, but nonetheless what it says and what it reflects very clearly on is what Professor Cordesman talked about as well, public diplomacy, explaining our purpose, explaining our intent, explaining our use of power.

We have not only not answered the tough questions that you three have put forward, but I think we are still rather murky in explaining to America and the world what we are about to do and why it is important.

Now, you have all laid out the questions, the concerns. I would ask the three of you to give this committee your thoughts on how we should proceed from here, assuming that the three of you agree that Saddam is in violation of 17 U.N. resolutions and assuming the three of you agree that he needs to be dealt with some way. Maybe that is a leap of assumptions here, but I think I understand where the three of you are.

But it would be helpful if the three of you would give us your process, how you think we should move forward to deal with Saddam Hussein. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Good question.

General ZINNI. Well, Senator Hagel, I think obviously we are going down this path. The first thing I would say, which has been said before, we need the international community and preferably we need to work under international agencies and institutions in much of what is described here, because the military piece and the security piece is not going to be the important part of all this. It is necessary, but not the most important.

What would worry me is, I can look at Tommy Franks and his mustering of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and I think everybody, including the two Senators who went out there, have complete confidence in that aspect of this. I would hope you did. But where is the counterpart economic, political, humanitarian, and recovery?

If it is just a small group in the Pentagon, by the way led by a very able individual in Jay Garner—I have the greatest respect for him. We were together in northern Iraq. But a planning cell, an

interagency planning cell at the Pentagon—now, my career is deficient in that I never served a tour there, but it does not do anything for me on the ground.

Where is the CENTCOM counterpart to a political organization that is going to come in? I think the two Secretaries this morning talked about political committees, judicial committees. They are necessary. In the early days of Somalia with Ambassador Bob Oakley and others when we had a degree of success, these had to be in place. But you need manpower and organization and structure and authority and resources to make this work.

If you are going to go in and assume responsibilities—I will just take a small thing, a small item, but it may point out how significant something could be. This morning these two Secretaries mentioned that 60 percent of the Iraqi people eat off the Oil for Food Program. There are 40,000 feeding stations there. Now, option one, best case, all those—and Saddam's government runs these feeding stations—they stay in place, nothing happens to them, the warehouses are sound and they continue to pump food. Good news, path one.

Path two, no, that half of them run away, some of the warehouses are destroyed. And then you could eventually get yourself to path three, 40,000 feeding stations are abandoned, destroyed, disrupted, and you have got to create 40,000 feeding stations from nothing. Who does that?

We talked about NGOs. These NGOs are a disparate collection of people that operate on their own with different charters, different motivations. Who pulls them together? Is there a humanitarian operations center under somebody from the U.N. or somewhere that is going to coordinate their efforts? Are we going to find them all in the Shia area and none in the Sunni area? And who fills in the blanks?

We need structure, we need organization, we need lines of authority. The tasks are out there. All the books that we can pick up, the work that people like Tony Cordesman have done, the CFR, have identified what has to be done. I do not doubt that the problem has been scoped. There is a bracket. There is the 2-year plan, which I doubt seriously, and there is the 10-year plan, which I will tell you is more realistic.

But the tasks to be performed there, and the it-depends answer is whether the 40,000 feeding stations are up and running or they are totally destroyed or something in between, that can all be mapped out, to use the phrase that Senator Coleman mentioned. But the problem is who is going to do it, where are they? You know, if you have hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground formed up into divisions and wings and task forces at sea, where is the counterpart on these other sides? It is not going to be a handful of people that drive out of the Pentagon, catch a plane, and fly in after the military piece to try to pull this together.

I mean, that is what I think the next step is.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

May I ask the other two to respond as well, Mr. Chairman, to that, to my question, if I could?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, briefly if you can.

Colonel FEIL. Briefly let me take a slightly different tack from General Zinni and talk about some operational things. I think that the previous panel got into the area where everything is all connected and so therefore when one thing is solved and then everything else will tumble and we will be able to connect everything else. I think there is a different way to separate some of these issues that flow from a central decision about what the goal is, that could be separated into things that are unknown and we are waiting for a decision and those things we have to set aside, things that we know we are going to have to do, and those things we can get on with right now.

I would harken back to the first panel: the issue of justice. They have a committee that has rewritten or is in the business of rewriting a justice code in Arabic, 600 pages. You can run the numbers that are based on previous historical experience about the population, the size of the police force, and how many police monitors you need. If they have a code, we should be out working with the international community right now to recruit, organize and train the police monitors that will help provide the local security and the community security that will alleviate the military of the burden of having to escort school children, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

Those sorts of things are more in the science of this business than the art of it. Those things I think, many of those things can be approached now. The other ones may have to be put in a box that flows from having a resolution of the central decision.

Mr. CORDESMAN. Let me say very briefly, I do not believe we are going to transform Iraq. We may start that process. There is no chance in hell that we will finish it. It takes too long to change a society and a country of 22 million people. What you can do is give them the opportunity to sustain change.

I think some of these issues were touched on this morning, but the first thing you have to do if you want to have nation-building is to provide security throughout the country, and that means going into the major cities, to the various regions, with some kind of teams which will maintain order right away. We saw in Afghanistan what happens when you do not do that, and we will probably pay for it with failure in our effort to create a stable Afghanistan.

You need food and you need to deal with currency. You need to provide immediate crude economic stability, and restoring the monetary and banking system rank with food, water, and security.

There are 23 ministries, and 6 are problem ministries that will need immediate reform. There are some 18 provinces, and about 30 major regional areas. I hope we have civil and military teams to go into each one very, very quickly. The minute we do, we are going to have to make those teams work with Iraq, who govern while we screen. You do not screen first, reorganize, and change.

I cannot think of anything more disastrous than a bunch of American political scientists wandering into a different country, who do not speak the language except in somebody else's theories, and attempting basically to change Iraq. It is a little like trying to sculpture an iceberg with the prow of the Titanic. It just is not going to work.

So the question is how do you get as many Iraqis helping as quickly as possible. Whether it is an assembly or a constitutional

convention, we need to have a forum to allow the Iraqis to work out how they can create a Federal system for power-sharing, dealing with problems like revenues, and getting to be more pluralistic, a republic.

I always hate the misuse of the word "democracy." Gentlemen, we do not live in a "democracy." None of our Founding Fathers would have made that mistake, and the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States are so fundamentally anti-democratic as to oppose the principle in every way. We have a sharing of power, responsibility, political parties, checks and balances, not a democracy. What we do in Iraq has to be to create that kind of system on their terms, not a democracy, which has never been a successful form of government anywhere in the world.

There are issues like debt and reparations forgiveness. We cannot burden this new Iraqi Government with what is in excess of several hundred billion dollars worth of current and potential obligations. Again, remember the Weimar Republic. To have any money to deal with social needs and change, that must be one of our highest priorities and to have that forgiven.

Finally, if the Iraqi's are to have any cash-flow, we have to go in and deal with the oil fields, oil revenues, and oil exports immediately. The lowest figure I have seen to fix the oil fields is \$7 billion. The Iraqis, incidentally, have talked \$36 billion for 3.5 of sustained million barrels per day.

Senator Biden, let me just make a last point. Until we go in this country and survey what are actually the problems there, we will not really know what we are doing. Nobody in Iraq knows. Any plan will be the first casualty of engagement with reality.

It is important to have people who can go in and deal with that flexibility. Let us remember there have been no Americans who have been in Iraq in 12 years. There are very few who ever were in Iraq.

There are no NGOs which have really worked with this scale of problem and most of them are tied up in other parts of the world and their issue and focus is humanitarian. There is nothing in the United Nations structure which says we can make this job "international." Oil for Food really does not run anything. The allocation is done by computer by the Iraqis, and that is the only substantive part of the U.N. that prepares us.

So either we do the job, and assume the responsibility for it with limited international aid, or it simply does not get done.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the hour is ticking on.

I think Professor Cordesman said the issue here is the practical and, to use a cliche, you have to do a cost-benefit analysis of where we are going. It seems to me that, yes, Saddam Hussein is a murderous tyrant, but we have those around the world, Charles Taylor in Liberia, but the difference you might say is that Saddam Hussein is a threat to us. And I for one have not been convinced of that and therefore have questions about the direction we are going in.

I would like to hear you comment on a cost-benefit analysis considering everything we have heard here this morning. Is Saddam Hussein a threat to us?

Mr. CORDESMAN. Let me, if I may, say I believe that he is. I found—or I have watched Iraq—I first was there in 1973—change from a country with immense potential to one which under Saddam Hussein fought a really bloody, murderous war with the Kurds after the Algiers Accords in 1975. It was one of the most unpleasantly ruthless campaigns imaginable.

He purged the country in 1979—

Senator CHAFEE. I know the time is ticking down. To us, to Americans?

Mr. CORDESMAN. Ultimately, there are 60 percent of the world's oil reserves in this area. You have a revenge-oriented dictator who will not stop proliferating. The most you will ever get out of U.N. inspection, frankly, is a delay or a pause before this man reasserts himself and tries to take revenge.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, professor.

General ZINNI. Senator, I do not believe he is an imminent threat to us. I think he is a threat. He threatens to destabilize the region, left unchecked. But he is very well checked. He could develop the kinds of threats that could directly affect us.

My problem is not in dealing with him militarily. My problem is in timing. Everything we are talking about here—the use of the military, the cost and the resources, the potential destabilization of the region, distraction from other priorities—this is in my view the worst time to take this on and I do not feel it needs to be done now. I do feel he needs to be dealt with, though.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, general.

Colonel FEIL. Sir, I would agree more with Professor Cordesman. I think in the medium term, I think he is a threat. I think that, to General Zinni's point and back to the planning issue, my discussions with NGOs and government agencies, the lack of planning for Iraq has caused some of the problems that we have got in Afghanistan, simply because organizations behave organizationally. They withhold resources until they know what the downstream requirements are. And Afghanistan just continues to trundle along. With an answer to the question that would apply resources to Iraq, they would have a better idea about what they could devote to Afghanistan.

But I think that Saddam is a medium-term threat.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, because of the lateness of the hour I will just ask quickly. I would like to just followup what General Zinni had said and with his stature as being in the middle of the Middle East peace negotiations. So is this a fair characterization of your opinion: Saddam Hussein is a problem, he has got to be dealt with, but one of the aspects right now of your concern in doing it now is the spillover into the volatility of the Middle East?

General ZINNI. Yes, sir, one of them. There are many others.

Senator NELSON. Do we expect that Iran in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would try to exert influence through the Shi'ite population?

General ZINNI. Yes, I believe Iran is going to see itself surrounded. We have relationships in the Caspian military to military.

We have troops in Afghanistan. We are creating—we have naval forces in the gulf and in the Indian Ocean. We are now about ready to put troops into Iraq. It looks like you are surrounded if you are an Iranian hard-liner.

Senator NELSON. So it would not be surprising then to see Iran try to stir up trouble in an occupied Iraq through the Shi'ites?

General ZINNI. Iran gets a two-fer here: One, they get rid of Iraq as a major threat by us getting in there; and they can deal with us by ensuring that we have a lot of trouble and problems that discredit us in the region if they can generate that in there. So they deal with Iraq and they deal with us if they can generate those kinds of problems, and they could generate them, not directly in just Iraq, but what they do to support terrorist groups that are operating in the Palestinian territories and in Israel, to try to draw them in.

The worst image, my worst nightmare, would be on Al-Jazeera TV a picture of American troops in combat fighting Iraqis at the same time the IDF is on the West Bank and in Gaza in incursions as a reaction to some sort of suicide bombing or worse and the images show Israelis and Americans killing Arabs. If I were an Iranian or an al-Qaeda or Hamas or Jihad, I would be wanting to generate that at the moment that we go in, and the effect in the region can be disastrous.

Senator NELSON. And if the Iranians really wanted to give us fits, that is what they would do, is stir up those groups such as Hezbollah so that the Americans would have it on two fronts.

General ZINNI. Well, the Iranian hard-liners are in trouble internally. They are seeing their own internal revolution come about. They need to do something to stop that momentum and to distract it. Nothing better than a common enemy and to mobilize, what Tony Cordesman mentioned, the natural feelings in terms of the Arab-Israeli and U.S. involvement. This is a chance for them to regain the initiative of the revolution.

What Tony said was a very important point and would cause me to disagree with what Secretary Feith said today. By changing the government in Iraq, you do not change the attitude on these issues with the people. You know, you are not. And no one can succeed in governance by having this sort of pro-American, pro-Israeli or reasonable approach to the Israelis in this environment today. So we would doom anybody that comes in with this idea. They may pander to us and say they have it; they will not last long in a leadership position with that attitude, because that is not the mood of the region right now.

Mr. CORDESMAN. Senator, could I make just one comment? I think everything General Zinni said is true. But there is one ameliorating factor: The Shi'ites of Iran are not Shi'ites first. They are Arabs. They are deeply divided. There are mixed tribes and clans within the area. Many of them are secular. They have a long history of internal divisions along class and economic and community lines. They differ with the Iranians on a number of aspects of religious practices.

So Iran's leverage in parts at least of the Shi'ite areas, probably even the majority, is more limited than it may appear. But that does not mean it is not a threat, as General Zinni pointed out.

Senator NELSON. And an additional threat, Mr. Chairman, perhaps that some of these groups that would be stirred up by Iran are also resident in the United States in some substantial numbers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Let me just make a summary comment that we have demonstrated again how many problems the United States has if you are a foreign policy person, or President of the United States. These may not have been obvious prior to September 11. Perhaps this triggered awareness on the part of the Senate, the people, everybody, that there are a lot of problems out in the world and a good number have been moving on for quite a long while. We may have been oblivious, now that we think of public diplomacy, of hundreds of millions of people in the Near East or the Middle East. But we are aware of them now.

My only hope would be that, even though there are so many problems, this would not deter Americans from trying to solve any of them. Some of the logic that I hear in the debate is to suggest that when people are asked in polls whether Iraq is more of a problem than North Korea, al-Qaeda, whatever else somebody thinks of, perhaps the Israeli-Palestinian thing, you can get a real division of opinion. Finally, some come to the conclusion that they are all problems and all insoluble. That, as Americans, we really find unacceptable.

So I appreciate the spirit of your testimony today. Although you have differing viewpoints about the urgency of dealing with Saddam Hussein or Iraq, none of you has argued that we ought to be oblivious to this. And furthermore, you have offered at least some guidelines that, if it is finally the will of our government to proceed either with the United Nations, or with a coalition of the willing, that there are some things we need to do very swiftly if we are to have some measure of success and some modesty with regard to how much is achievable in the process.

So I thank you for the wisdom and the thoughtfulness with which you have approached that, as well as your lifetimes of service to our country.

I thank all members for their constancy and all who have witnessed 4 hours and 10 minutes of hearings on the future of Iraq. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

